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1 Introduction
1 Introduction1
1.1 Opening Remarks
Head of State who commits murder and other grave crimes is chargeable with all the 
evils, all the horrors, of the war; all the effusions of blood, the desolation of families, 
the rapine, the violence, the revenge, the burnings, are his works and his crimes. He 
is guilty towards the enemy, of attacking, oppressing, massacring them without cause, 
guilty towards his people, of drawing them into acts of injustice, exposing their lives 
without necessity, without reason, towards that part of his subjects whom the war 
ruins, or who are great sufferers by it, of losing their lives, their fortune, or their 
health. Lastly, he is guilty towards all mankind, of disturbing their quiet, and setting 
a pernicious example.2 
Under traditional international law governed by the concept of state sovereignty, 
any alleged responsibility for international wrongdoings used to be attributed to the 
State alone.3 Indeed, the role of an individual in traditional international law was 
1 This book is based on my LLM thesis submitted to the University of Wales Aberystwyth, 
rewritten and updated as of 12 October 2013. Select parts of this work contain mate-
rial that was published in K. Novotna (Uhlirova), ‘Relationship between Crimes under 
International Law and Immunities: Coexistence or Exclusion?’ in K. M. Sinha (ed.), 
International Criminal Law and Human Rights (New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt., 
2010); K. Novotna (Uhlirova), Legal Basis for the Establishment of International and 
Hybrid Criminal Courts and its Impact on Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 
Days of Law Proceedings (Brno: Tribun EU, 2009).
2 E. de Vattel, quoted in Q. Wright, ‘The Legal Liability of the Kaiser’, 13 American 
Political Science Review 20 (1919), pp. 120, 126, available at http://www.amnesty.org/
es/library/asset/EUR45/001/1999/es/5dd2ca8b-e35a-11dd-a06d-790733721318/eu-
r450011999en.html (last visited 27 April 2010). 
3 See, e.g. R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (London: Long-
man, 1992), pp. 5-7. See also Koskenniemi, who suggests that: “international law funda-
mentally is a European tradition derived from a desire to rationalize society through law.” 
He however concludes that “the fact that international law is a European language does 
not even slightly stand in the way of its being capable of expressing something universal.” 
In M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Beetween Tradition and Renewal’, 16 
European Journal of International Law (2005), pp. 113-114 and M. Koskenniemi, The 
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marginalized. This position of an individual in international law began to change 
from the 20th century. Responsibility of individuals for breaches of international law 
started to be addressed in a  relatively new body of international law: international 
criminal law.4 
Admittedly, “criminal law in general, and international criminal law in particular, 
will never be a panacea for the ills of the world.”5 Nevertheless, international criminal 
law is designed to punish ‘extraordinary’ as opposed to ‘ordinary’ crimes.6 It should 
therefore aspire to show that as “those who bear the greatest responsibility”7 attempt 
to place themselves beyond the reach of law, “the law adapts to bring them back 
within its grasp.”8
International criminal law qualifies certain types of conduct as crimes under 
international law9 incurring individual criminal responsibility. In this context, the 
20th century witnessed rapid development of various international and hybrid judicial 
mechanisms for prosecution of individuals who commit these crimes. What if the 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001).
4 For a useful history, see T. L. H. McCormack, ‘From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee, 
the Evolution of an International Criminal law Regime’ in T. L. H. McCormack and 
G. J. Simpson (eds.), The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p. 31. 
5 P.  Sands, From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.71. 
6 International criminal law is said to expresses something universal, which is deeply rooted 
in moral philosophy - condemnation of acts of (in Arendt’s phrasing) ‘extreme evil’. See 
A. M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 182.
7 The term is used in the SCSL Statute as guidance for the court regarding its personal 
jurisdiction. See Article 1 (1) of the Statute, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=70 (last visited 16 August 2013).
8 Sands, supra note 5. 
9 The term crimes under international law will be used interchangeably with the terms 
international crimes and core crimes. Previously, the International Law Commission 
(ILC) used to refer to the term “international crimes” in connection with state 
responsibility. Although the ILC made clear that use of this term does not imply state 
criminal responsibility, it nevertheless raised some concerns and the ILC rather “decided 
to abandon this terminology in favour of a more neutral one” when dealing with issue of 
state responsibility for the most serious international wrongdoings. In B. I. Bonafe, The 
Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p. 11. See also J. Crawford, ‘Fourth Report 
on State Responsibility’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517, paras. 48-49. 
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proceedings are initiated against Head of State or other high-ranking state officials? 
On the one hand, the principle of individual criminal responsibility for crimes under 
international law is firmly established.10 On the other hand, the enforcement of this 
principle can, in some circumstances, be frustrated by operation of another well 
established principle, immunity of Head of State based largely on the notions of 
sovereign equality of States.11 
Traditionally, Heads of State were not subject to the jurisdiction of national courts 
for whatever acts they may committed and there were no international courts which 
would have jurisdiction over Heads of State. Until recently, the immunity of high-
ranking state officials who engaged in commission of such crimes was absolute, based 
on traditional rules safeguarding the sovereignty of States.12 Indeed, immunities have 
ancient roots and the international law of immunities extends back “not hundreds, 
but thousands, of years,”13 as opposed to international criminal law, which is relatively 
recent and not yet uniform body of law.
Nevertheless, the interests of the international community in the maintenance 
of effective and smooth functioning of international relations between states are 
being increasingly confronted with the interests of bringing alleged perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice. These two interests are fulfilling different functions 
of international law. Which interest should prevail if the accused is a Head of State? 
10 For the purposes of this work, these crimes include: war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. See also Principle 2 of The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 
which reads: 1. For purposes of these Principles, serious crimes under international 
law include (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes 
against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture. The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction, Princetown University, 2001, available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/
hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf (last visited 10 September 2013).
11 Immunities under international public law are conceptually different from immunities 
based on domestic law. This work will be limited to the discussion of immunities under 
international public law. See C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core 
International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008), pp. 
263–357.
12 A. Cassese, ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against 
International Criminality’, in C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. Kleffner (eds.), 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia and Kosovo 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
13 R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 531. 
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It is apparent that judgments of the last years of both international and national 
courts in the context of immunity have turned on whichever of these two divergent 
interests prevails for judges.14 Different approaches adopted by judges well characterize 
this tension of interests and the outcome depends to a large extent on the legal basis of 
the respective court (i.e. national versus international court) and on the status of the 
high-ranking official (i.e. former or incumbent official).15 
Various cases regarding the issue of the immunity of high-ranking officials have 
reached both national and international courts in the past years. Following (non-
exhaustive) list of cases serves as an illustration of the increasing frequency in attempts 
to institute prosecutions for international crimes. Main examples include former 
or incumbent Heads of State and other high-ranking officials: Manuel Noriega16 
(Panama), Augusto Pinochet17 (Chile), Fidel Castro18 (Cuba), Bouterse19 (Suriname), 
Ariel Sharon20 (Prime Minister of Israel), Slobodan Milosevic21 (the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia), Hissene Habre22 (Chad), Muammar Gaddafi23 (Libya), Fidel Castro 
14 Chatham House, ‘Immunity for Dictators?’ A summary of discussion at the International 
Law Programme Discussion Group (9 September 2004).
15 R. Cryer, ‘A  ‘Special Court’ for Sierra Leone?’ 50 International and Comparative Law 
Quaterly 435 (2001).
16 United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.Fla.1990), and The United States 
v. Manuel Antonio Noriega, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Nos.92-
4687; 96-4471, 7 July 1997.
17 R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 61 
(H.L. 1998) (Pinochet I); R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet II); R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet III).
18 Castro (1999) 32 ILM 596.
19 Petition numbers R 97/163/12 Sv and R 97/176/12 Sv, Decision of 20 November 2000. 
See also L. Zegvled, ‘The Bouterse Case’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 32 
(2001), pp. 97–118.
20 Case against Ariel Sharon and Amos Yaron, in response to Note by Michele Hirsh, Etat 
d’Israel. Decision of the Investigating Magistrate, Patrick Collignon, Court of First 
Instance, Brussels, Dossier No. 56/01, 18 June 2001.
21 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary 
Motions, 8 November 2001.
22 Cour de Cassation du Senegal (Premiere chambre statuant en matiere penale), Aff. 
Habre, Arret n. 14, 20 March 2001.
23 Chambre Criminelle, Frech Supreme Court, Criminal Division, Paris, Arret n. 1414, 13 
March 2001, Gaz. Pal. (2001), 2, somm. See also Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed 
Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-
01/11-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 27 
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(Cuba), Laurent Gbagbo24 (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire), Uhuru Kenyatta25 (Republic 
of Kenya), Omar Al Bashir26 (Sudan), Charles Taylor27 (Liberia), Abdulaye Yerodia 
Ndombasi28 (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
or Jean Kambanda29 (Prime Minister of Rwanda). 
As noted by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir, it is therefore clear that, “...
there has been an increase in Head of State prosecutions by international courts in 
the last decade...Subsequent to 14 February 2002, international prosecutions against 
Charles Taylor, Muammar Gaddafi, Laurent Gbagbo and the present case show that 
initiating international prosecutions against heads of state have gained widespread 
 
 
June 2011. Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate 
the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 22 November 2011.
24 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Warrant Of Arrest For 
Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 23 November 2011.
25 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimimuthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali, case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012. See also Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, 8 March 2011. 
26 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of 
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2008. Compare with the statement 
made by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn at a summit of African 
Union (the Assembly of the African Union meets at the level of Heads of States and 
Governments), attended by Kenyan President Kenyatta and Sudan President Omar al-
Bashir. Hailemariam Desalegn stated that it was unanimously agreed that “no charge 
shall be commenced, or continued, before any international court or tribunal against 
any serving head of state or government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such 
a capacity ... during his or her term in office”, available at http://news.yahoo.com/au-
icc-cannot-prosecute-sitting-head-state-145354234.ht (last visited 30 September 2013). 
See also D. Akande, ‘Is the Rift between Africa and the ICC Deepening? Heads of States 
Decide Not to Cooperate with ICC on the Bashir Case’, 4 July 2009, available at http://
www.ejiltalk.org/is-the-rift-between-africa-and-the-icc-deepening-heads-of-states-
decide-not-to-cooperate-with-icc-on-the-bashir-case/ (last visited 23 October 2011).
27 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004. 
28 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 14 February 2002, 
I.C.J. 21, (the Yerodia case).
29 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 
1998. 
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recognition as accepted practice.”30 Yet, how far can international law develop in this 
field when there is also significant State practice that opposes such developments?
The Taylor case is a  fascinating one, and contains many points of major legal 
interest. This work focuses on, and is therefore limited in its scope to, the issue of 
immunity of Taylor for his crimes committed while in the office. In particular, the 
central issue of this work is whether Taylor as an incumbent President of Liberia at 
the time of issuance of the indictment was entitled to claim immunity before the 
SCSL. This inquiry inevitably leads to the assessment of the legal basis of the SCSL, 
which was established by a bilateral treaty between the Republic of Sierra Leone and 
the United Nations (UN). 
It may be seen as unnecessary to examine the denial of immunity to Taylor once 
the final judgment was pronounced.31 However, the issue of denial of immunity 
is far from settled and as will be argued, the SCSL decision unfortunately did not 
contribute to the clarification of principles governing immunities. As the long and 
non-exhaustive list of high-ranking state officials above indicates, the issue of the 
immunity for crimes under international law definitely deserves further attention and, 
given the significance of this issue for current and future prosecutions of other high-
ranking state officials, its examination is anything but academic.
The topicality and practical importance of this issue can be supported, inter alia, 
by the recent developments before the ICC. The ICC issued arrest warrants against 
Al Bashir (President of Sudan), Muammar Gaddafi32 (then acting as the de facto Head 
of State of Libya),33 and may, in the future, issue an arrest warrant against Bashar 
30 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi 
to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the 
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 December 2011, para. 39. 
See also Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Non-compliance 
of the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding 
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, 13 December 2011, para. 
39 (in French).
31 The Appeals Chamber of the SCSL upheld Taylor’s conviction only few days before 
submitting this work to a publisher. 
32 On the issue of extradition of Gaddafi to The Hague after the arrest warrant was issued 
by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, see also K. Uhlířová, ‘Haag: zatykač na  libyjského 
vůdce Kaddáfího’, pořad ČT 24, 27 June 2011, available at http://www.ct24.cz/vysila
ni/2011/06/27/211411058300627-15:05-studio-ct24/ (last visited 10 July 2012).
33 Questions and Answers in the case of The Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu 
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al-Assad (President of Syria).34 None of these three countries are parties to the Rome 
Statute35 and the referral of these situations (i.e. Sudan and Libya) to the ICC by the 
UN Security Council has already raised difficult legal issues regarding the entitlement 
to immunity of serving Heads of States not parties to the Rome Statute.36 These 
challenging legal issues include, on the one hand, an obligation to grant immunity 
ratione personae to a sitting Head of State under customary international law and, on 
the other hand, denial of immunity under treaty law (i.e. the interplay between Articles 
27 and 98 of the Rome Statute)37 and connected questions such as the obligation of 
cooperation with the ICC, execution of arrest warrants by state parties and non-state 
parties to the Rome Statute38 and legal nature of Security Council referrals to the ICC 
and its implications for immunities.39 
Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, 27 June 2011, p.  3, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/Q-Gaddafi-Eng.pdf (last visited 10 August 
2013). 
34 On 14 January 2012, Switzerland coordinated the efforts of 57 UN Member States 
to petition the UN Security Council to refer the current crisis in Syria to the ICC for 
investigation and possible prosecution. See “Fifty-Seven Countries Call for Referral of 
the Syria Situation to the ICC: analysis of the merits of the referral and concerns as to its 
implementation”, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/14/fifty-seven-countries-
call-for-referral-of-the-syria-situation-to-the-icc-analysis-of-the-merits-of-the-referral-
and-concerns-as-to-its-implementation/ (last visited 20 February 2012). 
35 The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, which established the ICC. The Rome Statute 
came into force in 9 July 2002 following the 60th ratification.
36 The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, can refer a specific 
situation “in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed” to 
the Prosecutor. See Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. This mechanism can trigger the 
jurisdiction of the ICC without consent of the concerned State (which is not a party to 
the Rome Statute). For deeper discussion see, V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship 
between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, Graduate Institute 
of International Studies, Weltpolitik (2001), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
intljustice/icc/crisis/2001relationship.htm (last visited 17 February 2008). See also D. 
Jacobs, ‘A Sad Hommage to Antonio Cassese: The ICC’s confused pronouncements on 
State Compliance and Head of State Immunity’, 15 December 2011, available at http://
dovjacobs.blogspot.cz/2011/12/sad-hommage-to-antonio-cassese-iccs.html (last visited 
16 July 2013).
37 For comments on the interplay of Articles 27 and 98, see e.g. D. Akande, ‘ICC Issues 
Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (...At long Last...) But Gets the Law Wrong’, 
EJIL Talk, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-on-bashir’s-
immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/ (last visited 25 May 2013). 
38 See e.g. P. Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 7 (2) (2009), pp. 315-332.
39 D. Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact 
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As will become apparent below, the SCSL dealt with similar issues in the Taylor 
case, obviously in a different context and legal settings. It remains to be examined 
whether the decision in Taylor can be taken as a well-reasoned decision, which properly 
reflects and clarifies current rules governing immunities. As regards its possible impact 
beyond the Taylor case, the ICC has indeed already taken an opportunity to refer to 
this decision. Namely, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir case (Malawi and 
Chad decisions) held that Malawi (and Chad) failed to comply with the cooperation 
requests with respect to the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir.40 In summary, the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Malawi decision found that: “…customary international 
law creates an exception to Head of State immunity when international courts seek 
a Head of State’s arrest for the commission of international crimes. There is no conflict 
between Malawi’s obligations towards the Court and its obligations under customary 
international law; therefore, article 98(1) of the Statute does not apply.”41 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber supported its findings in the Malawi decision also by 
the reasoning of the SCSL in Taylor, where the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL held 
that “the principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does 
not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal 
tribunal or court” and further explained that “…the principle of state immunity derives 
from the equality of sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international 
criminal tribunals which are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the 
international community.”42 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber adopted this reasoning and 
concluded that irrelevance of immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State 
before international courts “is equally applicable to former or sitting Heads of States 
not Parties to the Statute whenever the Court may exercise jurisdiction.”43
Nonetheless, the problem is that neither the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir 
nor the SCSL in Taylor supported their reasoning by adequate State practice and/or 
corresponding opinio juris.44 Their decisions are problematic and poorly reasoned, not 
on Al Bashir’s Immunities’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 (2) (2009), pp. 
333-352. 
40 Malawi decision, supra note 30.
41 Ibid., para. 43.
42 Malawi decision, supra note 30, para. 35, quoting Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, 
Case No. SCSL-2003-l-AR72(E), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 
2004, paras. 51-52.
43 Malawi decision, supra note 30, para. 36 (emphasis added).
44 Similar approach was again taken by the ICC Pre-Trail Chamber I in the Gaddafi case: 
“consistent with its findings in the Al Bashir Case, the official position of an individual, 
whether he or she is a  national of a  State party or of a  State which is not party to 
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supported by any thorough legal analysis. It seems that immunity was assumed rather 
than established. The weakness of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber reasoning in Al Bashir, 
also in connection with Taylor, was well illustrated by Akande:
[…T]he precedents referred to by the Pre-Trial Chamber do not establish that the 
Head of a  State not party to (or not bound) by the instruments establishing an 
international tribunal will not be immune from the jurisdiction of that tribunal. 
Moreover, the ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case does not say this either. The 
ICJ only stated that foreign ministers may be subject to criminal proceeding in 
certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction. The only precedent that 
makes the point the Pre-Trial Chamber makes is the decision of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in the Charles Taylor case. But the logic of that decision is just as flawed 
as that of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber.45 
1.2 General Plan: Methodology and Structure 
From a methodological point of view, this work examines interplay of two different 
areas of law, namely international criminal law and its influence on international law 
immunities. All the above-mentioned developments, recently mainly before the ICC, 
“have triggered a vigorous international legal debate about the status of immunities”.46 
This work steps into the current debate and aims to contribute to clarifications of 
rules on immunity in relation to rules on individual criminal responsibility in modern 
international law. In particular, it focuses on the legal challenges faced by the SCSL 
in addressing the availability of immunities for international crimes in the Taylor case.
Only immunities in relation to international crimes will be discussed in this work. 
Immunities in civil proceedings and questions of State immunity47 will not be directly 
addressed as consideration of these immunities is not strictly necessary to answering 
the question of Taylor’s immunity before the SCSL. 
the Statute, has no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction”, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11, 27 June 2011, 
para. 9.
45 Akande, supra note 37 (emphasis added). 
46 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 556.
47 See e.g. A. Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and International Public Order’, 45 German 
Yearbook of International Law (2002); A. Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity in National 
and International Law: Three Recent Decisions of the European Court of Human Ri-
ghts’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 703 (2002).
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1.2.1 Normative Hierarchy of Jus Cogens Over Immunity?
A  reappearing argument, often advanced in the literature,48 is that immunity 
“must give way to the ‘higher value’ of ensuring prosecution”49 of international crimes 
that rise to the level of jus cogens (similar arguments were raised with regard to State 
responsibility for serious human rights violations). It has been asserted that there is 
no immunity in relation to international crimes both before national or international 
courts because such crimes amount to violations of jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms, 
as the argument goes, prevail over the international rules on immunity due to its 
hierarchical superiority that overrides any rules of immunity, which would otherwise 
apply.50 
However, State practice does not (yet) confirm the theory of normative hierarchy 
of jus cogens over immunity, “since the practice of according immunity ratione 
personae to certain state officials, even in cases alleging violations of jus cogens norms, 
is extensive”.51 The normative hierarchy arguments have been so far rejected before 
48 See e.g. A. Bianchi, ‘Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’, 10 European 
Journal of International Law 237 (1999), p.  265 (“As a  matter of international law, 
there is no doubt that jus cogens norms, because of their higher status, must prevail 
over other international rules, including jurisdictional immunities.”); H.F. van Panhuys, 
“In The Borderland Between The Act of State Doctrine and Questions of Jurisdictional 
Immunities”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 13 (1964), p. 1213; A. 
L. Zuppi, ‘Immunity v. Universal Jurisdiction: the Yerodia Ndombasi Decision of the 
International Court of Justice’, Louisiana Law Review, vol. 63 (2003), p. 323 (“It will 
therefore be difficult to understand that international law recognizes the prohibition of 
certain hideous crimes as paramount, rising to the level of jus cogens but on the other side 
accepts a shield of sovereign immunity in cases where the perpetrator holds an official 
position. Consequently, in cases where we speak of practices amounting to one of those 
categories of crimes against international law, such violations should not be covered by 
State immunity.”); A. Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why 
the House of Lords Got It Wrong’, 18 European Journal of International Law 5, pp. 955-
970. See also arguments of Italy in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. 
Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment (3 February 2012).
49 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 532.
50 Admittedly, there is some (albeit limited) support for this proposition also at domestic 
courts. See e.g., civil proceedings initiated in Italy against Germany, where the Court of 
Cassation held that international crimes must prevail over the rules on State immunity 
from foreign jurisdiction, because they have a “higher rank”. Ferrini v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, Court of Cassation, p. 547, para. 9.1.
51 D. Akande and S. Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Fore-
ign Domestic Courts: A Rejoinder to Alexander Orakhelashvili’, 22 European Journal of 
International Law 3 (2011), pp. 857-861 (emphasis added).
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various national courts,52 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)53 and 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).54 For example, in the Jones v. Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia case, which involved both immunity of State officials from foreign civil 
jurisdiction and State immunity, the House of Lords observed that there is no clash of 
norms, since “the rule on state immunity is not derogation from the prohibition on 
torture. It is not a rule which authorizes or absolves its perpetrators from liability.”55 
52 See e.g. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (SDNY, 2001) (USA); Jones v. Saudi 
Arabia, House of Lords, [2007] 1 AC 270; ILR, Vol. 129, p. 629 (United Kingdom); 
Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Court of Appeal of Ontario, DLR, 4th Series, Vol. 
243, p.  406; ILR, Vol. 128, p.  586 (Canada); Natoniewski, Supreme Court, Polish 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXX, 2010, p. 299 (Poland); Case No. Up-13/99, 
Constitutional Court of Slovenia (Slovenia); Fang v. Jiang, High Court, [2007] NZAR 
p. 420; ILR, Vol. 141, p. 702 (New Zealand); Margellos, Special Supreme Court, ILR, 
Vol. 129, p. 525 (Greece); Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Hwang 
Geum Joo, et al., v. Japan, Judgment of 27 June 2003, 332 F.3d 679 (USA). 
53 See e.g. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom App. No. 35763/97, (2002) 34 EHHR 11; paras. 
52-67, in particular para. 61: “[...] Notwithstanding the special character of the prohi-
bition of torture in international law, the Court is unable to discern in the international 
instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for concluding 
that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit 
in the courts of another State where acts of torture are alleged. [...].” Compare, howev-
er, with the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, joined by Judges 
Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić, para. 4: “[...] It is not the nature of the 
proceedings which determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has upon another rule of 
international law, but the character of the rule as a peremptory norm and its interaction 
with a hierarchically lower rule. The prohibition of torture, being a rule of jus cogens, 
acts in the international sphere and deprives the rule of sovereign immunity of all its 
legal effects in that sphere. The criminal or civil nature of the domestic proceedings is 
immaterial. The jurisdictional bar is lifted by the very interaction of the international 
rules involved, and the national judge cannot admit a plea of immunity raised by the de-
fendant State as an element preventing him from entering into the merits of the case and 
from dealing with the claim of the applicant for the alleged damages inflicted upon him. 
[...]”. See also Kalogeropoulou and others v. Greece and Germany, App. No. 59021/00, 12 
December 2002, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (last visited 17 October 2012).
54 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment 
(3 February 2012). See also the Armed Activities case, in which the ICJ held that the 
fact that a rule has the status of jus cogens does not confer upon the ICJ a jurisdiction 
which it would not otherwise possess (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New 
Application: 2002), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, paras. 64 and 125). See also Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), supra note 28, p. 3, 
paras. 58 and 78.
55 Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Claim No HQ 02 X01805, para. 19 (2). See also Lord 
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Akande points out that should the normative hierarchy theory be correct, “there 
would be no type of immunity in any case alleging violations of jus cogens norms,”56 
which clearly is not the case. This may be illustrated by the reference to Article 27(2) 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which reads: ‘immunities or special procedural rules 
which may attach to the official capacity of a person [...] shall not bar the court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.’ It would not have been necessary to 
insert such express provision if the State parties were of the view that immunities had 
been removed by virtue of the jus cogens status of the crimes.57
In terms of the law on State immunity, the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State case rejected the effect of jus cogens to be such as to automatically displace the 
State immunity by holding that:
The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to 
determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the 
conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful.58
The ICJ considered that there was no conflict between substantive rules and rules 
that are procedural in character.59 Similarly, Fox explains the false conflict between 
immunity and jus cogens rules as follows: 
State immunity is a  procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. 
It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a  prohibition contained 
in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of 
Hoffmann, especially paras. 45-44: “The jus cogens is the prohibition on torture. But 
the United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the Kingdom, is not proposing 
to torture anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in claiming immunity, justifying the use of 
torture. [...] To produce a conflict with state immunity, it is therefore necessary to show 
that the prohibition on torture has generated an ancillary procedural rule which, by 
way of exception to state immunity, entitles or perhaps requires states to assume civil 
jurisdiction over other states in cases in which torture is alleged. Such a  rule may be 
desirable and, since international law changes, may have developed. But, contrary to the 
assertion of the minority [of the European Court of Human Rights] in Al-Adsani, it is 
not entailed by the prohibition of torture.”
56 Akande and Shah, supra note 51, p. 858 (emphasis added).
57 Ibid.
58 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 54, para. 93.
59 Ibid., paras. 92-97. See also arguments in favour of the ICJ judgment, which was otherwise 
rather heavily criticized, S. Talmon, ‘Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Pro-
cedural Rules Distinguished’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012), pp. 979 –1002.
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settlement. Arguably, then, there is no substantive content in the procedural plea of 
State immunity upon which a jus cogens mandate can bite.60 
For these briefly highlighted reasons, this work will not engage in the normative 
hierarchy debate any further. In order to appreciate this area of law, it is suggested that 
a more appropriate approach is needed.61 It is important to understand the underlying 
principles of immunities and protected values and it is crucial to emphasize that the 
availability of immunities for international crimes depends to a large extent on the 
legal basis of the respective court (i.e. national or international court) and on the 
status of the high-ranking official (i.e. former or incumbent official). The central 
question is whether this generally accepted dichotomy, which will be used as a point 
of departure also for our purposes, suffices in case of the SCSL. In other words, does 
the SCSL have jurisdiction to try an incumbent Head of State of a country other than 
Sierra Leone even if proved that it is indeed an international court? 
1.2.2 Sources
My use of sources follows the generally accepted methodology of international 
criminal law, which has been already described by several authors.62 Primary sources 
will include, but will not be limited to, constitutive and other instruments related 
to the establishment of the SCSL (the Statute of the SCSL, the Agreement between 
the UN and Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), Special 
Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002), Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT Charter), Statutes of two ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals (i.e. the ICTY and ICTR) and, finally, the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
Due to the important role of case law for this work, it should be explained that 
decisions of both national and international courts are not necessarily treated here as 
“mere” subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law in light of the Article 
60 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 525; 
see also L. M. Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of 
the Normative Hierarchy Theory’, (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 741, 
pp. 771–772. For the deeper discussion of the dichotomy of substantive and procedural 
rules in the light of the law of immunities, see Chapter 5.4.1.
61 Cryer et al, supra note 13.
62 For details see e.g. I. Bantekas et al., International Criminal Law (London: Cavendish, 
2001), pp. 2-4, E. v. Sliedregt, The criminal responsibility of individuals for violations 
of international humanitarian law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), pp. 6-9. 
Inspiration also taken from A. Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International 
Criminal Law in National Courts (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006).
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38 (1) of the ICJ Statute. There is a considerable practical and doctrinal support that 
case law can serve as an evidence of opinio juris or amount to State practice.63 This 
work adopts this proposition, thereby partly departing from the classical distinction 
between primary and secondary sources reflected in Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute.64
 
As regards secondary sources, its use need not be treated here in detail. In addition 
to a widely available scholarly literature on the topic, the author could also benefit from 
the sources offered by the ICTY Library and the Peace Palace Library in The Hague, 
the WCC Library in Sarajevo and the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth. 
1.2.3 Structure
This work consists of three main parts: general introduction into the topic (Part 
I); identification of the SCSL’s legal basis (Part II) and its implications for immunity 
of Charles Taylor (Part III). Part I will present various criminal judicial bodies for 
prosecution of international crimes and offer an explanation as to why the legal basis 
matter. Next, the events leading to the establishment of the SCSL will be briefly 
described and the SCSL’s Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction65 in the Taylor case 
will be introduced.
Part II will focus on identifying the exact legal basis of the SCSL, which has important 
implications for the nature and extent of immunity afforded by contemporary international 
law to an incumbent Head of State. Considerable attention given to the legal basis of the 
SCSL is justified by the fact that the SCSL is a novel and unique mechanism for dealing 
with prosecution of violations of international criminal law. It represents a development of 
a new legal basis. It is the first time in a history when the court has been established by the 
agreement between UN and a State (Sierra Leone). This development inevitably brings 
various legal challenges and issues of real juristic doubt and difficulty. 
The issues brought by the Defence counsel for Taylor in the motion challenging 
the jurisdiction of the SCSL themselves turn to a  large extent on the process of 
the establishment of the SCSL, its legal basis and implications of this legal basis 
63 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An 
Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY’, in: G. Boas and W. A. Schabas (eds.), International 
and Criminal Law Developments in the Case law of the ICTY (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2003); H. Lauterpacht, ‘Decisions of Municipal Courts as a  Source of International 
Law’, 10 British Yearbook of International Law 65 (1929), pp. 78-94. 
64 See, similarly, W. N. Ferdinandusse, supra note 62, p. 6.
65 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27. 
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for its international jurisdictional reach. Accordingly, the proper assessment and 
identification of the SCSL’s legal basis is of central importance for drawing conclusions 
with respect to availability of immunities before such court. 
Part III then reveals a  close interconnection of the legal basis with the issue of 
withdrawal of immunity for incumbent Head of State. The SCSL in Taylor relied on 
certain passages of the ICJ decision in the Yerodia case and of the House of Lords 
decision in the Pinochet case. Both of these decisions made reference to the possibility 
of prosecuting high-ranking state officials before international courts, where they 
have jurisdiction. 
Not surprisingly, the SCSL thus connected the issue of denying immunity to 
Taylor with determination of its legal basis and found that it is indeed an international 
court. In turn, the SCSL held that the consequence of its international legal basis is 
that Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute can be opposed to Taylor.66 The outcome of 
this approach was that the SCSL denied immunity ratione personae to the incumbent 
President of Liberia. 
While such decision may be welcomed, the validity of the SCSL approach, including 
the impact of the Yerodia and Pinochet cases on the reasoning of judges in Taylor, will 
be subject to criticism. This Part will examine whether a classification of a  judicial 
body as an international criminal court automatically mean that a  Head of State 
has no immunity from prosecution before that body. For these purposes, the SCSL’s 
decision in Taylor will be put in the larger context of developments on both personal 
and functional immunities in international law. Based on these developments, this 
part will critically assess weaknesses in the SCSL’s reasoning and will make an attempt 
to present a cautious way forward by identifying other suitable solution. In sum, the 
main objective of this work is (i) to explain why the decision in Taylor is flawed and in 
doing so (ii) to make a broader contribution to the clarification of the law governing 
immunities of high-ranking state officials and indicate how is it developing.
1.3 Legal Basis of Mechanisms for Prosecuting Violations of 
International Criminal Law 
In this Chapter, various mechanisms for prosecuting violations of international 
criminal law will be introduced and a  definition of international, national and 
66 See M. Frulli, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Testing the Water. The Question of 
Charles Taylor’s Immunity. Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal Immu-
nities?’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), pp. 1118–1129.
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internationalized courts will be offered. The reason for this approach lies in the fact 
that the entitlement to immunity for core crimes does not have uniform application 
within different legal regimes and in front of various judicial bodies.67 It is therefore 
necessary to clarify the respective terminology and categorization in order to 
subsequently determine the SCSL’s legal basis for the purposes of lifting immunities 
to a serving Head of State of a country other than Sierra Leone. 
This all began with the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals 
more than a half a century ago. The beginning of the 1990s then witnessed a new 
evolution of various mechanisms for prosecuting violations of international criminal 
law, starting in 1993 with the establishment of the ICTY and followed by the ICTR 
in 1994. In 1998, the Rome Statute for the ICC was adopted. 
At the same time, other models referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘mixed’ or ‘internationalised’ 
courts came into being.68 As examples can serve the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
courts of Cambodia (ECCC),69 the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo,70 the 
District Court of Dili in East Timor,71 and potentially also the Iraqi Special Tribunal72 
67 I. Bantekas, ‘Head of Sate Immunity in the Light of Multiple Legal Regimes and Non-Self-
Contained Systems Theories: Theoretical Analysis of ICC Third Party Jurisdiction Against 
the Background of the 2003 Iraq War’, 10 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 21 (2005).
68 For an overview of some practical and legal problems internationalized courts might face, 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of such courts, see A. Cassese, supra note 12. 
69 Also referred to as ‘Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea’. See General Assembly 
Resolution 57/228 A, 187, December 2002. Orentlicher uses the term ‘court, established 
under Cambodian law but operating with substantial international participation’, D. 
Orentlicher, ‘The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of Transitional 
Justice’, in S. Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of 
Serious Crimes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 219.
70 In cases of Kosovo (prior to its independence) and East Timor the UN promulgated 
regulations on the establishment of the panels. The authority to promulgate these 
regulations came from the SC Resolution adopted under Chapter VII powers, which 
therefore served as the legal basis, albeit indirectly. “Nevertheless, these international 
instruments did not directly establish the courts, but granted the UN administration the 
authority to promulgate domestic laws. The regulations establishing these courts should 
be considered as domestic instruments.”, in: S.M.H. Nouwen, ‘‘Hybrid courts’, The 
hybrid category of a new type of international crimes courts’, 2 Utrecht Law Review 2, 
December, (2006). 
71 UNTAET, Resolution No. 2000/15, 6 June 2000. 
72 Also named ‘Iraqi High Court’ or ‘Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’.
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and the Ethiopian Special Prosecutor’s Office. The WCC73 is also sometimes being 
included in this category. 
These various judicial mechanisms dealing with crimes under international law are 
characterised by different legal regimes and applicable law. Some will apply primarily 
or only domestic criminal law into which crimes under international law might or 
might not be incorporated.74 Other mechanisms might be international ones and 
applying only international law. These can be either treaty-based such as the ICC or 
resolution-based (Resolution adopted under Chapter VII powers of the UN Security 
Council) such as the ICTY and the ICTR.75 Finally, we have a  newly emerging 
trend of so-called hybrid or mixed courts, which further complicate the picture. The 
qualification of the exact legal basis of hybrid courts is not always clear-cut. 
Hence, it is useful to start the discussion by defining the terms ‘international court’, 
‘national court’ and ‘hybrid/mixed/internationalized’ court. The term ‘international 
criminal court’ is frequently used in jurisprudence and academic literature, without 
much consideration given to what it actually means.76 At the same time, the legal 
consequences flowing from this distinction are indeed crucial for an effective 
functioning of the court. For example, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir 
offered no definition of an international court, but as Akande points out “the Pre-
Trial Chamber appears to be suggesting that if two States agree to establish by treaty 
a  tribunal to prosecute the officials of a  third state, international law would allow 
this.”77 This suggestion would certainly have far-reaching consequences. 
It is necessary to emphasize that the definition of what constitutes an international 
court as opposed to national court may vary significantly depending on factors taken 
into account, on the purposes of this identification and on those who are in charge of 
such identification. It should be therefore noted that the following definitions are not 
intended to be conclusive; they will rather serve as guidance for determination of the 
legal basis of the SCSL in the context of immunities analysis. 
73 The High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina promulgated the Law on the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12 November 2000. The Parliament of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina adopted this law on 3 July 2002. 
74 E.g. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, for more information see http://www.stl-tsl.org/ (last 
visited 27 June 2013).
75 UN Security Council Resolutions 808, 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) respectively.
76 See, however, Damgaard, supra note 11.
77 Akande, supra note 37.
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There is no universally accepted definition of an international criminal court in 
international law and the recent jurisprudence considering this issue has not proved 
particularly insightful, including for our purposes the important decision of the ICJ 
in the Yerodia case, where the ICJ simply stated that in ‘certain international courts’ 
(ICTY, ICTR, ICC) an incumbent or former Minister of Foreign Affairs could be 
subject to criminal prosecution, without providing any further guidance whether 
term ‘certain’ international courts excludes some other international courts.78 
Nevertheless, the ICJ in the Yerodia case held that an international court is a court 
that is established by two or more States or by a Security Council Resolution under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.79 Although the ICJ did not mention the following 
possibility, it is submitted that a  State and an international organization can also 
establish an international tribunal (i.e. the SCSL). 
Damgaard points to the following factors as important for indication of 
international nature (a) international court is not part of the judiciary of one single 
State (b) it applies international criminal law, the fact that it also applies domestic 
law does not disqualify it being international (c) its jurisdiction rationae materiae and 
rationae personae is international (d) its decisions are binding.80 The first three factors 
are easy to approve. It is however not clear how does the binding nature of a decision 
contributes to the international character of the respective court.
A hybrid court, according to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment 
of a  Special Court for Sierra Leone (Report), is one that has mixed jurisdiction and 
composition.81 This means that the court may have the jurisdictional privileges of 
applying both municipal and international law and may also have both local and 
foreign prosecutors and judges participate in its judicial process.82 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the mixed composition and jurisdiction does not of itself determine 
78 Damgaard, supra note 11.
79 See supra note 28, para 61.
80 Damgaard, supra note 11, p. 333.
81 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a  Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(S/2000/915), 4 October 2000, para. 9. For a  different view, see Judge Robertson in his 
Separate Opinion in Kondewa ‘[…] the Special Court […] is not accurately described in the 
Secretary-General’s report as a court of ‘mixed jurisdiction and composition’ […] is in reality 
an international court onto which a few national elements have been grafted.’, Case No. SCSL-
2004-14-AR7 2(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Establishment 
of Special Court Violates Constitution Sierra Leone, 25 May 2004, para. 15.
82 D. Orentlicher, ‘International Justice Can Indeed Be Local’, Washington Post, 21 Decem-
ber 2003.
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the legal basis of the court. Such a  description and judicial arrangement can be 
indeed described as a mixed judicial system. However, the legal basis of any court is rather 
determined by its constitutive instrument and authority of the body establishing the court. 
There is no bar to have local judges, prosecutors and other personnel participating in 
proceedings of the court whose legal basis is e.g. an international treaty or Resolution 
and which is therefore by its essence international. Equally, the fact that the legislative 
authorities of a particular State decide to include into the personnel composition of 
its national court non-nationals of that State “does [sic! meant is: ‘not’] make that 
court any less a ‘national court’.”83 
The WCC can serve as a useful example.84 The Defence in Stankovic submitted 
that the WCC is incapable of characterization as a ‘national court.’85 It was assumed 
that to be a national court it must be composed of judges who are nationals of the 
State concerned, but the ICTY held that no authority is offered for this proposition.86 
The view of the Referral Bench of the ICTY was that in the relevant context (i.e. 
under Article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute),87 there is no apparent justification for giving 
to the phrase ‘national court’ any meaning other than the normal connotation, which 
is ‘a court of or pertaining to a nation’.88 The ICTY stated that the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, of which the WCC is a component, is a court that has been established 
pursuant to the statutory law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It follows that it is a court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a ‘national court.’89 
83 Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on referral of case under rule 
11bis, Partly Confidential and Ex Parte, 17 May 2005.
84 The establishment of the WCC enabled cases to be transferred from the ICTY to national 
judicial authorities. For a  case to be referred to the WCC pursuant to Rule 11bis of the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Referral Bench must be fully satisfied that the 
accused would be tried in accordance with international standards and that neither the level of 
responsibility of the accused nor the gravity of the crimes alleged in the indictment were factors 
that would make a referral to the national authorities inappropriate. According to Rule 11bis 
a referral may be made to a State: (a) in which the crimes were committed; (b) the accused was 
arrested; (c) or which has jurisdiction and is willing and adequately prepared to accept the case.
85 Prosecutor v. Stankovic, supra note 83.
86 Ibid.
87 Article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute reads as follows: “The International Tribunal and national courts 
shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.”
88 Prosecutor v. Stankovic, supra note 83.
89 Ibid.
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
32
Despite the conclusions made above, the qualification of the exact legal basis of 
hybrid courts is admittedly not straightforward; there exist considerable uncertainty 
and diverse views on this topic. For example, Nouwen considers ECCC, the 
Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the District Court of Dili in East 
Timor as all being part of the domestic system and their legal status that of a national 
court.90 Ambach on the other hand suggests that the Regulation 64 Panels in the 
courts of Kosovo and the District Court of Dili in East Timor were set up by the UN 
Administration, and therefore are by nature international.91 
Terminological and conceptual difficulties of hybrid courts lay exactly in their 
combined/hybrid nature. If hybrid courts are implemented into the domestic judicial 
structure of the forum state, they cannot be considered as international institutions 
“since they lack international legal personality”, but they cannot be also qualified as 
purely national courts “since apart from having a considerable amount of international 
personnel and exercising jurisdiction over international crimes,” some of them are 
established through an international treaty with the UN.92
It needs to be borne in mind that these so-called hybrid courts have each a very 
different legal basis. Yet, they are ultimately established either under national law or 
international law.93 Still, the presented views already indicate the uncertainty with 
regard to finding the origins of their legal basis. This uncertainty may negatively affect 
 the functioning of these courts in many areas,94 including the area of immunities, as 
we shall see below.95 
90 See supra note 70 for Nouwen’s detailed explanation of this issue.
91 P. Ambach, ‘The Overlapping Jurisdictions between the International Criminal Court and 
Hybrid International Tribunals’, Bofaxe, No.298E (2006), available at http://www.ifhv.rub.
de/imperia/md/content/publications/bofaxe/2006/x298e.pdf (last visited 7 May 2007). 
92 Ibid.
93 Nouwen thus suggests that, “the manner of establishment is what distinguishes these courts 
from one another, not what unites them.” She is opposing calling hybrid courts ‘hybrid’ because 
of their hybrid roots as it, according to her, only confuses the picture. In Nouwen, supra note 70.
94 For example, Cassese refers to the following issues: “the current hybrid courts, as part 
of a domestic system or established by an international agreement not binding on third 
States, do not benefit from compulsory cooperation as does the ICTY or ICTR. Also, 
there is a question of reconciling the international legal standards to be applied with the 
local laws and regulations. For example in case of Kosovo, the UN Secretary-General in 
his Report of 15 December 2000 stated that significant outstanding issues include a lack 
of clarity among local judges as to whether international human rights standards were 
supreme law in Kosovo.” In A. Cassese, supra note 12. 
95 See e.g. C. P.R. Romano, A. Nollkaemper arguing that: “the questions of the international 
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1.4 Why Does the Legal Basis Matter? International v. National Courts 
Practice with Respect to Head of State Immunity
The SCSL in Taylor stated that ‘[t]he nature of the Tribunals has always been 
a relevant consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle 
of immunity’.96 The premise, which will guide our discussion, is that the legal basis of 
the judicial bodies is crucial for granting or withdrawing immunities to the Head of 
State. The discussion below serves only as a brief introduction to these issues, which 
will be analysed in more detail in the following Chapters.
As regards the practice of national courts, scholarly opinions vary significantly. The 
most important factor appears to be whether the senior official is serving or former one. 
Most of the legal scholars suggest that the operating principle in general international 
law is that a serving Head of State is entitled to personal (i.e. absolute) immunity from 
the jurisdiction of national courts, unless it has been waived by the State concerned. 
This appears to be the dominant view, but it is not the only view.97 
Some other commentators argue that the discussion about the legal nature of 
various courts and tribunals, national or international, would not have been necessary 
if the question of whether immunity applies to officials depended on factors other 
than the nature of the tribunals, namely, on the nature of the crime. 98 However, the 
suggestion about the nature of international crimes prevailing over the nature of the 
tribunals does not fully reflect the underlying principles and protected values served by 
two different kinds of immunities, i.e. personal and functional immunity.99 In other 
words, this may be a relevant argument as regards functional immunity, but personal 
immunity is not depended on the nature of the crime.100 Yet other commentators 
legal status of the SCSL, its obligations under international law and any remaining 
obligations of the founding entities are complicated by the hybrid nature of the Court.” 
In C. P.R. Romano, A. Nollkaemper, supra note 12.
96 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, supra note 27, para. 49.
97 For different views see P.  Sands, ‘Immunities before international courts’, Guest 
Lecture Serious of the Office of the Prosecutor (18 November 2003); see also A. 
Cassesse, ‘Why May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, European Journal of International Law 13 
(2002), pp. 853-875.
98 See S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The 
Arrest Warrant Case Continued’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), pp. 
645–669.
99 For more details see Chapter 5.
100 See Chapter 5.3.
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have claimed that neither functional, nor personal immunity is available in response 
of allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.101 
Nevertheless, these views are not supported by current State practice and/or opinio 
juris. Incumbent Heads of State or other senior state officials so far enjoy immunity 
even with respect of international crimes before national courts.102 Serving officials 
such as Yerodia Ndombasi, Fidel Castro and Muammar Gaddaffi were all said to 
enjoy personal immunity before national courts. Similarly, all of the Law Lords 
in the Pinochet case agreed that if Augusto Pinochet were an incumbent Head of 
State of Chile at the time of arriving to the United Kingdom (UK), he would have 
enjoyed personal immunity as well.103 Thus, there is as yet no single case of indicting, 
prosecuting and convicting a serving Head of State before national courts (i.e. other 
than courts of the State of the accused). 
In order to be able to prosecute international crimes before national courts, the 
State concerned has to have jurisdiction to start with. On which basis do the foreign 
courts assert jurisdiction if crimes are not committed on their territory and the 
accused is not a national of that State? Here comes into play universal jurisdiction, 
which is regarded by many scholars and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
as indisputable.104 In contrast, some others, such as Schabas, argue that States rarely 
initiate prosecution regardless of the seriousness of international crimes, unless there 
is either territorial or personal nexus, or a treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite.105 
It is however not the aim of this work to deal with universal jurisdiction in detail. 
Moreover, the consideration of this problem is not strictly necessary to answering 
the question of Taylor’s immunity before the SCSL. Thus, issues such as universal 
101 A. Bianchi, ‘Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’, 10 European 
Journal of International Law 237 (1999). See also the comprehensive study by Amnesty 
International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation 
(2001), AI Index IOR 53/2001.
102 See e.g. Rose v. R. (1947) 3 DLR 618, p. 645 (Canada); Qaddafi (2001) 125 ILR 456 
(France); Castro (1999) 32 ILM 596 (Spain), or case against Mugabe, reproduced in C. 
Warbrick, ‘Immunity and International Crimes in English Law’ 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly 769 (2004). 
103 Pinochet III, supra note 18, 171. See Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 546. For a detailed 
discussion of the Pinochet case, see Chapter 6.1.
104 For deep survey and analysis of universal jurisdiction see For deep survey and analysis of 
universal jurisdiction see L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction, International and Municipal 
Legal Perspectives (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
105 Ibid.
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jurisdiction, together with an inter-connected issue of immunities before national courts 
will be discussed only in the context of, and to the extent necessary for, the Taylor case. 
As regards the practice of international courts, amicus curiae invited by the SCSL 
stated that:
both international law and practice has generally distinguished between proceedings 
before national and international courts. As regards the international courts and 
tribunals which have been established, practice has been consistent, in that no 
serving head of state has been recognised as being entitled to rely on jurisdictional 
immunities.106
It is respectfully submitted that the argument that immunity can never be pleaded 
before international tribunals is an oversimplification of the issue. It is certainly true 
that there is a  significant difference between proceedings before international as 
opposed to national courts in the context of immunities. Nonetheless, there is no 
general rule in international law which would provide for immunities, would it be 
so, there will be little need for international courts and tribunals to justify in their 
Statutes derogation from immunities.107
Immunities should serve to prevent foreign states from interference into the affairs 
of other states and from exercising jurisdiction over another state.108 As long as the State 
concerned has not consented to the exercise of the jurisdiction, there is, according to Akande, 
no difference whether the exercise of this jurisdiction is done unilaterally by a  foreign 
State or through some collective judicial body.109 He adds that to claim nonexistence of 
immunities before international tribunals without the consent by the relevant state will 
allow a subversion of the policy underpinning international law immunities.110 
Judge Shahabuddeen equally argued in his Dissenting opinion in Krstic that there 
has to be some indication in the establishing instrument of the international tribunal, 
which allows for abrogation of immunities existing otherwise under international 
customary law: 
In my view, [...] there is no substance in the suggested automaticity of disappearance 
of the immunity just because of the establishment of international criminal courts 
106 See Sands, supra note 97, pp. 4-5. Compare with p. 117 (fn. 472). 
107 R. Cryer et al., supra note 13.
108 D. Akande, ‘International law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’,  
American Journal of International Law 7 (2004).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
36
[...].International criminal courts are established by States acting together, whether 
directly or indirectly as in the case of the Tribunal, which was established by the 
Security Council on behalf of States members of the United Nations. There is no 
basis for suggesting that by merely acting together to establish such a court States 
signify an intention to waive their individual functional immunities. A presumption 
of continuance of their immunities as these exist under international law is only 
offset where some element in the decision to establish such a court shows that they 
agreed otherwise.111 
The proposition that immunities do  not apply before international tribunals 
depends on the following factors that have to be considered: (i) The manner of 
the court’s establishment and identification of the exact legal basis for denying 
immunity;112 (ii) the establishing instrument of the court must bind the concerned 
State.113 The legal basis of the SCSL and the manner of its establishment is therefore 
of central importance in determining whether the SCSL can lawfully issue an 
indictment against a serving Head of State of country other than Sierra Leone, who is 
alleged to have committed acts which fall within the SCSL’s subject matter, temporal 
and territorial jurisdiction. These above-mentioned factors will therefore guide the 
analysis in an appropriate Chapter below.114 First, by way of setting the stage, the 
events leading to the establishment of the SCSL will be briefly described and the 
SCSL’s Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction115 in the Taylor case will be introduced 
in this mostly descriptive part. 
1.5 Brief History of the Conflict and Events Leading to the SCSL’s 
Establishment 
In 1991, a Liberian rebel group that brought the country into an armed conflict 
lasting a  decade invaded Sierra Leone. The causes of this armed conflict differ 
depending on those providing explanation. For example, the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice offered the following factors that likely contributed to the conflict: 
1. Sierra Leone had become a ‘failed state’, or the conflict was a crisis in government 
mainly driven by years of one-party rule and a small ruling elite’s exploitation 
of the country, widespread corruption and lack of accountability, and the 
disempowerment and militarization of youth.
111 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, 17 September 2003, paras. 11-12 (emphasis added).
112 See Chatham House, supra note 14. 
113 See Akande, supra note 108. 
114 See Chapter 4. 
115 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27. 
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2. The conflict was driven by various internal factions wanting control of the 
country’s rich diamond mines.
3. The conflict was a war driven by the personal political agendas of Charles Taylor, 
then-president of Liberia, and Muammar al-Qadhafi, president of Libya.
4. The conflict was a subtle ethnic conflict between the Mende-dominated Sierra 
Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the Temne-dominated All People’s Congress 
(APC).116
In January 2002 a cease-fire was finally declared and the Lome Peace Agreement 
was signed.117 Despite the peace agreement, fighting broke out again. It was soon 
recognized that the Lome Peace Agreement would not bring the conflict to an end. 
Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), one of the main 
fighting factions, was ultimately taken into custody. The government was however 
afraid that any trials of Foday Sankoh and other rebels from the RUF would aggravate 
the conflict. Therefore, President of Sierra Leone Kabbah wrote on 12 June 2000 to 
the Secretary-General of the UN and requested the assistance of the international 
community in order to create a court to try senior RUF officers.118
In 2002, the SCSL was established with the mandate to try those bearing the 
greatest responsibility for the crimes committed during the conflict in that country. 
The seat of the SCSL was deliberately established in Freetown, in the country where 
the crimes occurred so that justice be not only done, but be seen to done, by and for 
the people of Sierra Leone. Therefore, the SCSL is one of the latest versions of these 
mechanisms to address crimes under international law, taking place directly in the 
country where the crimes occurred in contrast with the proceedings in front of the 
ICTR and the ICTY taking place in Tanzania (Arusha) and The Netherlands (The 
Hague) respectively. 
116 T. Perriello, M. Wierda, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone under Scrutiny’, Prosecution 
Case Studies Series, International Center for Transitional Justice (2006).
117 For a deeper overview of the conflict see: No Peace Without Justice, ‘Conflict Mapping 
in Sierra Leone: Violations of International Humanitarian Law from 1991 to 2002’ (10 
March 2004).
118 Report, supra note 81.
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2 The SCSL’s Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction in the Taylor Case
2.1 Facts and Procedure
Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997. He remained Head of 
State until August 2003. His tenure of office covered most of the period the SCSL 
has temporal jurisdiction pursuant to its mandate to try those primarily responsible 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996.119
The Indictment against the first African incumbent Head of State was approved in 
March 2003. He was only the second Head of State to be indicted while in the office.120 
The Indictment initially included 17 counts in which Taylor was accused of planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, 
preparation or execution of crimes such as terrorizing the civilian population and 
collective punishments, unlawful killings, physical and in particular sexual violence, 
use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labour, looting and burning and attacks 
on peacekeepers.121 The Indictment claims, inter alia, that Taylor was acting with 
intent to gain access to the mineral wealth of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond 
wealth and to destabilize the State.122 
Subsequently, an international arrest warrant and order for Taylor’s transfer and 
detention were issued by the SCSL. The Prosecutor decided to reveal the indictment 
and arrest warrant while Taylor was attending and participating in peace negotiations 
in Ghana in June 2003. Taylor stepped down from office in August 2003, only after 
strong international pressure. 
119 K. Novotna (Uhlirova), ‘No Impunity for Charles Taylor’, Aberystwyth Journal of World 
Affairs 2 (2004), p. 90.
120 First Head of State indicted while still in the office was Slobodan Milosevic, President of 
the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
121 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003. The 
Indictment was amended on 16 March 2006, reducing the number of counts to 11. 
122 Ibid.
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Taylor’s subsequent efforts to secure the arrest warrant withdrawal for his resignation 
were not successful. Therefore, Taylor accepted asylum that was offered by Nigeria. 
Taylor was offered the asylum on the basis that he will not interfere in Liberian and 
regional politics while in Nigeria. However, there were growing international concerns 
about Taylor’s activities in Nigeria, from where he allegedly continued to interfere in 
Liberian affairs, which could have had a  destabilizing effect in the Liberian peace 
process and the West African region as a whole.123 
In response, the Nigerian authorities issued a  statement warning Charles Taylor 
that the authorities would not tolerate any violations of the terms of his exile, which 
forbade all interference in Liberian affairs. According to the statement, Charles Taylor 
had not been granted immunity and was subject to Nigerian law, indicating that he 
could be arrested if he continues to violate these terms.124 
The UN Security Council issued on 9 October 2003 a press statement125 expressing 
concern about attempts by Charles Taylor to influence events in Liberia, noting that 
his continued interference could threaten the carefully constructed peace agreement 
in Liberia.126 A year later, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1532 (2004), 
which demanded Taylor’s assets to be frozen. The Resolution expressed concern that 
Taylor has continuing access to misappropriated funds and property, which are used 
by him (and his associates) in order to engage in activities that undermine peace and 
stability in Liberia and the region. 
Except the involvement of the UN Security Council, the European Parliament and 
the United States of America (USA) were also actively engaged. In 2005, the European 
Parliament passed a Resolution that called on the European Union and its member States 
to act immediately in order to secure Taylor’s appearance before the SCSL.127 The US 
administration was urged by the US Congress to increase pressure on Nigeria to extradite 
Charles Taylor to the SCSL.128 All these events and international pressure led at the end 
(after Taylor’s attempt to escape) to Taylor’s apprehension and extradition to the SCSL. 
123 See Novotna (Uhlirova), supra note 119.
124 Ibid.
125 Press Statement - U-N/Liberia (L-O), No. 2-308435 (by Peter Heinlein). This statement 
took into account a report presented by Hedi Annabi, the Head of the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Liberia.
126 Ibid.
127 Resolution of EP (2005) is available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/ (last visited 21 
July 2007).
128 See, inter alia, H.CON.RES.127, passed 4 May 2005 in the US House and on 10 May 
2005 in the US Senate.
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2.2 Defence Submissions on the Preliminary Motion and the 
Prosecution’s Response
The parties’ submissions to the SCSL fall into two categories. The first category 
includes arguments of Defence counsel challenging the SCSL’s jurisdiction to try 
incumbent Head of State and corresponding counterarguments by the Prosecution. 
In sum, Defence argued that by issuing an indictment and an arrest warrant for 
Charles Taylor, who was an incumbent President of Liberia at that time, various rules 
governing jurisdiction, immunity, and sovereign equality under international law 
were violated. 
The second category of arguments deals with the national law of Sierra Leone. In 
particularly it deals with the legality of the actions taken by the Prosecutor and the 
SCSL and their consistency with provisions of the Sierra Leone Constitution of 1991. 
This work will discuss only the international law aspects of the case.
The relevant part of Taylor’s Defence Motion was summarized in the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL (Appeals Chamber) decision as follows:
1. Citing the judgment of the ICJ in the case between the Democratic Republic 
of Congo v Belgium (‘Yerodia case’), as an incumbent Head of State at the time 
of his indictment, Charles Taylor enjoyed absolute immunity from criminal 
prosecution;
2. Exceptions from diplomatic immunities129 can only derive from other rules of 
international law such as Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’);
3. The Special Court does not have Chapter VII powers; therefore judicial orders 
from the Special Court have the quality of judicial orders from a national court;
4. The indictment against Taylor was invalid due to his personal immunity from 
criminal prosecution.130
The key submission of the Defence was that Taylor was entitled to absolute personal 
immunity from criminal prosecution as Liberia’s incumbent Head of State at the time 
of his indictment. The Defence claimed that the immunity, which attached to Taylor, 
shielded him from prosecution whether on official business in a foreign State (Ghana) 
or in office in Liberia. 
129 The distinction between ‘diplomatic immunity’ as opposed to ‘Head of State immunity’ 
is explained in Chapter 5. 
130 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 6. 
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Further, the Defence argued that immunity is not nullified by any exceptions arising 
under other international law rules, such as resolutions enacted by the Security Council 
pursuant to its Chapter VII powers permitting international criminal tribunals to indict 
incumbent Heads of State for serious international crimes. According to the Defence, 
because the SCSL was a Sierra Leonean tribunal that lacked Chapter VII powers, in 
contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, it had no authority to assert jurisdiction over President 
Taylor since its judicial orders had the same (limited) force as those of a national court. 
The Defence analyzed Yerodia and stated that the immunity is more the matter of 
procedure than substance, with procedural immunity subsisting for as long as the 
official is in office. The Defence argued that the principles enunciated by the ICJ in 
Yerodia case establish that only an international court may indict a serving Head of 
State. It also noted that the SCSL does not meet the criteria of an international court 
and concluded that: 
the emphatic nature of the decision and the size of the majority endorsing it send 
a clear signal that the main judicial organ of the United Nations does not wish to 
subject the stability of international relations to disturbances originating from the 
decentralised judicial investigations of crimes, no matter how object they be.131 
It was argued that the SCSL’s approval of both the indictment and the arrest 
warrant failed to account for the ruling of the ICJ in Yerodia case. In addition, the 
Defence submitted that the Pinochet case has a restricted impact in international law 
and only stands as evidence of the practice of the UK in relation to the application 
and interpretation of the Torture Convention of 1984. In response to the substantive 
issues raised by the Defence, the Prosecution submitted, inter alia, that: 
1. Yerodia concerned “the immunities of an incumbent Head of State from the 
jurisdiction of the Courts of another state“ (which is not the case here);
2. Customary international law permits international criminal tribunals, of which 
the SCSL is an example, to indict serving Heads of State; 
3. The lack of Chapter VII powers does not encumber the SCSL’s jurisdiction 
over Heads of States because the International Criminal Court, which does not 
possess Chapter VII powers, similarly denies immunity to Heads of States in 
respect of international crimes 
4. Taylor’s indictment is for crimes committed within Sierra Leone rather than 
elsewhere;
5. In the Yerodia case the ICJ enumerated the number of circumstances in which 
a  Minister of Foreign Affairs could be prosecuted for international crimes, 
131 Ibid.
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including international criminal courts where they have the jurisdiction. 
The Special Court is such an international criminal court and therefore has 
jurisdiction. Article 6(2) of the Statute clearly envisages that the Special Court 
has the power to try a Head of State.132
2.3 Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction: Addressing the Legal 
Basis of the SCSL 
When dealing with the parties’ submissions and determining its legal basis, the 
SCSL focused on reviewing two main instruments. Firstly, the SCSL identified 
Resolution 1315 (2000) of the UN Security Council authorizing the Secretary 
General to negotiate an agreement on the Statute with the Government of Sierra 
Leone. Secondly, the SCSL pointed towards the Report of the Secretary-General 
submitted to the Security Council pursuant to this Resolution. 
Referring to Resolution 1315, the Appeals Chamber noted that the SCSL is given 
an international mandate and is part of the international justice machinery. It further 
stated that the SCSL is not part of the domestic judicial system of Sierra Leone. As 
regards the availability of immunities for an incumbent Head of State, the SCSL first 
cited the relevant provision of its Statute, i.e. Article 6 (2), which lays down that: “[t]
he official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government 
or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment”.
Next, the SCSL identified and cited the relevant provisions of the IMT Charter 
and the International Law Commission’s Principles of International Law Recognized in 
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal and Articles 
in the Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Based on these precedents, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded that “[t]he nature of the Tribunals has always been 
a relevant consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle 
of immunity”.133
The Appeals Chamber then focused on the decision of the ICJ in Yerodia, in which 
the ICJ upheld the personal immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affair 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Yerodia Ndombasi. The SCSL 
approved this decision while at the same time emphasizing that the ICJ had confirmed 
the withdrawal of such immunities in relation to ‘certain international criminal 
132 Ibid., para. 9.
133 Ibid., para. 49.
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courts’. The SCSL provided the following rationale for the distinction to be made 
between international and national courts: “the principle of state immunity derives 
from the equality of sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international 
criminal tribunals which are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the 
international community.”134
The Appeals Chamber stated that the irrelevance of immunities before international 
criminal courts and tribunals is in any case an established rule of international law 
and that Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute does not violate any jus cogens norms. The 
Appeals Chamber therefore held that personal immunity of Taylor could not constitute 
a bar to the jurisdiction of the SCSL and noted that as Taylor stepped down as Head 
of State prior to this decision, “[t]he immunity ratione personae which he claimed had 
ceased to attach to him. Even if he had succeeded in his application the consequence 
would have been to compel the Prosecutor to issue a fresh warrant”.135 
In the context of the Security Council powers, the Appeals Chamber came to the 
conclusion that:
Although the SCSL was established by treaty, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which 
were each established by resolution of the Security Council in its exercise of powers 
by virtue of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it was clear that the power of the 
Security Council to enter into an agreement for the establishment of the SCSL 
was derived from the Charter of the United Nations both in regard to the general 
purposes of the United Nations as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter and the 
specific powers of the Security Council in Articles 39 and 41. These powers are wide 
enough to empower the Security Council to initiate, as it did by Resolution 1315 
(2000), the establishment of the SCSL by Agreement with Sierra Leone.136 
The Appeals Chamber stated that Article 39 empowers the Security Council to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace and emphasized that the Security 
Council in its Resolution 1315 (200) indeed reiterated that the situation in Sierra 
Leone continued to constitute a  threat to international peace and security in the 
region.137 The Appeals Chamber continued that much issue had been made of the 
absence of Chapter VII powers in the SCSL, but in its view, a proper understanding 
134 Ibid., para. 51. See critically, Cryer, noting that the principle par in parem non habet 
iudicium is the basis for functional immunity, not personal immunity. Cryer et al., supra 
note 13, p. 551.
135 Ibid., para. 59.
136 Ibid., para. 37.
137 Ibid.
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of those powers shows that the absence of the so-called Chapter VII powers does not 
by itself define the legal status of the SCSL:138 
it is manifest from the first sentence of Article 41, read disjunctively, that (i) The 
Security Council is empowered to ‘decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decision;’ and (ii) it may (at its 
discretion) call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.139 
The Appeals Chamber underlined that where the Security Council decides to 
establish a court as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security; 
it may or may not, contemporaneously, call upon the members of the UN to lend their 
cooperation to such court as a matter of obligation.140 The Appeals Chamber pointed 
out that in carrying out its duties under its responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the Security Council acts on behalf of the members 
of the UN. In this regard the Appeals Chamber held:
the Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone is thus an agreement 
between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone. This fact makes the 
Agreement an expression of the will of the international community. The Special 
Court established in such circumstances is truly international.141
The Appeals Chamber also reaffirmed that the SCSL is not a  national court of 
Sierra Leone and is not part of the judicial system of Sierra Leone. While determining 
its own legal basis in a mere six paragraphs, it came to the conclusion that the SCSL 
is indeed an international criminal court.
2.4 Amicus Curiae Brief: Lack of Chapter VII Powers of the UN 
Charter
Due to the importance of the classification of the SCSL’ legal basis, the SCSL 
invited two amici curiae, Professors Sands and Orentlicher, to provide their 
submissions on these issues. Since the SCSL decided ‘to accept and gratefully adopt 
the conclusions’ reached by Sands and Orentlicher, it is useful to briefly recall their 
arguments supporting the international nature of the SCSL.
138 Ibid., para. 38.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
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Sands submitted that there can be no doubt that Resolution 1315 (2000) is 
binding, and that it expresses the authoritative view of the Security Council that the 
situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security.142 Sands went on to note that in respect of Chapter VII, the SCSL is in no 
different position from the ICC and yet, all three tribunals - the ICTY, the ICTR, 
and the ICC - were envisaged by the ICJ in the Yerodia case to have jurisdiction 
over a serving Head of State. Hence, the possession of Chapter VII powers, in his 
view, may not be relevant at all to the question of the SCSL’s exercise of jurisdiction 
(including in relation to any immunities). However, he admitted that the SCSL does 
not enjoy the consequences of powers which it may have had if it had been established 
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adding that 
the Chapter VII powers may be relevant in order for the SCSL to be able to legally 
enforce cooperation with third States, including requests for assistance from third 
States.143 
The Secretary-General was requested to address in his Report the possibility of 
sharing the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY or ICTR with the SCSL.144 Even though 
this possibility was not accepted in the end, according to Sands this clearly indicates the 
intention of the Security Council for the SCSL to have jurisdiction ratione materiae and 
ratione personae that would be generally analogous to the ICTY and ICTR jurisdictions. 
In the same context, Orentlicher stated that because the Secretary General considered 
that there was no legal obstacle to share the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY or ICTR, 
the SCSL is correctly considered to be an international court similar to the ICTY and 
ICTR.145 
Sands argued that the SCSL is neither part of the judiciary of Sierra Leone nor 
a national court. The SCSL bears, in his view, characteristics usually associated with 
classical international organisations, including legal personality; the capacity to enter 
into agreements with other international persons governed by international law; 
privileges and immunities; and an autonomous will distinct from that of its members.146 
He refused the Liberia’s view that the SCSL is not an international criminal court and 
142 P. Sands; D. Orentlicher, ‘Submissions of the Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity 
in the case of the Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor’, available at http://www.icccpi.
int/library/organs/otp/Sands.pdf (last visited 22 February 2008). 
143 Ibid.
144 SC/2000/1315 (para. 7 of the operative part).
145 See supra note 142.
146 See generally P. Sands, P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2001), p. 16.
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concluded that the SCSL is an international court established by treaty and should be 
thus treated as such, with all that implies for the question of immunity for a serving 
Head of State. 147
147 See supra note 142.
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The introduced submissions of the parties; submissions of two amici curiae and 
the Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction relating to the legal basis of the SCSL 
raise various legal issues. Both the establishment history and the constitutive legal 
instruments have bearing on the legal basis of the SCSL. They indicate the SCSL’s 
competences and jurisdiction. The SCSL did not pay much attention to elaborating 
on these constitutive instruments. This is especially regretful when bearing in mind that 
until the establishment of the SCSL, it had never been considered that the legal basis 
of an international criminal court could be an agreement between the UN and one or 
more States. 
It is therefore necessary to review these instruments more carefully before 
concluding whether the SCS is indeed an international court for the purposes of 
denying immunity to Head of State of another country. In the light of the below 
revision of these instruments related to the establishment of the SCSL, the relevant 
parts of the SCSL’s decision will be critically examined. Only then the availability of 
immunity from jurisdiction can be properly assessed. A two-part process consists of (i) 
description of the content of these legal instruments and (ii) analysis of their binding 
effects.
3.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000)
Resolution 1315 was adopted on 14 August 2000 and its preamble, it expressed 
concerns about the very serious crimes committed within the territory of Sierra 
Leone and reiterated that “the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute 
a threat to international peace and security in the region.”148 The Security Council 
stressed the need to bring about peace and security in the region, and to ensure that 
“persons who commit or authorize serious violations of international humanitarian 
law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations and that the 
international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in 
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law.”149 
148 SC/2000/1315.
149 Ibid.
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The Security Council recognised that “in the particular circumstances of Sierra 
Leone, a  credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes 
committed there would end impunity and would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace” and further noted 
“the negative impact of the security situation on the administration of justice in Sierra 
Leone and the pressing need for international cooperation to assist in strengthening 
the judicial system of Sierra Leone.”150
In this context, Resolution 1315 mentioned “the desire of the Government of 
Sierra Leone for assistance from the United Nations in establishing a  strong and 
credible court that will meet the objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting 
peace.”151 In particular, the steps taken by the Secretary-General in order to assist the 
Government of Sierra Leone in establishing the SCSL were appreciated. The operative 
part of Resolution 1315 contains request to the Secretary-General to “negotiate an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court 
consistent with this resolution…”152
 
As for the personal jurisdiction of the independent special court, Resolution 1315 
recommended the exercise of jurisdiction:
over persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the crimes 
referred to in paragraph 2 (crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra 
Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone), including those 
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.153
Importantly, Resolution 1315 also requested the Secretary-General to include 
recommendations on concluding any additional agreements that may be required for 
the provision of international assistance. Lastly, it requested the Secretary-General to 
recommend whether the SCSL could receive, as necessary and feasible, expertise and 
advice from the ICTY and the ICTR.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., (operative part), para. 1 (emphasis added).
153 Ibid., para. 3.
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3.2 Report of the UN Secretary-General 
The UN Secretary-General was requested to submit a  Report154 to the Security 
Council on the implementation of Resolution 1315, in particular on his consultations 
and negotiations with the Government of Sierra Leone concerning the establishment 
of the SCSL, including recommendations.155 The UN Secretary-General examined the 
specificity and nature of the SCSL and expressed views important for the subsequent 
analysis of its legal basis. It is therefore useful to quote his statement almost in its 
entirety:
The legal nature of the Special Court, like that of any other legal entity, is determined 
by its constitutive instrument. Unlike either the International Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia or for Rwanda, which were established by resolutions of the 
Security Council and constituted as subsidiary organs of the United Nations, or 
national courts established by law, the Special Court, as foreseen, is established by an 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and 
is therefore a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition. 
[…]. As a  treaty-based organ, the Special Court is not anchored in any existing 
system (i.e., United Nations administrative law or the national law of the State of 
the seat) […].
The Special Court has concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over Sierra Leonean 
courts. […] The primacy of the Special Court, however, is limited to the national courts 
of Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third States. Lacking the power 
to assert its primacy over national courts in third States in connection with the crimes 
committed in Sierra Leone, it also lacks the power to request the surrender of an accused 
from any third State and to induce the compliance of its authorities with any such 
request. In examining measures to enhance the deterrent powers of the Special Court, 
the Security Council may wish to consider endowing it with Chapter VII powers for the 
specific purpose of requesting the surrender of an accused from outside the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Beyond its legal and technical aspects, which in many ways resemble those 
of other international jurisdictions, the Special Court is Sierra Leone-specific.156 
The Report also states that the SCSL is established outside the national court system, 
which means that it operates “independently of the relevant national system”,157 along 
with the ICTY and ICTR.
154 Report, supra note 81. 
155 SC/2000/1315, para. 6.
156 Part II of the Report, supra note 81, paras. 9-11.
157 Ibid., para. 39.
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3.3 Agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone 
After the breakdown of the Abidjan and the Lome Peace Agreements158 the President 
of Sierra Leone sought international assistance with respect to the establishment 
of the independent court. The Security Council directed the Secretary-General by 
Resolution 1315 to report on how to implement this idea. The Agreement159 was 
subsequently concluded on 16 January 2002, after the adoption of Resolution 1315 
and following the subsequent negotiations between the Secretary-General and the 
Government of Sierra Leone. There was no explicit statement about immunity in the 
Agreement. Article 1(1) of the Agreement simply provided that: “[t]here is hereby 
established a Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”160
The Agreement addressed issues such as the functioning of the SCSL in accordance 
with its Statute, its composition and appointment of judges,161 expenses of the 
SCSL (voluntary contributions from the international community), Management 
Committee, established by interested States in order to assist the Secretary-General 
in obtaining adequate funding, and provide advice and policy direction on all non-
judicial aspects, the seat of the SCSL162 and the important issue of juridical capacities 
in order to be also able to enter into agreements with other States if it is necessary for 
the exercise of its functions.163
158 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, Lome Accord, 7 July 1999, available at www.sierra-leone.
org/lomeaccord.html (last visited 15 March 2007). 
159 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, available 
at www.sierraleone. org/specialcourtagreement.html (last visited on 6 March 2005). 
The Agreement was signed by Hans Corell on behalf of the UN and Solomon Berewa, 
Attorney General, on behalf of the Sierra Leone Government on 16 January 2002.
160 Ibid., Art. 1(1).
161 The Secretary-General shall appoint two of the three Trial Chamber judges and three of 
the five Appeals Chamber judges, (Art. 2(2)(a) and (c)). The UN Secretary-General also 
appoints the Prosecutor (Art. 3(1) and the Registrar (Art. 4(1)).
162 Article 10 reads: “The Special Court shall have its seat in Sierra Leone. The Court may 
meet away from its seat if it considers it necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions, 
and may be relocated outside Sierra Leone, if circumstances so require”, supra note 
162. Indeed, this situation has already arisen. The SCSL held the proceedings against 
Charles Taylor at the premises of the International Criminal Court at The Hague, The 
Netherlands.
163 Ibid.
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3.4 Statute of the SCSL
The Statute, which is annexed to the Agreement, describes all the applicable rules 
pertaining to the SCSL. Article 1(1) of the Statute provides that:
[t]he Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), have the power 
to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of 
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing 
such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace 
process in Sierra Leone.164
The SCSL may prosecute persons who have committed crimes against humanity 
(Art. 2), violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II (Art. 3), other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Art. 
4), and certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Art. 5). Article 6(2), crucial for the 
treatment of immunity, provides that: “[t]he official position of any accused persons, 
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall 
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”165 This 
provision is identical to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, and broadly similar to that of 
the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals. 
Under Article 8 of the Statute, the SCSL has concurrent jurisdiction with the 
national courts of Sierra Leone and primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone 
in prosecution of crimes falling under its jurisdiction. The SCSL can therefore request 
national courts of Sierra Leone to defer to its jurisdiction in certain cases. Article 14 
states that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR are applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the conduct of proceedings before the SCSL. According to Article 25, the 
President of the SCSL is required to submit an annual report to the UN Secretary-
General and to the Government of Sierra Leone. 
3.5 Sierra Leonean Law of 2002: Special Court Agreement 
(Ratification) Act
In 2002, the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed the Special Court Agreement 
(Ratification) Act.166 Since Sierra Leone has a dualist system with respect to reception of 
164 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at www.sc-sl.org (last visited 28 
October 2008).
165 Ibid., Art. 6(2).
166 (Ratification) Act 2002 is the ratification and implementation Bill by the Parliament of 
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international law into domestic legal system, the Act provides for the implementation 
of the Agreement into domestic law of Sierra Leone. It includes provisions in relation 
to inviolability, immunity and personality. Section 11(2) of the Act deals with the 
position of the SCSL within the domestic judiciary. 
The Act clearly states that the SCSL shall not form part of the judiciary of Sierra 
Leone.167 The crimes before the SCSL are thus not prosecuted in the name of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone. In this respect, the SCSL differs from the ECCC, which 
are established “in the existing court structure” of Cambodia, the same applies for the 
WCC established within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Sierra Leone of the Agreement between the Government and the UN, available at http://
www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scslratificationact. pdf (last visited 23 June 2007).
167 Ibid.
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4 Legal Instruments: Analysis of Their Bindings 
Effects 
4.1 Legal Significance of the Lack of Chapter VII Powers of the 
UN Charter
The considerable attention given to binding effects of Resolution 1315 during 
this analysis is justified by the fact that the SCSL attempted to establish its legal 
basis under Chapter VII powers. If it had been indeed the case, it would have had 
important implications for immunity afforded by contemporary international law to, 
at the time of the issuance of indictment, an incumbent Head of State.168 
This part will however reveal some shortcomings and inconsistencies in the SCSL’s 
reasoning and prove that the SCSL’s findings were not correct. Indeed, arguments 
of the SCSL relating to the bindings effects of Resolution 1315 were not very 
convincing, some of them were rather confusing and even contradictory. The following 
observations made by the SCSL can serve as an illustration of this contradiction. 
Firstly, the SCSL underlined that where the Security Council decides to establish 
a court as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security, it may or 
may not, at the same time, call upon the members of the United Nations to lend their 
cooperation to such court as a matter of obligation.169 By invoking the terminology 
of Chapter VII and terminology used in resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR, 
i.e. by using the phrase ‘as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and 
security’, the SCSL clearly tried to bring its establishment under the umbrella of 
Chapter VII powers, despite the fact that the language of Resolution 1315 does not 
support this conclusion.
168 The impact of the legal basis of the court on immunities of Head of State is dealt with in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In short, it is suggested that a right to claim immunity (as a part of 
customary international law) preexists also before international courts and can be thus 
lost only under certain circumstances.
169 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 38. 
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Secondly, the SCSL at the same time admitted that it was lacking Chapter VII 
powers by stating that the lack of Chapter VII powers “does not by itself define the 
legal status of the Special Court.”170 Similarly, in his amicus curiae submission, Sands 
stated that despite the fact that Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII, 
it however reiterated that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security in the region.171
Regarding the SCSL’s status as an international criminal court, the SCSL in its 
decision focused on the UN’s involvement with the establishment of the SCSL. The 
main attention of the SCSL was given to the authority of the Security Council to 
enter into an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone in order to establish 
the SCSL. According to the SCSL, this authority could emanate from (i) the general 
purposes of the UN as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter;172 as well as (ii) the specific 
powers under Article 39 and 41 to undertake appropriate measures to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.173 
When examining Resolution 1315, the SCSL concentrated on the second scenario, 
i.e. on the Security Council’s specific powers under Article 39 and 41. Resolution 
1315 authorized the UN Secretary-General to negotiate the establishment of the SCSL, 
while reaffirming in the preamble that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.174 Does the mere reaffirmation 
in the preamble that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to 
peace suffice to imply the binding effect of this Resolution? 
As opposed to the resolutions establishing the ICTY and the ICTR, which 
specifically invoked Article 41 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council did not expressly state that it was acting under Chapter VII when authorizing 
the UN Secretary-General to conclude an agreement with the Government of Sierra 
Leone. Even though the Security Council does not have to expressly refer to Chapter 
VII when taking mandatory measures, it has become standard practice for the SC to 
state that it is ‘acting under Chapter VII of the Charter’.175 At the same time, it is true 
170 Ibid. 
171 P. Sands; D. Orentlicher, supra note 142.
172 Article 1 states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to maintain international 
peace and security.
173 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 37.
174 C. Jalloh, ‘Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles 
Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, ASIL Insights (2004), available at http://
www.asil.org/insigh145.cfm (last visited 4 May 2007).
175 B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A  Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
57
4 Legal Instruments: Analysis of Their Bindings Effects
that the Security Council often determined the existence of a threat to peace without 
a reference to Chapter VII and thus left the legal basis in doubt.176 
Accordingly, it may be argued that the Resolution 1315 could serve as another 
example of leaving its legal basis unclear. The Security Council reiterated that the 
situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. But it did so only in a preamble, not in the operative part. 
According to Simma, “unless other factors indicate that action under Chapter VII 
is envisaged, such resolutions should, according to the general rule, be interpreted 
narrowly”.177 Simma argues that resolutions that cannot be considered as adopted under 
Chapter VII do not create binding effects for member States.178 In our case, it is submitted 
that there were no other factors indicating any intention to adopt Resolution 1315 under 
Chapter VII, except the terminology similar with Article 39. Indeeed, as Racsmany 
suggests, “instead of using classical Chapter VII verbs such as ‘demands’, or the imperative 
‘shall’, the language falls even short of ‘calling upon’ states to undertake certain measures”.179
In order to further support the above conclusions, one can point to the request of 
the President of the SCSL to the Security Council to grant the SCSL Chapter VII 
powers, which has never occurred.180 There would certainly be no need for this request 
should Resolution 1315 be already adopted under Chapter VII powers. There would 
also be little need to arrange any subsequent cooperation agreements as envisaged in 
paragraph 8 of Resolution 1315.181 In subsequent resolutions regarding the situation 
in Sierra Leone, the Security Council has called upon all states to ‘cooperate fully’ 
with the SCSL, but has not resorted to Chapter VII mandatory procedure.182 
University Press, 2002), p. 727.
176 See e.g., SC Res 502 (1982) (‘breach of the peace’, Falkland conflict), SC Res 393 (1976) 
(Zambia, ‘armed conflict’ by South Africa), SC Res 1227 (1999) (Eritrea and Ethiopia). 
177 Simma, supra note 175, p. 727.
178 Ibid., p. 455.
179 Z. Deen-Racsmany, ‘Prosecutor v. Taylor: The Status of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and Its Implications for Immunity’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 
(2005), quoting from P. C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’, 96 American 
Journal of International Law 901 (2002), p. 902. 
180 See Report supra note 84, para. 10. See also Press Release of the SCSL (11 June 2003), 
available at www.sc-sl.org (last visited 18 October 2010).
181 Resolution 1315, para. 8: “Requests the Secretary-General to include recommendations on the 
following: (a) any additional agreements that may be required for the provision of the international 
assistance which will be necessary for the establishment and functioning of the special court.”
182 Security Council Resolutions 1478 (2003), 1508 (2003). 
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The SCSL’s conclusions that Chapter VII powers are not determinative of its legal 
basis (i.e. whether it is an international or a national court) were certainly correct. 
Still, both the SCSL and Sands were nevertheless trying to imply the binding nature 
of Resolution 1315. Why, if the international legal basis of the SCSL can be clearly 
supported by the fact that the SCSL was established by international agreement? 
It is suggested that proving the binding effects of Resolution 1315 either under 
Chapter VII or under other provisions of UN Charter (e.g. Article 25 in connection 
with Chapter VI) would have crucial implications with respect to issues such as 
(obligatory) cooperation of states other than Sierra Leone with the SCSL or, more 
importantly for our purposes, withdrawal of immunities of serving Head of State 
should the agreement be found unsatisfactory in regulating these issues.183 It seems 
that the SCSL was trying to ‘cure’ shortcomings of a merely bilateral agreement by 
trying to imply binding effects of Resolution 1315 in order to justify the denial of 
immunity of a Head of State of another country.
4.2 No Need for Chapter VII Powers?
The above conclusion that Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII powers 
is further supported by the argument that, at least initially, there was no need for Chapter VII 
powers. The Security Council can define its involvement in any matter either under Chapter 
VI or Chapter VII. Involvement under Chapter VII powers allows the Security Council to 
‘intervene’ in the respective state without the consent of that state. It is submitted that, in 
the case of Sierra Leone, there was actually no need to impose measures under Chapter VII. 
The SCSL’s establishment was initiated by the President of Sierra Leone. Hence, 
the Security Council’s involvement was based on the invitation and request for 
international assistance and help from the UN by Sierra Leone itself. The government 
of Sierra Leone was willing to cede jurisdiction to the SCSL, although its original 
request was limited to assistance in conducting trials of the RUF.184 The establishment 
of the SCSL was thus clearly consensual.185
183 The agreement and its binding effects will be dealt with in Chapter 4.3.
184 However, the SCSL itself did not approve the delegation of jurisdiction because it would arguably 
diminish its claim to its international nature. According to the SCSL “the establishment of the 
Special Court did not involve a transfer of jurisdiction of sovereignty by Sierra Leone…the judicial 
power exercised by the Special Court is not that of Sierra Leone, but that of the Special Court itself 
reflecting the interests of the international community”, in Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-
15-AR72(E), Decision on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court, 25 May 2004, para. 6.
185 It can be nonetheless argued that the fact that Sierra Leone requested the help with 
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It is the first time that a court has been established on the basis of an agreement 
between the UN and a member state. Accordingly, there was no need for Chapter 
VII powers in a sense of imposing the establishment of the SCSL on Sierra Leone, 
as the situation differed significantly from the situations in the former Yugoslavia or 
Rwanda, where the two ad hoc tribunals were established without the consent, or even 
against the will, of the respective countries. 
During the proceedings before the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor stated 
that “Chapter VII powers were needed in the case of Yugoslavia and Rwanda because 
there was no agreement with the States concerned. Here, in Sierra Leone, that is not 
the case.”186 Thus, the SCSL is a similar creation, but one that is in the Prosecutor’s 
view actually more democratic, because Sierra Leone has explicitly agreed to its 
establishment. Both the Prosecutor and the Defence in the Fofana case acknowledged 
that the SCSL might not enjoy all of the consequences as if it had been established by 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII.187 
While pointing to Chapter VII as the legal basis for concluding the agreement 
between the UN and Sierra Leone, the SCSL did not elaborate any further on the first 
scenario, i.e. how (or if ) the general purposes of the UN as expressed in Article 1 of 
the Charter applied to its establishment. 
Article 1 states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to maintain international 
peace and security. Decisions taken under other Articles may be regarded, according to 
Simma, as “implementing such purposes and principles.”188 In his view, international 
peace and security can be promoted and achieved through various policies or measures. 
This can include (1) measures of collective security taken under Chapter VII and (2) 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations under Chapter VI. Thus, 
Article 1 identifies another path to maintain international peace and security.189 
establishment of the SCSL and was thus certainly willing to cooperate in all respects, 
does not mean that other State will be willing to voluntarily cooperate as well. Especially 
when it comes to requests for arrest and extradition of an incumbent Head of State of 
another country.
186 Report on proceedings before the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(1 November 2003), available online at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/
WhatHappening/ReportAppealHearings01NOV03.html (last visited 12 April 2011).
187 Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary 
Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal Delegation of Jurisdiction by Sierra Leone, 25 
May 2004.
188 Simma, supra note 175.
189 Ibid.
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Since international peace and security can be achieved through various policies 
or measures, there is no need for the UN Charter to anticipate all possibilities to be 
used. The UN Charter for example also originally did not anticipate peacekeeping 
missions.190 Despite the fact the UN Charter does not explicitly mention peacekeeping, 
it was suggested that it could be implied from the UN’s primary purpose as stated in 
Article 1, i.e. the primary purpose of the UN being to maintain international peace 
and security.191 The UN therefore must possess powers and means in order to be able 
to fulfil its primary purpose.192 Construing the powers of the UN in the Charter too 
strictly could prevent the UN from acting. The Charter as a flexible legal and political 
document allows for many possible approaches and interpretations, depending upon 
the given international situation.193 
There was consensus among many policymakers that peace could be jeopardized 
if certain individuals and factions were not neutralized. The peacekeeping mission in 
Sierra Leone was at that time the largest in history and the international community 
was already investing huge financial resources. The international community and the 
government of Sierra Leone both sought to stabilize the country. In this context, the 
study conducted by No Peace Without Justice Initiative stated that:
The government wanted the RUF leadership tried without the instability that would 
result from national trials. The international community wanted to prosecute those 
responsible for attacks on UN peacekeepers. While the evaluation criteria have since 
changed to encompass notions of legacy and promoting the rule of law, the Special 
Court was originally conceptualized as central to redressing security concerns.194 
190 The UN Charter neither explicitly mentions nor authorizes peacekeeping. As the former 
UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs stated, “[t]he technique of peace-
keeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations. The Charter does not mention 
it. It was discovered, like penicillin. We came across it, while looking for something 
else, during an investigation of the guerrilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947.” In 
B. Urquhart, ‘The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping’, 
quoting from A. K. Henrikson (ed.), Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and 
Architecture of Global Diplomacy 59 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), p. 62. 
191 J. P. Bialke, ‘United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of 
the Law of Armed Conflict’, Air Force Law Review (2001). 
192 “[T]he Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential 
to it in the course of its duties,” see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations, Advisory opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, para. 182.
193 M. R. Berdal, ‘The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold 
War’, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 71, 73 (1996).
194 No Peace Without Justice Conflict Mapping in Sierra Leone: Violations of International 
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Maintaining peace and security was therefore one of the main motivations for 
establishing the SCSL.195 The Security Council’s role in establishing the SCSL could 
be thus also justified under the general powers of the Security Council under Article 
1 and their subsequent implementation through Chapter VI.196 
It is submitted that none of the two mentioned sources of authorization for the 
Security Council should be disputed. The power of the Security Council to enter 
into an agreement for the establishment of the SCSL was clearly derived from the 
Charter of the UN. There is no reason why the Security Council could not base its 
authority to act either (1) on the basis of the general purposes of the UN as expressed 
in Article 1 of the Charter or (2) on the basis of the specific powers under Article 39 
and 41 to undertake appropriate measures to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 
What can be nevertheless subject to criticism is an attempt of the SCSL to imply the 
binding effect of Resolution 1315 based allegedly on specific powers of the Security 
Council under Articles 39 and 41. Resolution 1315 contains just recommendations 
with respect to the subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction of the SCSL 
and requests for the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government 
of Sierra Leone, to submit a report to the Security Council on the implementation of 
this Resolution or to address in his Report the questions of the temporal jurisdiction 
of the SCSL and other issues pertaining to the establishment of the SCSL. Resolution 
1315 should be rather viewed as another path to promote and maintain international 
peace and security via adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
under Chapter VI.197 
Humanitarian Law from 1991 to 2002 (10 March 2004), at p. 14, available at http://
www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf (last visited 17 April 2012).
195 Ibid. This holds true especially for the United Kingdom, which led the operations in 
Sierra Leone.
196 In the Namibia Advisory Opinion the ICJ noted that Article 24 of the UN Charter “vests 
in the Security Council the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in the 
present case (i.e. the adoption of Resolution 276 (1970). The reference in paragraph 2 
of this Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the 
Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to discharge the responsibilities 
conferred in paragraph 1.” See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (SouthWest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 14, pp. 52–53, para. 110.
197 Chapter VI actions usually rest in providing assistance to a  state in order to help the 
state to maintain peace and order, but do not include the possibility of enforcement as 
oppose to actions under Chapter VII powers. Racsmany for example suggests that the 
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While concluding that Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII, the 
question can still be raised as to its binding effects. In other words, can resolutions 
adopted under Chapter VI in general, and Resolution 1315 in particular, be 
nevertheless still binding on the member states? The opinions vary, which might be 
one of the reasons why the SCSL did not wish to enter into this discussion and instead 
tried to bring adoption of Resolution 1315 under Chapter VII powers. However, the 
prevailing view is that under certain specific circumstances, some Resolutions, even if 
not adopted under Chapter VII, can still have legally binding effects. 
Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that members of the UN “agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.” It is submitted that Article 25 does not necessarily apply only to decisions 
taken under Chapter VII (i.e. decisions on enforcement measures). According to 
Simma “if one followed such a narrow interpretation of Art. 25, the whole system set 
up for the maintenance of peace would be weakened, and it would clearly run counter 
to the overall concept of the Charter. Furthermore, Art. 25 would be unnecessary as 
the binding effect of decisions taken under Chapter VII could already be achieved on 
the basis of Art. 48 and Art 49.”198 
To further support this view, one can refer to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,199 where 
the ICJ held that “the decisions made by the Security Council […] were adopted in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its 
Articles 24 and 25.200 The decisions are consequently binding on all States Members 
establishment of the SCSL “is better compared to classical, consensual peacekeeping 
operations. These are generally considered as falling under Chapter VI or between 
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Their legal basis is in any case commonly 
located outside of Chapter VII.” See Z. Racsmany, supra note 182, p. 308.
198 Simma, supra note 175, p. 458. 
199 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (for 
a full citation see supra note 196). Compare with statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross in 
the ICJ Corfu Channel case, where he asserted that recommendations “under Chapter 
VI of the Charter, relating to methods of settling disputes which endanger peace, are 
binding.” He contested the applicability of Article 25 only to Chapter VII, by stating 
that such position, in his opinion, “is completely untenable. [Even] if one were to 
disregard […] the preparatory work and the commentaries, one could not find in the 
Charter itself a shred of support for the view that Article 25 is limited in its application 
to Chapter VII of the Charter”, See Corfu Channel Case, Prelim. Objections, Pleadings 
Vol. III, (1949) ICJ Rep., 72, pp. 76-77. 
200 In the Fofana case, the SCSL held that Article 24(1) may be invoked as the direct basis 
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of the UN which are thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.”201 By 
adopting this contextual approach, the ICJ further stated: 
It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement 
measures adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the 
Charter any support for this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard 
to enforcement action but applies to “the decisions of the Security Council” adopted 
in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, 
but immediately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the 
functions and powers of the Security Council…The language of a resolution of the 
Security Council should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as 
to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers of Article 25, the question 
is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to 
be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provision invoked and, in 
general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of 
the resolution of the Security Council.202
Even if this contextual approach would be adopted and applied to Resolution 1315, it 
can be still concluded that in the light of interpretation of all circumstances (i.e. language 
and terms of Resolution 1315, its content and purpose, the discussions leading to its 
adoption or the UN Charter provisions invoked), Resolution 1315 was not intended 
to have binding effects. Resolution 1315 contains mere recommendations regarding the 
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction of the SCSL and requests for the UN 
Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone.
4.2.1 Summary of the Relevant Findings Relating to Chapter VII Powers 
Proving that Resolution 1315 was indeed adopted under Chapter VII would have 
crucial implications for withdrawal of immunities of serving Head of State should the 
agreement be found unsatisfactory in regulating these issues. It is however suggested that 
Resolution 1315, which recommended the establishment of the SCSL, was not adopted 
under Chapter VII powers despite the attempt of the SCSL to prove otherwise. 
for action of the United Nations, i.e. for the establishment of the Agreement pursuant to 
the Resolution 1315 (2000). The SCSL further stated that Article 24(2), which refers to 
the specific powers granted to the Security Council is not exhaustive and must be read 
as fulfilling the function of closing the gaps. It was argued by the Prosecutor that if the 
Security Council can establish an international tribunal under Article 41, there is no 
reason why it could not take the same action under Article 24 of the Charter when the 
state affected has consented. See supra note 187.
201 See supra note 196, p. 53, para. 115. 
202 Ibid.
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There are some doctrinal opinions203 and advisory opinions of the ICJ204 suggesting 
that the resolution can be still binding under certain circumstances even if not adopted 
under Chapter VII powers, however, it is not a case in the context of Resolution 1315. 
There was no intention of the Security Council to adopt this resolution as binding for 
reasons provided above. 
Moreover, the SCSL was not even established by the SC Resolution, as opposed to 
the ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL was established by a bilateral agreement pursuant to 
Resolution 1315. For the reasons given, it is not possible to imply binding effects of 
Resolution 1315 for the purposes of denying immunity to high-ranking state officials 
as was in the case of the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL should 
instead direct its attention to the binding effects of Agreement establishing the SCSL. 
Accordingly, this issue will be addressed next. 
4.3 Binding Effects of the Agreement between the UN and the 
Republic of Sierra Leone
Apart from Resolution 1315, attention needs to be given to the Agreement that 
actually establishes the SCSL.205 Analysis of the Agreement is the next important step 
in order to identify those who are the parties to the Agreement and thus bound by its 
provisions. While focusing on the binding effects of Resolution 135, the SCSL did 
not pay much attention to the Agreement as such. 
The SCSL adopted conclusions reached by both amici curiae.206 According to one 
amicus curiae, Orentlicher, the Security Council by authorizing the UN Secretary-
General to negotiate an Agreement with Sierra Leone was not only carrying out its 
responsibility to maintain peace and security, but “in doing so, it was acting on behalf 
of all Members of the United Nations”.207 
203 See e.g. Simma, supra note 175, p. 458.
204 See the Namibia Case, supra note 196. 
205 The SCSL justified the fact the SCSL is treaty-based by referring to Article 2(1)(a) in 
connection with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
between States and International Organizations (The 1986 Vienna Convention) and 
provided a  modified version of Article 2(1) by defining international treaty as “an 
international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written form…
between one or more states (in this instance Sierra Leone) and one or more international 
organizations (in this instance UN). 
206 See supra note 142.
207 Ibid., para. 12.
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Subsequently, the SCSL developed this argument further by stating that since the 
Security Council was acting “on behalf of all Members of the United Nations”, the 
Agreement is to be regarded as “between all members of the United Nations and Sierra 
Leone”.208 According to the SCSL “this fact makes the Agreement an expression of the 
will of the international community”.209 However, it is rather disputable to assert, as 
the SCSL did, that only by virtue of the fact that States are members of the UN, they 
are therefore parties to the Agreement and accordingly are bound by its provisions. 
Both State practice and scholarly opinions210 show that the conclusion of the SCSL 
was not correct. For example Article 17 of the SCSL Statute states “the Government shall 
cooperate with all organs of the Special Court at all stages of the proceedings”. Article 17 
therefore addresses obligation to cooperate only for the government of Sierra Leone. Are 
third States also obliged to cooperate with the SCSL and if so, on what legal basis? 
It is suggested that the Agreement cannot be interpreted so broadly. For example, 
Damgaard claims that such consequences of the UN membership were not envisaged 
when the UN Charter was adopted and further suggests that if the Agreement was 
indeed between all the UN member States and Sierra Leone, then the UN member 
States would assume obligations under such Agreement.211 However, no State expressed 
that it feels bound by this Agreement. In fact, many States acted otherwise.212 
The SCSL itself approved the limitation of the SCSL when it stated that: “[w]hile 
208 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 38.
209 Ibid.
210 See e.g. “Since the Special Court was set up by treaty between Sierra Leone and the 
United Nations; no other state is party to this treaty and hence is not bound by it”, in: 
H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Preface to Paperback Edition), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 23. 
211 Damgaard, supra note 11.
212 For example, we may refer to the Ghana’s failure to arrest Taylor or Nigeria’s refusal to 
extradite Taylor. Moreover, Liberia initiated proceedings against Sierra Leone before the 
ICJ. Liberia referred to the Yerodia case and argued that the SCSL is not an international 
court that could deny immunity to its President. Liberia requested the ICJ to declare 
that: “the issue of the indictment and the arrest warrant of 7 March 2003 and its 
international circulation, failed to respect the immunity from a  criminal jurisdiction 
and the inviolability of a Head of State which an incumbent President of the Republic 
of Liberia enjoys under international law.” Nevertheless, Sierra Leone did not accept 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. See ‘Liberia 
applies to the International Court of Justice in a dispute with Sierra Leone concerning 
an international arrest warrant issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone against the 
Liberian President’, ICJ Press Release No. 2003/26 (5 August 2003), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iprlast.html (last visited 17 October 2012). 
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acknowledging that the ICTY and ICTR have Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter 
ensuring that there is an obligation on all UN members to cooperate, in the case 
of the Special Court, as the Agreement is between the UN and Sierra Leone, its 
primacy is limited to Sierra Leone alone, as also the obligation to co-operate with the 
Special Court.”213 
Under these circumstances, it is hard to maintain the position that the Agreement 
is to be regarded as ‘between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone’. 
Becoming a party to a treaty ‘by interpretation’ does not respect principles of State 
sovereignty.214 Furthermore, the UN possesses separate legal personality and such as 
“is more than a sum of its members and the organization occupies a position in certain 
respects in detachment from its members.”215 As a general matter, treaties concluded 
by the UN do not bind member States by the virtue of membership alone.
At this point, it is useful to reiterate what led the SCSL’s to emphasize the role and 
involvement of the Security Council in the establishment of the SCSL. As already 
indicated in Chapter 4.1, the SCSL did so arguably in order to imply binding effects 
of Resolution 1315 and therefore by implication also binding effects of the Agreement 
for all member states of the UN. It is nevertheless suggested that individual member 
States remain third parties and are thus not bound by bilateral agreement (pacta tertiis 
nec nocent nec prosunt). In this respect, Nollkaemper noted that, “the SCSL is not 
a creature of the Security Council. Its powers derive from a  treaty that binds only 
the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone. All other states, including Ghana and 
Liberia, are third parties to the treaty, and as such are not bound by it.”216
An alternative approach, which was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in his 
Report, would be the conclusion of a multilateral treaty by all UN member States. 
On the one hand, this approach would allow the treaty to be opened for signature 
and ratification by all member States.217 The advantage of this approach would be 
the possibility of a detailed examination and elaboration of all issues relevant to the 
213 Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the 
Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of the 
Accused Fofana, 3 March 2004, para. 69.
214 See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations 1986 (Convention). Article 34 
of the Convention provides that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for 
a third state without the consent of that State. 
215 Reparation of Injuries Suffered in The Service of the United Nations, supra note 195, p. 174.
216 C. P.R. Romano, A. Nollkaemper, supra note 12.
217 Report, supra note 81.
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establishment of the international tribunal. States participating in the negotiation 
and conclusion of the treaty could then fully exercise their sovereign will, in particular 
whether they wish to become parties to the treaty or not.218 
On the other hand, this approach will admittedly require considerable time to 
establish the treaty and subsequently to achieve the required number of ratifications 
for entry into force.219 Even then, there could be no guarantee that ratifications will 
be received from those States, which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly 
effective.220 Therefore, what sounds as legally more elegant approach, might prove 
unfeasible from the practical point of view. 
The following statements well illustrate the divergence of views on the way of 
establishment of the SCSL. In the Fofana case, applicant argued that the UN illegally 
delegated its powers in this respect and suggested that, “the situation may have been 
different if the court had been set up by the agreement involving a wide group of 
concerned states.”221 
In contrast, Judge Robertson expressed his views on the establishment of the SCSL 
through bilateral treaty by stating:
it cannot in my judgement make any meaningful difference that the Security Council has 
chosen to authorise the Secretary-General to establish the Court with a similar purpose 
by agreement with a single state (a state where peace need to be restored) rather than by 
unilateral action or by action in agreement with many states... multilateral agreement 
would presumably make it more difficult for the Security Council to e.g. terminate 
a court, since it would need the agreement of a number of states rather than one.222 
It is respectfully submitted that there is a ‘meaningful difference’ in establishing the 
court by bilateral or multilateral treaty. The SCSL’s legal basis is certainly international 
regardless of the number of parties to the treaty, i.e. whether it is established by 
bilateral or multilateral treaty.223 The difference lies in the fact that the bilateral 
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Prosecutor v. Fofana, supra note 187, para. 7.
222 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara, Case No. SCSL 2004-14-AR72(E), Decision 
on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, Separate Opinion of Judge Robertson,13 
March 2004, para. 5. 
223 The Secretary-General rightly held that the legal nature of the SCSL is determined by 
its constitutive instrument. Since the constitutive instrument is an agreement between 
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agreement is arguably binding only on Sierra Leone; it does not bind any other State. 
This conclusion has important consequences for the purposes of denying immunity of 
an incumbent Head of State of a third country not party to the treaty, as we shall see 
in Part III dealing with immunities.224 
By concluding that it is indeed an international court, the SCSL automatically 
assumed that it could deny immunity to the Head of State of another country.225 It is 
however submitted that the SCSL ignored the bilateral treaty nature of the SCSL and 
therefore did not correctly address the consequences flowing from such legal basis.226 
The situation is further complicated by the special legal nature of the SCSL, whose 
examination thus follows. 
4.4 Hybrid Nature of the SCSL Not Recognised
The SCSL is often referred to as a ‘hybrid court’.227 Some refer to its hybrid nature 
due to the fact that under the SCSL Statute, not only crimes under international law, 
but also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law can be prosecuted and punished. 
The mixed composition of both internationals and Sierra Leoneans within the SCSL 
is often emphasized as another sign of the SCSL’s hybrid nature. However, as already 
noted in Chapter 1, the legal nature of the court is not determined by the applicable 
law and/or by the nationality of the staff.228 
a state - Sierra Leone - and an international organization - the UN - the legal nature of 
the SCSL is international. 
224 See Part III, in particular Chapters 7 and 8.
225 See different reasoning provided by Akande in respect to an assertion of jurisdiction over 
US nationals by the ICC, which can usually be interpreted as “a violation of the well-
established principle that a treaty may not impose obligations on non-parties without 
the consent of those parties.” Akande however suggests that: “there is no provision in the 
ICC Statute that requires non-party states (as distinct from their nationals) to perform 
or to refrain from performing any actions. The Statute does not impose any obligations 
on or create any duties for non-party states. To be sure, the prosecution of non-party 
nationals might affect the interests of that non-party but this is not the same as saying 
that obligations are imposed on the non-party.” In: Akande, supra note 108, pp. 407-433. 
226 Frulli, supra note 66.
227 See e.g. S. Linton, ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International 
Justice’, 14 Criminal Law Forum (2001), p. 231, describing the SCSL as a ‘new species of 
tribunal’ (internationalised domestic tribunals). 
228 See differently, Cryer, who argues that the applicable law also determines the legal 
nature of a court. R. Cryer, ‘A “Special Court” for Sierra Leone’, 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly (2001), p. 437.
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The hybrid nature of the SCSL was also emphasized by Richard Holbrooke, who 
has been an active supporter of the establishment of the SCSL in the Security Council. 
After Resolution 1315 was passed, Holbrook described the proposed character of the 
SCSL in the following way:
This court is going to be of a hybrid nature […]. We have not asked the United 
Nations to set up another international war crimes tribunal such as the ones that exist 
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but rather we have asked the Secretary-General to work 
with the Sierra Leone Government for what I would call a mixed court, although the 
actual phrase of this resolution is “Special Court.”229 
At the beginning, Resolution 1315 anticipated the possibility for the SCSL to 
share the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and the ICTR. However, according to 
the UN Assistant Secretary-General Office of Legal affairs Zachlin: “the judges in 
those two courts were very apprehensive of the legal efficacy of such an arrangement 
given the different nature of the two court systems” and he further explained that the 
judges “felt that it would be very difficult for an appeals chamber of the Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda Tribunals to be sitting as an appeals chamber for a Sierra Leone Court 
which has its own statute and which is operating on the basis of its own jurisdictional 
provisions. And they felt very uncomfortable with that. And it seems to us that this 
was a very legitimate point.”230
The SCSL’s legal nature, even if international due to its constitutive instrument, is to 
a large extent different from the two ad hoc tribunals or the ICC. The SCSL was labeled 
a ‘treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition’.231 The SCSL is 
indeed Sierra Leone specific including the consequences attached to such legal nature. 
Many of the legal choices made were intended to address the specificities of the Sierra 
Leonean conflict. As such, the SCSL has a unique place in international criminal justice 
system.232 Nevertheless, the analysis of the SCSL’s legal basis also revealed new legal 
issues and challenges, including the question of denying immunity to the incumbent 
Head of State of the country not party to a treaty that established the SCSL.
229 Statement by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to the media, following adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution concerning the establishment of a Special Court in Sierra 
Leone at August 14, 2000, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourt081400.
html (last visited 19 September 2012) (emphasis added).
230 Press Briefing by the UN Assistant Secretary-General Office of Legal Affairs, Ralph Za-
cklin, (September 2000), New York, available at www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourt0900.
html (last visited 26 July 2013).
231 Report, supra note 81, para. 9.
232 Ibid.
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It cannot be simply concluded that the SCSL is an international court through 
an attempt to compare it with the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. Shortcomings in its 
establishment via bilateral agreement should have been acknowledged and admitted 
by the SCSL in order not to sacrifice legal clarity and certainty. The SCSL is indeed 
international as for its legal basis. Nevertheless, it is proposed that the question is not 
simply whether the court is international as for its legal basis, but rather whether the 
court’s international legal basis allows for abrogation of immunities.233 
Undeniably, the SCSL possess various international features. Nevertheless, this 
identification does not precisely define the consequences for the purposes of denying 
immunity to high-ranking officials of other States.234 The availability of immunities 
before international tribunals depends mainly on the manner of the court’s 
establishment and on the fact that the establishing instrument of the court binds 
the concerned State.235 The central conclusion of this Chapter is therefore a finding 
that a  classification of a  judicial body as an international criminal court does not 
automatically mean that a State official has no immunity from prosecution before 
that body.236 
Do these findings suggest that Taylor is completely immune from the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the SCSL? No, they rather propose that there is a serious legal issue 
to be discussed in the context of immunities available to a  serving Head of State. 
This complex legal issue will be discussed in Part III in the light of the available 
State practice, relevant jurisprudence as well as scholarly opinions in order to properly 
evaluate the SCSL’s approach in denying immunity ratione personae to a serving Head 
of State of another country. 
233 See e.g. the discussion in Chatham House, one of the questions raised was: “Could state 
A get around the obligation to provide immunity to the head of state B, by entering into 
a treaty with state C to set up an “international” court?”, supra note 14.
234 See e.g. Racsmany “it may thus be concluded that the Sierra Leone–UN Agreement 
cannot endow the SCSL with a  competence to set aside rights pertaining to other 
international legal persons under customary international law. Accordingly, it does not 
in and of itself render immunities of foreign officials irrelevant.”, supra note 182, p. 313.
235 See Akande, supra note 108.
236 See Damgaard, supra note 11.
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Responsibility and the Law of Immunities
After analysing the first part of the SCSL’s decision (i.e. identification of its legal 
basis) and coming to the conclusion that the SCSL is indeed an international court, 
the second part of the decision (i.e. the denial of immunity to a serving Head of State 
due to the SCSL’s international legal basis) will be examined. In particular, it will 
be examined whether the reasoning of the SCSL that immunity ratione personae is 
irrelevant before an international court can be supported and if not, whether there 
was another route for the SCSL to proceed. 
In order to properly contextualize immunities available to Taylor, it is important to 
understand the underlying principles of immunities and protected values. Moreover, 
as noted in the introduction, it is crucial to emphasize that the availability of 
immunities for international crimes depends on the legal basis of the respective court 
(i.e. national or international court) and on the status of the high-ranking official (i.e. 
former or incumbent official). The Part III will assess whether this generally accepted 
dichotomy, which will be used as a point of departure also for our purposes, suffices 
in case of the SCSL. Before doing so, Chapter 5 provides a historical background 
and some general reflections on the development and interplay between individual 
criminal responsibility and the law of immunities.
5.1 Individual Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Under International 
Law
The principle of individual criminal responsibility for crimes under international 
law is firmly established. The submission that international law was not construed 
to punish individuals and is therefore concerned only with acts of States was already 
rejected by the IMT. In this respect, the IMT also refused the opinion that individuals 
who carried out acts of State are not responsible due to the protection provided by the 
doctrine of the State sovereignty. 
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By stating that “international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals 
as well as upon States has long been recognised”237, the IMT confirmed the role of 
individuals as subjects of international law. In its famous quote, the IMT further 
supported the above proposition holding that: “Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”238
Half century later, Watts in his 1994 Lectures at The Hague Academy of 
International Law emphasized the general acceptance of this principle while at the 
same time noting the lack of international judicial mechanisms to exercise jurisdiction 
over international crimes: 
States are artificial legal persons: they can only act through the institutions and 
agencies of the state, which means, ultimately, through its officials and other 
individuals acting on behalf of the state. For international conduct which is so serious 
as to be tainted with criminality to be regarded as attributable only to the impersonal 
state and not to the individuals who ordered or perpetrated it is both unrealistic 
and offensive to common notions of justice. The idea that individuals who commit 
international crimes are internationally accountable for them has now become an 
accepted part of international law. Problems in this area – such as the non-existence 
of any standing international tribunal to have jurisdiction over such crimes – have 
not affected the general acceptance of the principle of individual responsibility for 
international criminal conduct.239 
These rules developed in ‘the framework of an international legal order’ where there was 
no international criminal court and the enforcement was left to national courts.240 By now, 
the non-existence of any international criminal tribunal is clearly no longer the problem. 
However, the enforcement of this principle can, in some circumstances, be frustrated by 
operation of another well-established principle, immunity of a Head of State.241 
237 See the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major 
War Criminals, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 22, p. 466.
238 Ibid.
239 A. Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of 
Government and Foreign Ministers’, in: Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit 
international, 1994, III, p. 82. For more authorities on this point see also A. Cassese, 
supra note 100 or Institut de Droit International, ‘Immunities from Jurisdiction and 
Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law’, Resolution of 26 
August 2001, available at www.idi-iil.org (last visited 6 February 2013).
240 P. Sands, ‘International Law Transformed? From Pinochet to Congo...?’, Leiden Journal 
of International Law 16 (2003), pp. 37-53.
241 For example the US Supreme Court has long maintained that the courts of the United 
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5.2 Immunities - Necessary Evil or Workable Principle? 
In order to correctly assess the validity of the SCSL’s reasoning in Taylor, the 
fundamental principles of international law governing immunities of Head of State 
will be first briefly reviewed. The most well defined area of immunities is that of 
diplomatic immunities, which has always been regulated by its own regime.242 
The contours of Head of State immunity are less clearly delineated.243 There is no 
conventional law (as opposed to diplomatic immunities) and limited State practice 
on this point, although one can notice an increasing tendency to initiate proceedings 
against incumbent or former Heads of State. The doctrine of Head of State immunity 
is largely a  matter of custom.244 The previous lack of State practice is probably 
a reflection of the reluctance of States to interfere with Heads of State.245 
It is widely accepted that Heads of State enjoy at least the same immunities as 
diplomats: immunity ratione personae while in office and immunity ratione materiae 
for official acts that were carried out while in office.246 Often, Head of State immunity 
is indeed treated as a diplomatic immunity.247 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations has been used extensively in order to determine the treatment of Head of 
 
States are bound by suggestion of immunity. The US Supreme Court declared that the 
Executive Branch suggestion of immunity “must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive 
determinative by the political arm of the Government that the court’s retention of 
jurisdiction would jeopardize the conduct of foreign relations.” In Ex Parte Peru 318 
U.S. (1943), para. 588, available at http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/318/578/ 
(last visited 19 October 2011). 
242 R. Cryer; H. Frimain; D. Robinson, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure, Cambridge (2007), p.  424. See e.g. J. C. Barker, The Abuse of Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities: A  Necessary Evil? (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1996), pp. 14-
31; L. S. Frey and M. L. Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1999); G. V. McLanahan, Diplomatic Immunity (New York: St. 
Martin‘s Press, 1989), pp. 18-25.
243 J. L. Mallory, ‘Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined 
Right of Kings,’ 86 Columbia Law Review 169 (1986).
244 This was pronounced, inter alia, by the ICJ in Yerodia. See also Akande, supra note 108; 
J. Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1997); A. Watts, supra note 239.
245 Cryer et al., supra note 242.
246 Ibid., p. 425.
247 See e.g. the Defence Submission in Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 6.
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State.248 Nevertheless, it is suggested that Head of State immunity should be regarded 
as a separate category as was also confirmed, inter alia, by the ICJ in Yerodia. 
Immunities are needed for maintaining a smooth conduct of international relations 
and protecting the officials from any possible interference, which could hamper their 
activities while representing the state in one way or the other. At the same time, the 
availability of immunities especially for commission of crimes under international law, 
can lead to serious injustice.249 
The justifications for immunities have changed quite significantly over time. At 
the same time, it is obvious that not all of these justifications directly correspond and 
address the rationale for Head of State immunity. In addition to that, the rationale 
differs with regard to personal and functional immunity, which will be illustrated 
below. As for now, they can be very briefly summarized as follows. 
The immunity of rulers originally derives from the seventeenth century when 
states were ruled by Divine Right or feudal inheritance.250 At this time, the legal 
fiction of ‘personification’ was created. On this basis the Head of State was personified 
with the State itself.251 Another legal fiction applying to ambassadors was ‘personal 
representation’, when the ambassador was viewed as an equivalent to his Head of 
State. Yet another legal fiction was so called ‘extraterritoriality’, when the premises 
of the mission were regarded as an extension of the sending State’s territory.252 Some 
commentators also add for consideration the need for political expediency253 and 
respect for the dignity of the Head of State as stated in the Schooner Exchange case by 
the ICJ.254 
Stern provides the classical rationale for existence of immunities, adding however 
the different role of immunities before international courts and tribunals: 
It is quite clear that the theory of immunity has developed in order to protect a state 
and its agents from being tried in states’ courts, primarily in the jurisdiction of 
248 E. Denza, Diplomatic Law (Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations) (Oxford: Oxford, 2008), pp. 1 and 8.
249 Cryer et al., supra note 13.
250 G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity (Allen Lane: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 
332-371.
251 Ibid.
252 Cryer et al., supra note 13.
253 See Tahiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (SDNY, 2001) p. 290.
254 See Schooner Exchange v. M’ Fadden 11 US 116 (1812), p. 137.  
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another state. The immunity from arrest as well as the immunity from jurisdiction 
or execution is based on the sovereign equality of states. But naturally, the sovereign 
equality of states does not prevent a  state’s representative from being prosecuted 
before an international court, if this court is given jurisdiction over former or acting 
heads of state”.255
Koller identifies other explanations for possible irrelevance of immunities in front 
of international courts:
(i) the ‘internationalness’ argument, which provides that as the rules governing 
international immunities are primarily derived from international law, the 
international community may determine when those immunities are no longer 
possible; (ii) the ‘world order/constitutional’ argument, which argues that as the 
UN Charter is the constitution of the international community, the UN Security 
Council could bind the entire international community; and (iii) the ‘treaty’ 
argument whereby states which each individually possess the right to waive their 
own immunities, agree by treaty to waive such immunities before an international 
criminal judicial body.256
Piotrowicz also uses the ‘internationalness’ argument while explaining the difference 
between assertion of jurisdiction by international, as opposed to national, courts. 
Justification of a different approach taken by international courts lies, according to 
Piotrowicz, in the ‘internationalness’ of the court and the assertion of jurisdiction by 
such court “in some way represents an interest so important that it overcomes the 
objections.”257
Traditional rationales such as the indignity of putting a Head of State on trial carry 
less weight in the twenty-first century.258 The remaining rationale for immunities is 
their value in facilitating international relations, i.e. functional necessity, which took 
precedence over previous justifications.259 This rationale remains very important; it 
255 B. Stern, ‘Immunities for Head of State: Where Do We Stand?’, in M. Lattimer and 
P.Sands (eds.), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), 
p. 126 (emphasis added). 
256 See D., S., Koller, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the Yerodia 
judgement as it pertains to the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, 
20 American University International Law Review 7 (2004), pp. 30-41, quoted from 
Damgaard supra note 12, p. 272.
257 R. Piotrowicz, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers and their Exposure to Universal 
Jurisdiction, Australian Law Journal 76 (2002), p. 293.
258 Robertson, supra note 250.
259 Akande, supra note 51, p. 824. “There are two further justifications for immunity ratione 
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
78
has been described by the ICJ in the case of United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Iran260 as the most fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations 
between States.261 
5.3 Immunity ratione personae 
The term ‘immunity’ covers two distinct types of immunity, i.e. functional (ratione 
materiae) and personal (ratione personae) immunity. In short, functional immunity is 
limited to official acts, but is permanent. In contrast, personal immunity is absolute, but 
only temporary. While functional immunity is linked to the conduct, personal immunity 
is linked to the status of a person. They coexist and somewhat overlap as long as the state 
official is in office. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the two, and as 
obvious as it may sound, the courts (as well as some legal literature) often fail to do so.262 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities makes clear (for both types of 
immunity) that the purpose is not to benefit individuals but to protect official acts 
(immunity ratione materiae) or to facilitate international relations (immunity ratione 
personae).263 It is the State that is the beneficiary of the immunity, and it is the State 
that may waive it, irrespective of the wishes of the person claiming the immunity. 
Personal immunity is not limited to any particular conduct; it provides complete 
immunity to the person of certain office holders while they carry out important 
representative functions. Personal immunity is granted only to a comparatively small 
set of people, such as Heads of State and diplomats accredited to a host country. It is 
temporary, in that it lasts only as long as the person is serving in that representative 
role. There is no exemption based on the seriousness of the alleged crime, or whether 
the acts were private or official, since the rationale is unconnected to the nature of the 
act. Personal immunity is therefore absolute and the person covered by this kind of 
immunity enjoys complete inviolability.264 
personae, beyond the ‘functional’ rationale discussed above, which may be of use: (1) 
symbolic sovereignty and (2) the principle of ‘non-intervention’. It is worth pointing out 
here that none of these ration-ales can be taken as the sole justification for the rule of 
immunity ratione personae. They must be read together to give a convincing account of 
why the rule of immunity still exists.”
260 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran, Merits, 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, para. 91. 
261 Cryer et al., supra note 13.
262 For example, Cassese argues that the ICJ failed to recognize the important distinction 
distinguish between the two immunities. See supra note 97, p. 862. 
263 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Preamble, paras. 2-4.
264 The Yerodia case, supra note 29, paras. 54-55 and para. 58.
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The rationale was stated as long ago as of 1740 by Wicquefort: “[…] if Princess 
had the Liberty of proceedings against the Embassador who negotiates with them 
on any Account, or under any Colour whatsoever, the Person of the Embassador 
would never be in Safety, because those who should have a Mind to make away with 
Him would never want a Pretext.”265 More recently, for example Cryer described that 
the purpose of personal immunity is “to preclude any pretext for interference with 
a State representative, in order to allow international relations between potentially 
distrustful States.”266 Akande, who emphasized the importance of the principle of 
non-intervention, provides following justification:
 
The principle is the ‘corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of states’, which 
is the basis for the immunity of states from the jurisdiction of other states (par in 
parem non habet imperium). To arrest and detain the leader of a country is effectively 
to change the government of that state. This would be a particularly extreme form 
of interference with the autonomy and independence of that foreign state. Were the 
rule of Head of State immunity relaxed in criminal proceedings so as to permit arrests, 
such interference right at the top of the political administration of a  state would 
eviscerate the principles of sovereign equality and independence.267
There were repeated attempts to limit personal immunity; all of them were 
nonetheless rejected “even in situations of great pressure or incentive to prosecute, 
including cases of espionage, drug smuggling, murder and plots against monarchs.”268 
While acknowledging all of the difficulties with immunities, the benefits of upholding 
the system of immunities always prevailed over the disadvantages so far.269 Recent 
cases of national courts in the context of serious international crimes confirm this 
approach. In the Qaddafi case, the French Cour de Cassation held that a serving Head 
of State is entitled to personal immunity in domestic courts even with regard to acts 
of terrorism.270 In the Castro case, the Spanish Audienco Nacional reached a similar 
result271 as well as a UK court in the Mugabe case.272 
265 A. van Wicquefort, The Embassador and his Functions (2nd edn, London, 1740) (transla-
ted into English by John Digby), Ogdon, Juridical Bases 128-129, quoted from Cryer; 
Frimain; Robinson, supra note 242, p. 423. 
266 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 546.
267 Akande, supra note 51, p. 824.
268 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 546.
269 Cryer et al., supra note 13.
270 Qadaffi (2001) 125 ILR 456.
271 Castro (1999) 32 ILM 596.
272 C. Warbrick, ‘Immunity and International Crimes in English Law’, 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly 769 (2004). Quoted from Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 546. 
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This practice is illustrated also in the work of the Institute de Droit International 
(IDI), which stated in its Resolution of 2001 that “in criminal matters, the Head 
of State shall enjoy immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign State 
for any crime he or she may have committed, regardless of its gravity.”273 Similarly, 
eight years later, its Resolution of 2009 entitled “Immunity from Jurisdiction of 
the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in case of International 
Crimes”, confirms: ‘[n]o immunity from jurisdiction other than personal immunity 
in accordance with international law applies with regard to international crimes’.274 
Interpretation of the words ‘other than’ leads to the conclusion that while the IDI 
upholds personal immunity even in respect of international crimes, it clearly rejects 
the availability of functional immunity for international crimes, which leads us to 
examine the exact scope of functional immunity.275 
5.4 Immunity ratione materiae
Functional immunity as a  well-established rule of customary international law 
dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was also restated by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in the Blaskic case in the following terms: 
[state] officials are mere instruments of a  State and their official action can only 
be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or penalties for 
conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of the State. In other words, 
State officials cannot suffer the consequences of wrongful acts which are not 
attributable to them personally but to the State on whose behalf they act: they enjoy 
so-called ‘functional immunity’.276
Immunity ratione materiae attaches to all those who carry out duties of State, which 
means that it covers official acts of not only de iure, but also de facto State officials.277 
273 Article 2, Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government 
in International Law, Institut de Droit International, Session of Vancouver (2001).
274 Art. III(1), Institut de Droit International, Naples Session (2009). See also Ch. J. Tams 
and J. Sloan, The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
275 See also Advisory Report on the Immunity of Foreign State Officials (Translation), Advisory 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Advisory Report No. 20, The Hague 
(2011), pp. 15-19.
276 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis, Objection to Issue of Subpoenae 
duces tecum, 29 October 1997, para. 38.
277 In context of de facto officials, see e.g. Prosecutor v. Muammar Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-
01/11-01/11-2, 27 June 2011, para. 17, (“acting as the Libyan Head of State”). See 
also S. Zappala, ‘Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for 
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This kind of immunity is permanent, i.e. it does not cease with the end of office 
because it is attributable to the State itself. Finally, this immunity may be invoked 
towards any other State, i.e. is erga omnes.278 
5.4.1 Immunity ratione materiae: Procedural Bar or Substantive Defence?
At this point, it is important to acknowledge the controversy both in practice 
and among scholars “whether immunities affect substantial responsibility or merely 
impose a procedural obstacle with regard to criminal proceedings”.279 At the same 
time, this distinction has a direct impact on the reconciliation of individual criminal 
responsibility and immunities. Accordingly, the following discussion is framed around 
the line between substantive and procedural rules.
In general, the line between substantive and procedural rules in international 
public law may not always be self-evident. Leaving aside the general definition of 
these categories, no specific criteria seem to exist in domestic law either and it is thus 
for the courts to determine in which category a certain rule falls in each case.280 This 
may not be a simple task, for example in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the court noted 
that ‘line between procedural and substantive law is hazy.’281 The picture is further 
complicated by the fact that “one and the same rule may qualify as a substantive or 
a procedural rule”, depending on the circumstances.282 
In the Yerodia case, the ICJ observed that individual criminal responsibility and 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction were quite separate concepts and noted that the 
former was a question of substantive law, while the latter was procedural in nature.283 
In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, Italy and Germany relied in its argumentation 
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation,’ Europe-
an Journal of International Law, 12:3 (2001), pp. 595-612.
278 Cassese, supra note 97.
279 K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume 1: Foundations and General 
Part, Oxford: Oxford Universiry Press, p. 410.
280 S. Talmon, ‘Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural 
Rules Distinguished’, Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law, 
Paper  No  4/2012,  16  June  2012, p. 7.
281 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 91 (1938), quoted from S. Talmon.
282 For example, the rules relating to most-favoured-nation treatment, estoppel or the 
exhaustion of local remedies have been treated both as procedural and as substantive 
rules. For a deeper discussion, see Talmon, supra note 280, p. 8.
283 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 28, para. 60. Similarly see Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006, para. 34.
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on the distinction between procedural and substantive rules,284 with Germany arguing 
that rules governing immunity “have the nature of substantive rules of international 
law”.285 Yet, Greece (non-party intervener) argued that this distinction “has no logical 
or, still less, legal relevance.”286 In fact, the ICJ based its decision in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities case on the distinction between substantive and procedural rules and stated 
that rules on State immunity as well as the functional and personal immunity of State 
officials are procedural in nature.287 Nevertheless, it did not provide any criteria for 
their distinction.288 
Procedural effects of immunities were also emphasized by Ambos, who noted that, 
“the rationale of any immunity, be it functional or personal, is to prevent procedural or 
judicial measures which impede the respective official from carrying out his functions 
in an effective way.”289 According to Cryer, the immunities are merely procedural bars, 
not a ‘defence’ as such.290 He nonetheless approves that:
a claim to functional immunity may also bring with it a claim under the ‘act of State 
doctrine’, under which national courts of one State may decline to examine the acts 
of another State. This is a matter of substantive law and, along with the fact that it 
applies only to particular conduct, probably explains why functional immunity is 
sometimes referred to as a substantive defence.291 
On the other side of the spectrum, it has been argued that functional immunity 
constitutes a  substantive defence, which means that any breach of national law of 
284 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Counter-Memorial of Italy, 22 December 2009, 54, 
para. 4.44; Reply of the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 October 2010, 21, para. 37.
285 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 12 
June 2009, para. 92.
286 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, Written Statement of the Hellenic Republic, 3 
August 2011, para. 54; ibid., CR 2011/19, 14 September 2011, 37, para. 102. The line 
between substantive and procedural rules may also be sometimes blurred on purpose, 
which in fact seems to suggest Talmon, by arguing that Germany “probably for tactical 
reasons” categorized rules on immunity as substantive rules “so that the Court would 
have had to apply the immunity rules in force at the time of events in 1943–1945. 
Talmon, supra note 280, p. 14.
287 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 48, para. 58.
288 Talmon, supra note 280, p. 7.
289 Ambos, supra note 279, p. 410.
290 Cryer, supra note 13, p. 534.
291 In Cryer, supra note 13, p. 534, referring to H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 93-97. Compare with Ambos, who notes that the act 
of State doctrine is not recognized in civil law systems. In Ambos, supra note 279, p. 409.
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the foreign country or international law by the State official is attributable to the 
State instead of the State official. Thus, no individual criminal responsibility or civil 
liability can arise.292 As such, Cassese is of the view that functional immunity relates to 
substantive law. Van Alebeek even argues for re-conceptualization of State immunity 
(and immunity of State officials) as imposing not merely procedural limits on the 
competence of the forum State, but instead set of substantive rules. In this context, 
she perceives immunity as a  lack of jurisdictional competences of the State rather 
then the non-exercise of existing ones, as commonly believed.293 As for the difference 
between personal and functional immunity, she adds:
While personal immunity constitutes a classic immunity from jurisdiction, functional 
immunity constitutes an exemption from the law in a  personal capacity. The term 
“immunity” may in fact not be the most apposite to describe the phenomenon at hand.294 
Similarly, Beckett explains that if proceedings are brought against a former Head of 
State with regard to his official acts “he has a defence to the action (i.e. that he is not 
personally liable for such acts) but not a claim to immunity.”295 
In any event, we agree that the formalism in the substantive/procedural dichotomy 
“tends to obscure the nature of the dynamic relationship that seems to exist”296 and 
we argue that law on immunities accommodates both procedural and substantive 
understanding of functional immunity of State officials. 
Personal immunity was described above as an absolute, it thus represents a complete 
procedural bar in a sense that there is no exemption based on the seriousness of the 
alleged act, or whether the acts were private or official. Functional immunity, however, 
is limited and connected precisely to the nature of the act. Since there is a different 
292 Cassese, A., International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 303-304. G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (T.M.C. Asser Press: 2009).
293 A. Sari, Book Review: ‘The Immunities of States and their Officials in International 
Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law By Rosanne Van Alebeek’, 79 
British Yearbook of International Law (2008), p. 389.
294 R. Van Alebeek, The Immunities of States and their Officials in International Criminal Law 
and International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 133.
295 Ibid., Van Alebeek quoting E. Lemonon (Rapporteur Institut de Droit International) 
L’immunité de jurisdiction et d’execution force des Etats étrangers, Rapport et project 
de Résolution définitifs, Observations E. Beckett, (1952) 44-I AIDI 5, 60 (fn. 107).
296 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, UN General Assembly, 
Memorandum by the Secretariat at the Request of the International Law Commission, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/956, 31 March 2008, p. 39, para. 69. 
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rationale for their existence, different justification as regards their procedural and/or 
substantive effects can be offered. 
It is acknowledged that personal immunity is clearly procedural, but it is claimed 
that functional immunity is not purely procedural. While it is possible to argue that 
functional immunity serves as a procedural bar, we suggest that it serves as a ‘limited’ 
(as opposed to complete) procedural bar, i.e. only with regard to official acts. And, 
arguably, the qualification of the act as official or not does inevitably enter the realm 
of substantive law. In other words, the procedural nature of functional immunity does 
not deprive it of any substantive function.297
The ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case held that the rules of State 
immunity are procedural in character and therefore “do not bear upon the question 
whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was 
lawful or unlawful.”298 In terms of immunities of State officials, Ambos similarly notes 
that, “immunities do not in any way deliver a verdict on criminal responsibility-they 
have no substantive effect, but merely constitute procedural defence.”299 
But we do  not argue that immunities have certain substantive effects because 
they relate to lawfulness or unlawfulness of any act. Clearly, they do not. We rather 
propose that it is important to mind the difference between personal and functional 
immunities. And since functional immunity is connected with the nature of the act, 
the decision about the nature of the respective act (i.e. whether it is official or not) 
may be seen as a substantive issue, not a procedural one. In other words, functional 
immunity of State officials bears upon the question whether or not the conduct in 
respect of which the proceedings are brought is official or not, which means that it 
indeed has also substantive effect.
Akande and Shah maintain that functional immunity “has both a substantive and 
a procedural function, in that it gives effect to a defence available to state officials 
and prevents the circumvention of the immunity of the state.”300 In particular, they 
focused their explanation on two related policies underlying functional immunity:
297 See e.g. Van Alebeek, supra note 294: “The applicability of functional immunity therefore 
depends on a distinction between ‘acts of State’, that is act performed on behalf of the 
State, and private acts serving the individual’s own ends”. See also Cryer et al., supra note 
13, p. 534, fn. 13.
298 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 48, para. 93.
299 Ambos, supra note 279, p. 411.
300 Akande and Shah, supra note 51, p. 817.
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First, this type of immunity constitutes (or, perhaps more appropriately, gives effect to) 
a substantive defence, in that it indicates that the individual official is not to be held legally 
responsible for acts which are, in effect, those of the state. Such acts are imputable only 
to the state and immunity ratione materiae is a mechanism for diverting responsibility 
to the state. Secondly, the immunity of state officials in foreign courts prevents the 
circumvention of the immunity of the state through proceedings brought against those 
who act on behalf of the state…In this sense, the immunity operates as a jurisdictional, 
or procedural, bar and prevents courts from indirectly exercising control over the acts 
of the foreign state through proceedings against the official who carried out the act.301 
Substantive effect of functional immunity was equally stressed by the Italian court 
in the Rissmann case, which held in its response to the German Embassy objections 
that its Consul Rissman acted in the exercise of his functions and is therefore entitled 
to consular immunity: 
Functional immunity…finds its justification in the general principle according to 
which the consul’s acts, even though they may be valid within the legal system of the 
receiving State and thus produce legal consequences therein, constitute an activity of 
the sending State and not of the consul personally, since, in the exercise of his office 
he is accountable to his government. Such an immunity is not, therefore, merely 
procedural. It is based on a principle of substantive law and continues even after his 
tour of office has terminated.302 
And how is the procedural/substantive distinction relevant for our purposes? The 
above inquiry is particularly relevant in the light of a  subsequent analysis of the 
interplay of immunities and individual criminal responsibility. There exist various 
approaches how to balance these competing legitimate international values. With 
regard to availability of functional immunity, two main developments in international 
criminal law in the twenties century had an impact on the law of immunities: “the 
establishment of international criminal jurisdiction and the development of the 
substantive law relating to irrelevance of official position, each of which effectively 
raising the bar of accountability for egregious offences.”303 Both of these interrelated 
developments are discussed in more detail in the respective Chapters below.304 
At this point, however, it is crucial to clarify the relationship between the principle 
of the irrelevance of official position and functional immunity in the context of 
301 Ibid., pp. 826-827 (emphasis added).
302 Re Rissmann (Italy, 1970), 71 ILR 577, 581.
303 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, supra note 296.
304 See, in particular, Chapter 6.
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procedural/substantive distinction. In fact, many commentators do not engage in this 
exercise and therefore do not properly justify the denial of functional immunity (with 
regard to practice before both domestic and international courts).305 Instead, they 
only seem to mechanically repeat arguments about the irrelevance of official position 
in case of international crimes, mostly by way of referring to various provisions and 
their historical development.306
305 See, for example Ambos, who referred to various approaches used to reconcile criminal 
responsibility and immunity, such as (i) jus cogens argument (raised and rejected also 
in the methodology part of this work), (ii) argument that international crimes cannot 
be qualified as sovereign or official acts or (iii) conflict between the rule conferring 
extra-territorial jurisdiction to domestic courts and the rule on functional immunity, 
when these rules are considered as incompatible because of the lex posterior derogate 
legi priori principle, i.e. newer rule on prosecution of international crimes prevails over 
older rule on functional immunity (suggested by Akande, supra note 51). Ambos found 
such approaches unconvincing and rejected most of them. What solution Ambos offers 
then? He distinguishes between so called “vertical immunity” (before international 
tribunals) and “horizontal immunity” (before domestic courts). As regards practice 
before international tribunals, Ambos suggests that immunities are not generally 
regarded as a valid defence. This, however, is an oversimplification of the issue, since 
international legal basis of the respective tribunal is not decisive for the purposes of 
availability of immunity. Moreover, it is not entirely clear from his reasoning how to 
reconcile the irrelevance of official capacity with functional immunity if he considers 
functional immunity merely procedural in nature. As regards practice before domestic 
courts, Ambos distinguishes between traditional state-oriented approach providing 
no exception to immunity and more human-rights oriented approach providing that 
international crimes should not be in principle exempted from prosecution, since there 
is an increasing state practice to regard the official position in such context as irrelevant. 
Ambos emphasized the need to take into account “par in parem principle, function of 
immunity and the effect of its restriction with regard to the functional sovereignty of the 
respective state.” However, it seems that Ambos does not provide any direct response as 
to whether there is any substantive limitation on functional immunity, except offering 
a “balancing exercise” between functional immunity (procedural in nature, according 
to Ambos) and substantive rules of international criminal law. Ambos, supra note 279, 
pp. 411-418 (emphasis added). See also Cryer, supra note 13, pp. 534 and 542. On 
the one hand, Cryer claims that both personal and functional immunities are “merely 
procedural bars”, except the situation when a claim to functional immunity brings with 
it a claim under the ‘act of State doctrine’. On the other hand, he approves an exception 
to functional immunity with regard to prosecution for serious international crimes. Yet, 
it is not entirely clear from his argumentation on which basis is such exception accepted, 
if functional immunity is considered as a merely procedural bar. 
306 Mainly referring to the third Nuremberg Principle (Principle III) and Statutes of inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals. 
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According to the principle of the irrelevance of official position, the official 
status of the perpetrator of international crimes does not exempt him (or her) from 
criminal responsibility.307 The above analysis as to whether the functional immunity 
is of procedural or substantive nature has relevance to our later inquiry since the 
recognition of functional immunity as purely procedural would conflict with the 
substantive law relating to irrelevance of official position for international crimes. The 
UN Secretariat in its Memorandum, prepared at the request of the ILC, summarized 
this conflict in the following terms: 
There could also be some question as to whether the various elements of practice 
supporting the principle of the irrelevance of the official status of an individual 
in respect of crimes under international law would necessarily entail the non-
applicability, in relation to such crimes, of immunity ratione materiae from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction. This question would seem to remain open if immunity ratione 
personae and immunity ratione materiae are both considered as mere procedural bars 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by a  foreign State. In contrast, if immunity ratione 
materiae from foreign criminal jurisdiction were considered to be a  substantive 
defence predicated on the ground that the official acts of a  State organ are to be 
attributable to the State and not the individual, there would appear to be convincing 
reasons for holding that such a defence cannot operate in respect of conduct that has 
been criminalized by the international legal order.308
It follows that it was necessary to examine the nature of rules on functional immunity 
in order to assess its compatibility with the substantive rules on the irrelevance of 
official position. Based on this examination, we propose that international criminal 
law indeed provides for a substantive limitation on functional immunity, which in 
turn cannot be invoked in respect of crimes under international law. Obviously, any 
wider normative implications of the irrelevance of official position cannot simply 
307 See also the position of the ILC in its Commentary to Article 7 of the 1996 Draft Code 
of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind: “As further recognized by the 
Nürnberg Tribunal in its judgment, the author of crime under international law cannot 
invoke his official position to escape punishment in appropriate proceedings. The absence 
of any procedural immunity with respect to prosecution or punishment in appropriate 
judicial proceedings is an essential corollary of the absence of any substantive immunity or 
defence. [Footnote 69: Judicial proceedings before an international criminal court would 
be the quintessential example of appropriate judicial proceedings in which an individual 
could not invoke any substantive or procedural immunity based on his official position to 
avoid prosecution and punishment.” Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996, 
vol. II (Part Two), p. 27, para. (6) (emphasis added).
308 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, supra note 296, p. 134 (foot-
notes omitted).
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be inferred from the principle itself but have to be reflected in the State practice 
accompanied by opinio juris. In order to further support our proposition, the relevant 
practice (including references to domestic and international case law and to various 
further instruments) is provided in more detail in the respective Chapters below.309 
Before turning to examine this practice, another closely related problem that may 
arise with respect to characterization of international crimes, needs to be addressed 
first.
5.4.2 International Crimes as Private or Official Acts: Unanswerable Dilemma? 
As repeatedly noted, immunity ratione materiae can be invoked in respect of 
acts performed in an official capacity. At the same time, we have explained that 
international criminal law provides for a substantive limitation on immunity ratione 
materiae by way of establishing criminal responsibility for international crimes 
regardless of official position of the person.
Nevertheless, there remain some arguments connected with the qualification of 
international crimes that deserve our attention. These arguments relate to an existing 
and much debated distinction between private and official acts and the operation of 
this distinction in the context of international crimes. Where does this distinction 
leave international crimes? Can international crimes be qualified as official acts and 
309 See Chapter 6. In general, various elements of practice can be referred to, including 
domestic case law (in particular the Eichmann and Pinochet cases or numerous other 
cases, in which State officials were denied immunity by (foreign) domestic courts for 
international crimes, although these cases concerned primarily military officers, for more 
details see Cassese, supra note 100, p. 871); international case law (Prosecutor v. Karadzic 
and others, 16 May 1995, paras. 22-24; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, 10 December 
1998, para. 140; and Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 
8 November 2001, para. 28), but also instruments such as: the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal and the Judgment; 
the Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East; the 1945 Control Council 
Law No. 10; the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles, affirmed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in its resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946; the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973; the 
Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and the Rome Statute of the ICC. For Eichmann case, see 
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Supreme Court (sitting 
as a Court of Criminal Appeal), Judgment of 29 May 1962, reproduced in International 
Law Reports, vol. 36, pp. 277-343. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf 
Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Judgment of 12 December 1961, reproduced in 
International Law Reports, vol. 36, pp. 5-276. 
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hence be potentially covered by immunity ratione materiae? And is it at all useful to 
resort to this distinction in the context of international crimes? 
The problem of identifying a clear line between what constitutes private, as opposed 
to official, acts arises in most cases where immunity ratione materiae is (or can be) at 
stake. This will become evident from the analysis of the Pinochet and Yerodia cases, 
which were relied on by the SCSL.310 The discussion is therefore directly relevant for 
the Taylor case as well.
In the Yerodia case, the ICJ held that a national court (providing it has jurisdiction) 
can try a  former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state for acts committed in 
a private capacity. The question is to be raised whether international crimes are to be 
regarded as committed in a private or official capacity, which is by no means clear-cut.
The origins of this distinction, which emerged historically, can be traced to State 
immunity.311 The restrictive approach to State immunity distinguished between 
governmental actions that remained immune (acta iure imperii) and acts of a private 
or commercial nature, which were justiciable in foreign courts (acta iure gestionis). 
The distinction was never very satisfactory in practice, and national courts attempting 
to apply it came to different decisions on similar subjects. It is not surprising that 
the distinction, which proved to cause such confusion in commercial cases, is even 
less satisfactory when adjusted and invoked within international criminal law.312 The 
following comments prove this point. 
Wirth and Ambos are of the view that the distinction between private versus official 
acts is unworkable in practice.313 According to Cassese, the ICJ’s resort in the Yerodia 
case, to the distinction between acts performed ‘in a private capacity’ and ‘official acts’, 
is a distinction that, within the context of international crimes “proves ambiguous 
and indeed untenable.”314 Cassese argues that to hold, as the ICJ did, that State 
officials after leaving office may be prosecuted and punished for international crimes 
perpetrated while in office only if such crimes are regarded as acts committed in 
310 See Chapter 6.
311 Cassese argued that origins of this distinction can be also found in a transposition of this 
distinction from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Cassese, supra note 
97, p. 868.
312 Robertson, supra note 250.
313 Ambos, supra note 279, p.  417. S. Wirth, ‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s 
judgement in the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal of International Law 877 
(2002), pp. 90-91.
314 See Cassese, supra note 97, p. 867.
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their ‘private capacity’, is “hardly consistent with the current pattern of international 
criminality and surely does not meet the demands of international criminal justice.”315 
Cassese notes that it is not conceivable that high-ranking state officials (including 
both Foreign Ministers or Heads of State) may perpetrate crimes such as genocide, 
torture, war crimes or crimes against humanity in a  private capacity. While 
performing, willingly condoning or ordering those acts, high-ranking state officials 
rather act, according to Cassese, in the exercise of public functions.316 As regards 
crimes committed in private capacity, he gives examples such as personal offences, 
which may include killing one’s wife (or husband), beating a servant or stealing from 
a shop.317 
Wouters, similarly with Cassese, points to the fact that treating international crimes 
as private acts “ignores the sad reality that in most cases those crimes are precisely 
committed by or with the support of high- ranking officials as part of a State’s policy, 
and thus fall within the scope of official acts.”318 Wirth also opposes the categorisation 
of international crimes as acts committed in a private capacity. He provides a different 
rationale, explaining that this categorisation would imply that such acts cannot be 
attributed to the State for the purposes of State responsibility, which would prevent 
a State being ordered to pay compensation.319 
It is suggested that the distinction between private and official acts should not be 
used in the context of international crimes. This terminology has different origins. 
The original distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis applies to 
civil (not criminal) proceedings before courts of foreign states. Since it does not have 
roots in international criminal law, it causes significant problems not only in a theory, 
but also for domestic and international courts, as will be illustrated in more detail on 
the Pinochet and Yerodia cases. This argument can be also supported by the approach 
followed by the IDI.320 The IDI refrained from directly addressing this problematic 
315 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 120.
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
318 J. Wouters, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant 
Case: Some Critical Remarks’, 16 Leiden Journal of Intenational Law 253 (2003), p. 262.
319 Wirth, supra note 313.
320 See Article 13 of the 2001 Resolution, which reads: “1. A former Head of State enjoys 
no inviolability in the territory of a foreign State. 2. Nor does he or she enjoy immunity 
from jurisdiction, in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, except in respect of 
acts which are performed in the exercise of official functions and relate to the exercise 
thereof. Nevertheless, he or she may be prosecuted and tried when the acts alleged 
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distinction and instead simply excluded crimes under international law from the 
operation of immunity ratione materiae. 
Nevertheless, since courts tend to employ this terminology, it would not be 
satisfactory to close the discussion simply by referring to unsuitability of this 
distinction. As was already set out above, courts and scholars have offered various 
reasoning and propositions in order to support the argument that immunity ratione 
materiae is inapplicable in respect of crimes under international law. Although views 
and approaches often differ significantly, it is possible to identify two main lines of 
reasoning and thus offer two possible solutions to the issue at hand. 
The first solution could be to avoid the discussion over irrelevance of immunity 
ratione materiae for international crimes by denying the official nature of these acts. 
International crimes could be then treated as private acts and no immunity ratione 
materiae would arise in this respect. This appears to be an easier way to proceed. 
However, it is suggested that the legal construct, which would turn international 
crimes into solely private acts, seems rather artificial.321 Admittedly, there have been 
arguments advanced by some judges322 and scholars323 that crimes under international 
constitute a  crime under international law, or when they are performed exclusively to 
satisfy a personal interest, or when they constitute a misappropriation of the State’s assets 
and resources. 3. Neither does he or she enjoy immunity from execution.” Immunities 
from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law, 
Institut De Droit International, Session of Vancouver (2001), available at http://www.
idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2001_van_02_en.PDF (last visited 25 July 2013).
321 See e.g. the case of Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938-1945) Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, who was convicted for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, which would have to be regarded as his ‘private acts’ or the Japanese Foreign 
Minister (1943-1945) Shigemitsu who was convicted for failing ‘to secure observance 
and prevent breaches of the law of war.’ In Cassese, supra note 97, p. 870. 
322 See e.g. the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the 
Arrest Warrant case, supra note 28, para. 85. See also arguments by some Law Lords in the 
Pinochet case I, supra note 17, with regards to torture and conspiracy to commit torture, 
in particular Lord Steyn, p. 1337 and Lord Nicholls, p. 1332.
323 See, for example, M. N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p.  658 (“The definition of official acts is somewhat unclear, 
but it is suggested that this would exclude acts done in clear violation of international 
law.”); M. A. Tunks, ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State 
Immunity’, Duke Law Journal, vol. 52 (2002), p. 659 (“While former heads of state 
still retain immunity for the official acts they committed while in power, they enjoy no 
protection for their international crimes, because such serious abuses cannot fall within 
the scope of a head of state’s legitimate functions. Even though Pinochet served as a head 
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law would not qualify as “official acts” for various reasons, main argument often being 
that they would not fall within the “legitimate” or “normal” functions of the State. 
At the same time, views considering crimes under international law as being “private” 
by their very nature have been subject to much criticism and rejected by various 
domestic and international courts324 and other scholars.325 
The second, and it is suggested that a  more adequate, solution, is to consider 
international crimes as most often committed by state officials while holding certain 
public/official position, therefore in an official capacity. In order to support this view, 
one may refer to the case of torture. One of the objective elements of the torture (not 
as a war crime or crime against humanity), in the context of the Torture Convention, 
of state at the time, international law deems acts of torture so far outside the bounds of 
legitimate state action that he must be considered a private actor with respect to such 
conduct.”); M. White, ‘Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, and Impunity’, Southwestern 
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, vol. 7 (2000), pp. 216-222; A. Bianchi, 
‘Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights’, Austrian Journal of Public and 
International Law, vol. 46 (1994), pp. 227-228 and Liu M. Sears, ‘Confronting the 
‘Culture of Impunity’: Immunity of the Heads of State from Nuremburg to ex parte 
Pinochet’, German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 42 (1999), p. 126. 
324 See e.g. dissenting opinions in the Pinochet case I, supra note 17, in particular Lord Slynn 
of Hadley, p. 1309, and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, pp. 1323-1324 or the following cases, 
although in civil proceedings: Jane Doe I, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Liu Qi et al., Defendants; 
Plaintiff A, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Xia Deren, et al., Defendants, District Court, Northern 
District of California, pp. 1283, 1285; Ra’Ed Mohamad Ibrahim Matar, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. Avraham Dichter, former Director of Israel’s General Security Service, Defendant, 
District Court, Southern District of New York, pp. 292-293; Ali Saadallah Belhas et 
al., Appellants v. Moshe Ya’alon, Former Head of Army Intelligence Israel Appellee, No. 07-
7009, Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 15 February 2008. See 
also the position adopted by the ICTY in the Kunarac case: [...] there is no privilege 
under international criminal law which would shield state representatives or agents from 
the reach of individual criminal responsibility. On the contrary, acting in an official 
capacity could constitute an aggravating circumstance when it comes to sentencing, 
because the official illegitimately used and abused a power which was conferred upon him 
or her for legitimate purposes. In Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and 
Zoran Vukovic, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 494 (emphasis added). See also the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh in the Arrest Warrant case, where he noted 
that international crimes are by definition official acts. The Arrest Warrant case, supra 
note 28, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, p. 95.
325 See e.g. Akande, supra note 111, p. 414; L. De Smet and F. Naert, ‘Making or breaking 
international law? An international law analysis of Belgium’s act concerning the 
punishment of grave breaches of international humanitarian law’, Revue belge de droit 
international, vol. 35 (2002), p. 505.
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is “instigation or consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity”.326 Similarly, the crime of enforced disappearance can be 
perpetrated only by ‘agents of the State’ or ‘persons or groups of persons acting with 
the authorisation, support or acquiescence of the State’, as defined in the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.327
On the one hand, it is true that most international crimes, according to their 
definitions in Statutes of international courts and tribunals and in other relevant 
Conventions, are not limited to acting in an official capacity (as opposed to torture 
in the context of the Torture Convention or enforced disappearance). On the other 
hand, “it is clearly the case that these crimes are intended to capture the conduct of 
those acting in the exercise of official capacity.”328 Akande further stresses the fact that 
at the time of creation of most of international crimes, “they were intended, primarily, 
to cover state action, and it is only more recently that they have been extended to 
cover private (i.e., non-state) action.”329
The official position (and means available in such position) in turn allows for 
breaches of international law on such a scale that they can be qualified as international 
crimes.330 It follows that international crimes are seldom perpetrated in a  private 
326 See Article 1 of the Torture Convention (emphasis added). 
327 See Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (2006), GA Res 61/177, 20 December 2006, A/RES/61/177 
(emphasis added).
328 Akande and Shah, supra note 51, p. 843.
329 Ibid. As regards the crime of genocide see the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 
UN Doc E/794 (1948), at paras. 29 and 32 (Representatives of states recognized that 
“in almost every serious case of genocide it would be impossible to rely on the Courts of 
the States where genocide had been committed to exercise effective repression because 
the government itself would have been guilty, unless it had been, in fact, powerless”. 
Moreover, it was observed that “genocide would be committed mostly by the State 
authorities themselves or that these authorities would have aided and abetted the crime”). 
See also W. Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, 98 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 953 (2008).
330 Similarly, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in her dissenting opinion in the Arrest Warrant 
case: “[The Court] could and indeed should have added that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity can never fall into [the] category [of private acts]. Some crimes under 
international law (e.g., certain acts of genocide and of aggression) can, for practical 
purposes, only be committed with the means and mechanisms of a State and as part of 
a State policy. They cannot, from that perspective, be anything other than ‘official’ acts.” 
The Arrest Warrant case, supra note 28, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den 
Wyngaert, p. 162, para. 36 (emphasis added). Compare with Van Alebeek, who posits 
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capacity. How to justify the denial of immunity ratione materiae for international 
crimes if they are considered as committed in (the abuse of ) an official capacity 
then? Cryer cogently expressed legal theory underlying inapplicability of functional 
immunity in respect of international crimes in the following terms: 
First, functional immunity protects State conduct from scrutiny, but it would be 
incongruous for international law to protect the very conduct which it criminalizes 
and for which it imposes duties to prosecute. Second, the State cannot complain 
that its sovereignty is being restricted or that a policy is being imposed, when the 
prohibited conduct is being recognized by all as an international crime. Finally, it is 
also sound in terms of balancing the underlying values; where an individual possesses 
only functional immunity, international law already reflects that such an individual is 
no longer playing a high representative role which necessitates absolute immunity.331 
It is claimed that immunity ratione materiae does not cover crimes under 
international law due to an exception established by international law. Customary 
international law grants immunity ratione materiae to the state officials for acts they 
that “the rule of functional immunity explicitly regards a presumption of authority.” This 
presumption of authority may be defeated, claims Van Alebeek, on the basis of a priori 
(general) defeat. She suggests that States may agree, in the form of a rule of international 
law, that certain activity may never be cloaked by the authority of a State. It follows 
that the act is not “in law an act of the state rather than of the official that happened 
to perform the act.” According to Van Alebeek, the act is not official in character and 
the state official incurs responsibility in his personal capacity. She concludes that the 
development of the principle of individual criminal responsibility following WWII can 
be understood from this particular perspective. Van Alebeek, supra note 294, pp. 130-
132 (emphasis added).
331 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 542-543. Compare with P. Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and 
Immunities’, in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 982. For 
an explanation relating to the possible rationale behind this special rule, Gaeta argues 
that crimes under international law “amount to attacks on values that the international 
community has come to consider as being of paramount importance. Consequently 
it appears to be unjustifiable to permit the prosecution and trial of minor offenders 
while leaving the leaders unpunishable, the more so because normally such crimes are 
perpetrated at the instigation, or with the connivance or at least the toleration, of senior 
State officials. Since under normal circumstances, national authorities do not bring to 
trial their own senior officials for the alleged commission of the crimes under discussion, 
those crimes would go unpunished, should the customary rule on functional immunities 
continue to protect high-ranking State officials against prosecution and trial before 
foreign courts or international criminal tribunals.” Ibid. Compare with Cryer et al., supra 
note 13, p. 552. 
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perform in their official capacity (lex generalis). This rule, as will be further explained, 
has to give way to a  specific rule of international customary law (lex specialis) that 
removes immunity ratione materiae for state officials committing international 
crimes.332
To put it differently, immunity ratione materiae (lex generalis) is not compatible 
with the specific rule on the irrelevance of official position (lex specialis) in respect of 
international crimes that has developed in international criminal law.333 We will now seek 
to confirm this hypothesis by supporting evidence including domestic and international 
case law, other State practice, relevant treaty provisions and Statutes of international 
criminal tribunals, in addition to the elements of practice mentioned already above.334 
It is worth repeating that decisions of domestic courts are not necessarily treated 
here as “mere” subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law in light of the 
Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute. It was noted in the methodology section that there 
is a considerable practical and doctrinal support that case law can serve as an evidence 
of opinio juris or amount to State practice.335 
The SCSL in Taylor relied on certain passages of the House of Lords decision in 
the Pinochet case (functional immunity at stake) and the ICJ decision in the Yerodia 
332 See Chapter 6.
333 Compare with Akande and Shah, resorting to the justification of inapplicability of 
functional immunity in respect of international crimes on the basis of the conflict 
between the rule conferring extra-territorial jurisdiction to domestic courts and the rule 
on functional immunity. They claim that these rules are considered as incompatible 
because of the lex posterior derogat legi priori principle, i.e. newer rule on prosecution 
of international crimes prevails over older rule on functional immunity. They argue that 
while international crimes can be official acts “immunity ratione materiae is removed 
as soon as a rule permitting the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction over that crime 
and contemplating prosecution of state officials develops. Indeed, the very purpose of 
international criminal law is to attribute responsibility to individuals, including state 
officials, and to defeat the defence of official capacity or act of state. The newer rule of 
attribution supersedes the earlier principle of immunity which seeks to protect non-
responsibility”. Akande and Shah, supra note 51, p. 840. 
334 See supra note 309. As regards support for this proposition in the legal literature, see 
e.g. Cassese, who suggests that this customary rule exists regardless of the legal basis of 
the court. See Cassese, supra note 97, pp. 870-874. Equally, Frulli posits that national/
international legal basis of the court has no bearing on functional immunity as opposed 
to personal immunity. Frulli, supra note 66. See also Gaeta, supra note 331, pp. 979-982; 
Zappalà, supra note 277, pp. 601-602 and Akande, supra note 108, p. 414.
335 Nollkaemper, supra note 63. 
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case (personal immunity at stake), since both of these decisions made reference to 
the possibility of prosecuting high-ranking state officials before international courts, 
where they have jurisdiction. Accordingly, we shall start our examination with these 
two decisions.
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Courts with Respect to Immunities
6.1 The Pinochet Case 
The Defence in its submission in Taylor referred to the Pinochet case. While 
focusing on the Pinochet case, only those areas relevant for drawing conclusions with 
respect to the Taylor case will be addressed, i.e. the status of international courts and 
the distinction between so-called private and official acts with respect to prosecution 
of international crimes. It is not necessary to provide a detailed analysis of all aspects 
of the decision, but the reasoning of the judges in Pinochet I and Pinochet III well 
illustrates the difficulties relating to rationale of the decision. 
Both theory and practice struggle with proper distinction and qualification of what 
exactly constitutes and distinguishes private and official acts while this distinction 
has a  significant bearing on the application of immunity rationae materiae. Proper 
analysis and assessment of official versus private acts proved to be a problem in both 
the Pinochet and Yerodia cases. Equally, it is suggested that should the SCSL have had 
to address immunity ratione materiae instead of immunity ratione personae, the same 
problem could arise.
The Pinochet case became one of the most important precedents for law on 
immunities since Nuremberg.336 The facts of the case are well known. Spain requested 
the extradition of the former Head of State of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, on the basis 
of his alleged involvement in the commission of crimes including torture, hostage 
336 The worldwide impact of the Pinochet case on the issue of immunities was well summa-
rized by Orentlicher: “It took only an instant to reverse centuries of diplomatic practice 
and unsettle the deepest foundations of international law…For centuries, international 
law and the practice of states had affirmed a bedrock principle of mutual restraint among 
nations: courts of one state would not judge the sovereign acts of another. Now, a former 
Chilean head of state had been arrested by British authorities at the request of a Spanish 
magistrate on charges that were, at their core, about how the accused had governed Chile 
a quarter of a century before.” In D. F. Orentlicher, ‘Whose Justice? Reconciling Univer-
sal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles’, Georgetown Law Journal (2004), p. 1070.
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taking and conspiracy to murder committed in Chile at the time when he was Head 
of State.337 We will start an examination of the Pinochet case with the reasoning of the 
Divisional Court and then turn to the reasoning of the House of Lords in Pinochet 
I and Pinochet III. 
6.1.2 The Divisional Court: Where to Draw a Line Between Ordinary Versus 
Extraordinary Crimes? 
The Divisional Court (Court) as the first instance court in Pinochet applied the 
classical reasoning that a former Head of State is not entitled to immunity for private 
acts but continues to enjoy functional immunity in respect of public acts performed 
by him as Head of State. As the Court emphasized, Pinochet was charged ‘not with 
personally torturing or murdering victims or causing their disappearance, but with 
using the power of the State of which he was head to that end’.338 The Court thus found 
that these acts could be hardly described as ‘private acts’, which is certainly a correct 
observation. Judge Collins stated that crimes against humanity are committed in the 
exercise of the official functions because ‘history shows that it has indeed on occasions 
been state policy to exterminate or oppress particular groups.’339 
The Court then concluded with the finding that since these acts had to be treated as 
official acts; Pinochet was entitled to claim immunity ratione materiae. The Court was 
apparently not ready to approve the possibility of an exception to immunity ratione 
materiae restricted to serious international crimes.340 
In this regard, the Court held that the argument about a  special nature and 
seriousness of international crimes has ‘some attraction’, but it would be unclear 
‘where to draw a  line’.341 One can respectfully disagree with Court on this point. 
There are clear and strict criteria for act(s) to qualify as international crimes (both 
subjective and objective elements are established in international criminal law with 
337 See e.g. C. Warbrick, D. McGoldrick, H. Fox, ‘The First Pinochet Case: Immunity of 
a  Former Head of State’, 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 (1999), 
pp. 207-216; C. Warbrick, D. McGoldrick, J. C. Barker, ‘The Future of Former Head 
of State Immunity After Ex Parte Pinochet’, 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 4 (1999), pp. 937-949. See also C. Warbrick, D. McGoldrick, E. Denza, ‘Ex 
Parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?’, 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4 
(1999), pp. 949-958.
338 Ibid., para. 58.
339 Ibid. (Justice Collins).
340 Ibid., paras. 63-65.
341 Ibid., para. 63. (Chief Justice Bingham).
99
6 Practice before National and International Courts with Respect to Immunities
respect to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide). Certain acts are thus 
either qualified as international crimes and accordingly prosecuted as such or not. It 
is up to the Prosecutor to prove its case on the basis of the evidence he/she has. The 
Court then ‘only’ has to draw a line between ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’, unless it decides 
to grant immunity. 
The Nuremberg Charter and Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR were recognized 
not to have any bearing on the proceedings before national courts as ‘these were 
international tribunals, established by international agreement. They did not therefore 
violate principle that one sovereign State will not implead another in relation to its 
sovereign acts.’342 Judges thus unanimously upheld Pinochet’s claim and quashed the 
warrant. 
6.1.3 The House of Lords Hearings 
The case in the House of Lords had to be considered twice, as the counsels for 
Pinochet challenged the first decision on the basis of links of Judge Hoffmann (one of 
the law lords) with Amnesty International (AI), one of the interveners in the case. The 
first decision (Pinochet I)343 was thus set aside by the second decision (Pinochet II).344 
A different judicial panel then gave a different final decision - Pinochet III.345 This final 
decision was not actually different in the outcome; Pinochet was denied immunity 
ratione materiae just as in the Pinochet I. However, the legal basis used and the Law 
Lords’ reasoning differed substantially. 
Although the decision in Pinochet I is not binding, it contains useful legal arguments 
by persons of high authority. Therefore, arguments used both in Pinochet I and III are 
offered below on the basis of the understanding that only legal arguments in Pinochet 
III are legally binding and certainly carry more weight. The following statements 
by the law lords reveal how the same court was divided twice on the same issue. In 
order to illustrate their approach with respect to areas under discussion, the relevant 
statements will be quoted in their entirety. 
342 R. v. Evans, ex parte Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 28 October 1998, Divisional Court (Chief 
Justice Bingham, Justice Collins and Justice Richard), para. 68.
343 15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
[2000] 1 AC 61.
344 16 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 2) [2000] 1 AC 119.
345 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.
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6.1.3.1 The House of Lords Hearings: The Pinochet Case I
Three (out of five) judges found that serious international crimes cannot be 
covered by functional immunity. The core of the decision was that certain crimes 
under international law cannot be protected by international law as official functions, 
because they are at the same time condemned by all States as illegal. Furthermore, 
commission of some of these crimes including torture constitutes breach of ius 
cogens.346
Let us first start with minority views. After examining the Statutes and case law 
of international courts from Nuremberg up to the present time, Lord Slynn strictly 
separated proceedings aiming at the withdrawal of immunity to Head of States before 
international tribunals and courts as opposed to national courts. Lord Slynn rejected 
the possibility of universal jurisdiction for commission of international crimes and 
pointed to the fact that no State practice, general consensus or conventional support 
has been shown with respect to the fact that: 
all crimes against international law should be justiciable in National Courts on the 
basis of the universality of jurisdiction . . . That international law crimes should be 
tried before international tribunals or in the perpetrator’s own state is one thing; 
that they should be impleaded without regard to a  long-established customary 
international law rule in the courts of other states is another.347
Lord Lloyd, the other judge in the minority, added “the setting up of these special 
international tribunals for the trial of those accused of genocide and other crimes 
against humanity, including torture, shows that such crimes, when committed 
by Heads of State or other responsible government officials cannot be tried in the 
ordinary courts of other states.”348 He noted that if the proceedings against Heads 
of State could be initiated before national courts, there would be little need for the 
international tribunals.
Being both in the minority, Lord Slynn and Lord Lloyd concluded that Pinochet 
was entitled to immunity before the House of Lords since it is a national court. Hence, 
while recognizing the possibility to try Heads of State for crimes under international 
law, only international criminal tribunals and courts were considered as proper fora 
for addressing these issues. 
346 Cryer et al., supra note 13. 
347 15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
[2000] 1 AC 61, p. 79 (emphasis added).
348 Ibid., at p. 98 (emphasis added).
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The majority was of a different view and held that Pinochet was not entitled to 
immunity ratione materiae before the House of Lords. Nevertheless, all Law Lords 
agreed that if Pinochet was still an incumbent Head of State, he would have enjoyed 
immunity ratione personae, i.e. immunity both in respect of acts committed in an 
official and private capacity. Since Pinochet was no longer a  Head of State, only 
immunity ratione materiae was available for him to be invoked. 
For the immunity ratione materiae to be available, the conduct in question has 
to be qualified as committed in an official capacity, as opposed to immunity ratione 
personae, which is not dependent on the conduct in question being an official act. 
Accordingly, the legal argumentation turned to the question whether torture could be 
considered as an official act, giving rise to immunity ratione materiae.349 
There was some support amongst the law lords in Pinochet I  for the notion 
that despite the fact that Head of State can commit certain unlawful acts, serious 
international crimes cannot be regarded as official acts. Those law lords in the majority 
(Lords Steyn, Nicholls and Hoffmann) considered that torture cannot by its definition 
be part of the functions of a Head of State. 
They held that Pinochet could claim absolute immunity only while in office 
(immunity ratione personae), but he could no longer claim immunity while out of 
office (immunity ratione materiae), since his acts could not have been regarded as 
official acts performed in the exercise of his functions. Lord Steyn observed that, 
“some acts of a  head of state may fall beyond even the most enlarged meaning of 
official acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of state.”350 
Equally, Lord Nicholls considered that:
International law recognises, of course, that the functions of a head of state may 
include activities which are wrongful, even illegal, by the law of his own state or by 
the laws of other states. But international law has made plain that certain types of 
conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the 
part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it does to 
everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law.351 
349 See also the Yerodia case, supra note 28, para. 85. 
350 See supra note 347, p. 115.
351 Ibid., p. 109.
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It was often claimed that after Pinochet I, international law would never be the 
same again since the majority held that the immunity applied only to those state 
officials who exercise legitimate state functions. “By no strech of imagination”, it 
was said, “could widespread torture be regarded as legitimate conduct by anyone, let 
alone a head of State”.352 That is all very well. However, one may query for what the 
immunity would be needed, if not for situations when the State official breaches the 
law? 
There would be little need for immunity when the State officials are indeed exercising 
solely legitimate functions of State as suggested by some law lords and approved by 
some scholars.353 Therefore, the first part of the argument that certain acts are so 
unacceptable that they fall outside being protected by functional immunity even if 
executed on behalf of the State is approved. Those acts would qualify as international 
crimes for which individual criminal responsibility exists. 
Nevertheless, the second part of the argument that torture can accordingly not 
fall within legitimate functions of Head of State is disputed for the following reasons. 
Torture can certainly not be regarded as legitimate function of Head of State. Yet, nor 
can be any other breach of law for which immunity exists in the first place. Accordingly, 
the Law Lords’ line of argumentation is not very convincing in this respect. 
The decision of law lords in Pinochet I can be approved to the extent that commission 
of international crimes does not give a rise to functional immunity. In fact, Pinochet 
I represents a revolutionary decision in a sense that functional immunity was denied 
before national court for international crimes on the basis of general international 
law. But it is also claimed that Law Lords failed to acknowledge that international 
crimes are most often committed in official capacity. Pinochet I shows the reluctance 
to hold that torture (especially if institutionalized as a part of a State’s policy) is indeed 
committed in an official capacity. 
Some Law Lords suggested that international crimes are not official acts or cannot 
be regarded as part of the functions of Head of State. It is argued that it is possible 
to reconcile their approach in the following way. Committing international crimes in 
an official capacity does not necessarily turn them into ‘official acts’ for the purposes 
of functional immunity.354 They represent an exception to immunity ratione materiae, 
352 Robertson, supra note 250, p. 337.
353 Ibid.
354 Similarly, see Van Alebeek arguing that international crimes are not to be attributed 
to State for the functional immunity purposes since “functional immunity ends where 
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which is otherwise granted for all other breaches of national or international law that 
are committed in the name of or on behalf of State.
It is suggested that the holding of office does not metamorphose international 
crimes committed while in office into the official acts of state to be covered by 
functional immunity. Moreover, if the State is a party to international treaties such 
as the Torture Convention or the Genocide Convention, it cannot at the same time 
recognize acts condemned by these treaties as official functions attracting immunity 
(as confirmed by the House of Lords in Pinochet III).355 These crimes are indeed most 
often committed in an official capacity; however, they do not qualify as official acts for 
the purposes of immunity. They qualify as international crimes implying the individual 
criminal responsibility of individuals regardless their position. 
In any case, the fact that the State official has acted in his official capacity does 
not of itself impose functional immunity,356 which was stressed also by De Sena, who 
provided one of the most comprehensive studies on the functional immunity of 
(foreign) State officials.357 As was already indicated above, the best solution would be 
to depart from the ‘false distinction’ between private and official acts.358 It is submitted 
that international crimes are nor private, neither officials acts. Yet, international crimes 
can be committed in an official capacity, usually by abusing that official capacity. 
The emphasis should shift from ‘official’ or ‘private’ act, to a ‘criminal activity’ and 
its nature. It is well acknowledged that the former State official can be prosecuted 
for criminal activity carried out in a private capacity (e.g. ‘ordinary’ murder), as also 
confirmed by the Yerodia case. It is difficult to see then, why criminal activity carried 
out on a large scale (e.g. systemic and institutionalized use of torture) could not be 
subject to prosecution. Especially if such acts are, due to their nature and seriousness, 
qualified as international crimes and, as increasingly claimed, even give a rise to the 
exercise of a universal jurisdiction by national courts under certain circumstances.359
individual responsibility begins.” Van Alebeek, supra note 294, p. 241.
355 Compare with Article 13 of the Resolution of the 13th Committee of the Institut Droit 
International stating that although a  former head of state enjoys immunity for acts 
committed in the course of his official duties, these do not include acts constituting 
international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes contrary to the Hague or Geneva 
Conventions and a single act of state torture contrary to the UN Convention Against 
Torture.
356 P. De Sena in Van Alebeek, supra note 294, pp. 139–140.
357 Ibid.
358 See Nouwen, supra note 98. 
359 See the Yerodia case, Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins. Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
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6.1.3.2 The House of Lords Hearings: The Pinochet Case III
At the final hearing of this case, six (out of seven) judges confirmed that a former 
Head of State could be extradited for commission of torture.360 Each of the judges 
issued a separate opinion and their reasoning was not always clear.361 As Cryer put it 
“[a]s a result, the judgment is one of those gems of the common law system in which, 
however important the decision, it is difficult to identify ratio decidendi.”362 
In sum, the majority of the judges denied immunity ratione materiae on the 
basis of argumentation that since the Torture Convention requires the torture to be 
committed in the exercise of official capacity, the functional immunity cannot excuse 
international crimes (even if committed in an official capacity). It can also not coexist 
together with the granting of universal jurisdiction in relation to these acts by the 
Torture Convention. Otherwise, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the context 
of the Torture Convention would have no practical meaning. 
The Law Lords in Pinochet III held that Pinochet would enjoy absolute immunity 
whilst in office; nevertheless since he was no longer in office, his acts could be subject 
to scrutiny for their compliance with the Torture Convention. The decision in 
Pinochet III can be characterized by a twist of approach to the question at hand. As 
opposed to Pinochet I, where the Law Lords decided on the basis of international 
law in general, in Pinochet III the attention was turned to the treaty instrument that 
played a central role, i.e. the Torture Convention. Accordingly, the ratio decidendi of 
Pinochet III is much more specific and narrow than Pinochet I.363 It is indeed limited, 
as also claimed by the Defence in Taylor, to the effect of the Torture Convention on 
claims to immunity ratione materiae.364 
at paras. 59-60 and 79-85.
360 See further C. Warbrick; D. McGoldrick; H. Fox, ‘The Pinochet Case No. 3’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (1999). 
361 Cryer et al., supra note 13.
362 Ibid., p. 540.
363 As a result, the law lords dramatically reduced the number of charges against Pinochet 
and kept only those extraditable under the Torture Convention.
364 Moreover, in Bouzari v Iran, it was claimed that Pinochet III reasoning applies only with 
respect to criminal proceedings. It provides no support for damages for alleged torture in 
civil proceedings. Bouzari v Iran, Ontario Superior Court, (2002), 124 IRL 428, at para. 
18.
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6.1.3.2.1 National versus International Courts
As regards the possibility of prosecution of Heads of State by national courts, 
some Law Lords were as sceptical as their colleagues in Pinochet I. In that respect, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson reiterated the classic principle of international law that one 
sovereign state cannot adjudicate on the conduct of another State.365 Lord Goff stated 
that if the State intends to wave immunity in any treaty, it has do so expressly. He 
further referred to Watts while emphasizing that Watts does not mention accountability 
before national courts, but only “international accountability.”366 
In contrast, Lord Millett took the view that national courts in fact can exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under customary international law when crimes under 
international law are committed. This requires that courts of the respective State 
have an extraterritorial jurisdiction, which in turn depends on the constitutional 
arrangements including the relationship between customary international law and 
the jurisdiction of its criminal courts.367 
He noted that prosecution in national courts will certainly remain important even 
after the establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal. With respect 
to any official position held by the accused he stated that “[i]n future those who 
commit atrocities against civilian populations must expect to be called to account if 
fundamental human rights are to be properly protected. In this context, the exalted 
rank of the accused can afford no defence.”368 The establishment of international 
criminal courts in his view does not in any way change this conclusion. 
6.1.3.2.2 Private versus Official Acts 
Where the Law Lords ‘parted intellectual company’ was over whether torture falls 
outside the characterization as an official act (because they could never be a legitimate 
functions: Pinochet I) or whether they were indeed, as the US Supreme Court in 
365 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.), p. 209 (emphasis added).
366 “The idea that individuals who commit international crimes are internationally 
accountable for them has now become an accepted part of international law. Problems 
in this area – such as the non-existence of any standing international tribunal to have 
jurisdiction over such crimes – have not affected the general acceptance of the principle 
of individual responsibility for international criminal conduct.” (emphasis added). In 
Watts, supra note 239, p. 82.
367 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.) p. 276.
368 Ibid., p. 279.
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Nelson held, “paradigm official acts”.369 As Robertson observed, “If Pinochet I and 
Pinochet III established anything, it is the unworkability in criminal law of the 
distinction between ‘public’ (or ‘official’) acts and ‘private’ acts - a distinction which 
the Court in US v. Noriega presciently predicted ‘may prove elusive’.”370 
In order to fall within the ambit of the Torture Convention, the conduct in question 
must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 
a public official or a person acting in public capacity.”371 It is therefore suggested that 
for the purposes of the definition of torture in the Torture Convention, the approach 
of some Law Lords in Pinochet I of treating torture as a private act is rather unhelpful. 
Their approach would be hard to reconcile with the definitional criteria set in the 
Torture Convention, although it is admitted that Law Lords in Pinochet I actually did 
not base their argumentation by relying on the Torture Convention. 
In relation to the definitional criteria of torture in the Torture Convention, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson emphasized that: “…as a result all defendants in torture cases will be 
state officials. Yet, if the former head of state has immunity, the man most responsible 
will escape liability while his inferiors (the chief of police, junior army officers) who 
carried out his orders will be liable. I  find it impossible to accept that this was the 
intention.”372 Equally, Lord Saville considered a Head of State to be a person acting in 
an official capacity for the purposes of the Torture Convention and added that he would 
consider a Head of State “as a prime example of an official torturer.”373 
In relation to international crimes, Lord Phillips was of the view that there is no 
established rule of international law, which would require immunity ratione materiae 
to be granted to the accused upon his demonstrating that he was acting in official 
capacity. While admitting that immunity ratione materiae protects all acts of the Head 
of State which were performed in the exercise of his official functions, Lord Hope 
emphasized that there are two exceptions recognized by the customary international 
law “the first relates to criminal acts which the head of state did under the colour 
of his authority as head of state but which were in reality for his own pleasure or 
369 Robertson, supra note 250, p. 366.
370 Ibid., “It is easy to accept that Noriega’s drug trafficking while head of Panamian 
government could not constitute public acts done on behalf of the Panamian state. But 
compare charges against Pinochet-his alleged direction of systematic torture by army, 
police and secret service of his political opponents.” See US v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506, 1521-22 (SD Fla. 1990). 
371 Article 1 of the Torture Convention.
372 See supra note 347, p. 218.
373 Ibid., p. 266.
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benefit[…]The second relates to acts the prohibition of which has acquired the status 
under international law of ius cogens.”374
Pinochet III represents a unique approach of the majority of judges with regard to 
the interpretation and application of the Torture Convention. No explicit waiver of 
the immunity of a Head of State can be found in the Torture Convention. Equally, 
there is no indication that States parties to the Convention intended to abrogate 
immunity of its highest State representatives. Yet, this was the way of interpretation of 
the Torture Convention by the majority of judges. 
6.2 Impact of the Pinochet Case in the United Kingdom, on the 
Taylor Case and Beyond
The decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet was complex, views of the Law 
Lords were divergent and their legal analysis was partly confusing. It was for this 
reason that both supporters and opponents of denying immunity to a former Head of 
State used the decision. While interpretations of this decision vary, the broader reading 
of the Pinochet case confirms the above arguments that international crimes cannot 
be treated as a type of official conduct, which would attract functional immunity.375
As for the impact of the Pinochet decision in the UK, the House of Lords in Jones 
v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have subsequently interpreted the Pinochet decision 
rather narrowly.376 Clearly, this does not mean that other States have to consider the 
Pinochet case as “exhaustive of international law on the matter”,377 which is further 
illustrated on decisions of other domestic courts. Decisions of (or proceedings before) 
domestic courts, which proceed (implicitly or sometimes explicitly) on the basis of 
inapplicability of functional immunity in respect of international crimes, include the 
Bouterse, Sharon, Castro, Ferrini and other cases.378 For example, in the Bouterse case 
374 Ibid., p. 243.
375 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 542. See also Ch. Chinkin, ‘Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)’, 93 American Journal of International Law 
(1999), p. 703 and S. Wirth, ‘Immunities, Related problems and Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), p. 429. 
376 See Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, supra note 55, paras. 19 and 79-81. See also the 
opinion of Lord Hoffmann, ibid., para. 71.
377 Cryer, supra note 13, p. 542.
378 See also the statement made by the Spanish authorities with regard to the request 
for extradition of Pinochet: “The situation is very different, however, with respect to 
former heads of State. International law does not require their protection, for the same 
principles also applicable to the Act of State Doctrine, which does not extend to crimes 
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concerning the former Head of State of Suriname, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
stated that crimes against humanity are not covered by functional immunity.379 
In order to point to other authorities, it is also worth to mention the case of Habreé, 
former President of Chad. The Republic of Senegal was mandated by the African 
Union to prosecute Habré “on behalf of Africa”.380 In this respect, the African Union 
established the Committee of African Jurists, which held that, “Hissène Habré cannot 
shield behind the immunity of a  former Head of State to defeat the principle of 
total rejection of impunity that was adopted by the Assembly.”381 Similarly, the IDI 
in its Resolution affirmed that a  former Head of State (as well as a  former Head 
of Government) “[...] may be prosecuted and tried when the acts alleged constitute 
a crime under international law [...]”.382 In sum, majority of current State practice 
as well as scholarly opinions383 indicate a  trend pointing in the direction of non-
applicability of functional immunity for international crimes also before domestic 
courts.384
under international law. In this regard, all of contemporary international criminal law, 
whether expressly or implicitly but clearly, rejects defence on the grounds of official 
acts or based on the immunities of heads of State or similar persons.” Auto de solicitud 
de extradición de Pinochet, Madrid, 3 November 1998, available at http://www.ua.es/
up/pinochet/documentos/ auto-03-11-98/auto24.htm. For international courts, see e.g. 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, supra note 276. See Cassese, supra note 97, pp. 870–871, referring 
to Israeli, French, Italian, Dutch, British, US, Polish, Spanish, and Mexican cases dealing 
with crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
379 See the Bouterse case, Decision of the 5th chamber of 20 November 2000, Petitions nos. 
R 97/163/12 Sv and R/97/176/12 Sv. See also the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court 
stating that Bouterse cannot be tried in absentia, Judgment of 18 September 2001, no. 
00749/01, CW 2323.
380 See Decision on the Hissène Habreé case and the African Union, Assembly of the African 
Union, 1-2 July 2006, Banjul, The Gambia, Assembly/AU/Dec.127(VII), para. 5 (ii), 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/ Past/2006/July/summit/
doc/Decisions_and_Declarations/Assembly-AU-Dec.pdf (last visited 28 April 2011).
381 See Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the case of Hissène Habré, 
submitted to the Summit of the African Union, para. 13 (2006), available at: http://www.
hrw.org/justice/habre/CEJA_Repor0506.pdf (last visited 28 April 2011).
382 Supra note 276, Article 13, paragraph 2. 
383 See e.g. Cassese, supra note 97; Watts, supra note 239 or the Princeton Principles, supra 
note 10.
384 See also Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, supra note 296, 
para 240 (fn 589).
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However, let us come back to our scenario, in which the Defence in Taylor took 
the opportunity to try to diminish the significance of the Pinochet decision by arguing 
that the case had a restricted impact in international law and stands only as evidence of 
the practice of the UK in relation to the application and interpretation of the Torture 
Convention of 1984. Indeed, by focusing solely on the Torture Convention of 1984, 
the Law Lords did not approve the reasoning of Pinochet I, i.e. that national courts 
can prosecute international crimes under customary international law on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction. Despite the differing opinions with regard to prosecution 
of the high-ranking state officials before national courts, there seemed to be a clear 
agreement (even within the Law Lords being in minority) that the situation would 
be different before international courts, which is surely a relevant outcome for the 
purposes of the Taylor case.
6.3 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (The 
Yerodia Case)
Some scholars have criticized the SCSL’s attempt to defend its jurisdiction over 
Taylor in line with the judgment of the ICJ in the Yerodia case. However, the SCSL’s 
reliance on that judgment is simply explained by the fact that the judgment was raised 
by the Defence in its submission to the SCSL as one of its arguments. The Yerodia 
case was invoked and relied upon by both the Defence and the Prosecution in their 
submissions. 
Therefore, the SCSL had to address the legal arguments brought by the Defence 
while relying on the judgement in the Yerodia case. The way the SCSL did so is 
another matter, which can certainly be subject to criticism as well as the judgment 
and reasoning of the ICJ in the Yerodia case itself. The fact that the SCSL had to 
consider the Yerodia case does not mean that the SCSL had to follow the outcome 
of this decision.385 As well known, the judgement in the Yerodia case attracted an 
extensive criticism both in the legal scholarship386 and also in separate and dissenting 
opinions.387 
385 The decisions of the ICJ are binding only for the parties to the dispute and only for the 
particular case. However, this does not deny the high authority of ICJ decisions and 
often-strong reliance on its decisions by other international courts, including the SCSL. 
386 Cassese, supra note 100, p.  864; Wouters, supra note 321, pp. 257, 259–61. A. 
Orakhelashvili, ‘Case review on Arrest Warrant’, 96 American Journal of International 
Law 677 (2002).
387 See e.g. Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad HocVan denWyngaert, paras. 26–8; Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, paras. 78 and 85. The 
Yerodia case, supra note 28.
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Since the Yerodia case played an important role in the Taylor case, it is useful to 
start with a brief recollection of the ICJ relevant findings in this case. Yet, the Yerodia 
case will be dealt with only in the context of, and to the extent necessary for, drawing 
conclusions with regard to the Taylor case.
On 11 April 2000 a  Belgium court issued an international arrest warrant in 
absentia against Yerodia Ndombasi. He was charged with crimes against humanity 
and acts constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols of 1977. The DRC subsequently brought a case to the ICJ. The 
DRC disputed the legality of the circulation of an international arrest warrant by 
Belgium with respect to, at the time of the issuance of warrant, its incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Yerodia Ndombasi. The ICJ had to examine whether Belgium 
had a  jurisdiction under customary international law over an incumbent Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of another state and whether there is any exemption from this 
jurisdiction on the basis of immunities available to the high ranking officials. 
The DRC argued that, while in office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs is entitled to 
absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of any other state. 
According to the DRC, immunity has a functional purpose, i.e. to enable the official 
to carry out his duties without any interference. Moreover, the DRC suggested that 
this immunity covers all acts regardless of whether they were committed before the 
official took office, and also regardless of whether they could be characterized as 
‘official acts’ or not. The DRC nevertheless accepted that:
the fact that immunity might bar prosecution before a specific court or over a specific 
period does not mean that the same prosecution could not be brought, if appropriate, 
before another court which is not bound by that immunity, or at another time when 
the immunity no longer exists.388 
Belgium argued that despite the existence of immunities of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs from jurisdiction to be exercised by the courts of another state, in case of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity the incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
cannot claim immunity.389 
388 Ibid., para. 48. 
389 See, differently,V. Klingberg, ‘(Former) Heads of State before international(ized) criminal 
courts: the case of Charles Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, German 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 46 (2003), pp. 552-556.
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Majority of judges was however of a  different view. At the beginning the ICJ 
observed that “in international law it is firmly established that, as diplomatic and 
consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head 
of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities 
from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”390 The ICJ emphasized 
that immunities granted to e.g. Ministers for Foreign Affairs “are not granted for their 
personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf 
of their respective States.”391
As for the argumentation and distinction made by Belgium with regard to private 
or official acts, the ICJ confirmed the far-reaching approach in regard to personal 
immunity by stating that: 
[t]he functions of a  Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the 
duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect 
the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which would 
hinder him or her in the performance of their duties. In this respect, no distinction 
can be drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an ‘official’ 
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a ‘private capacity’, or, for that 
matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed office and acts 
committed during the period of office.392
The ICJ examined, inter alia, decisions of national courts such as the House of Lords 
(UK) and the Court of Cassation (France), and stated that “the rules concerning the 
immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity…do not enable 
it to conclude that any such exception exists in customary international law in regard to 
national courts.”393 The ICJ also considered the rules concerning immunity in the legal 
instruments creating international criminal tribunals. It found that the relevant provisions 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charter394 and of the ICTY395, ICTR396 and ICC397 Statutes 
denying immunity to high-ranking officials cannot serve as the basis for denying immunity 
390 The Yerodia case, supra note 28, para. 51.
391 Ibid., para. 53.
392 Ibid., para. 54-55. 
393 Ibid.
394 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Art. 7, Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Fast East, Art. 6.
395 Statute of the ICTY, Art. 7 (2).
396 Statute of the ICTR, Art. 6 (2).
397 Statute of the ICC, Art. 27.
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before national courts.398 The ICJ therefore limited the possibility of prosecution of 
international crimes committed by serving state officials only to international courts.
Despite the criticism in the international legal scholarship, it is suggested that the 
ICJ’s conclusion in this respect is in line with decisions of national courts. Many 
other national courts have reached similar conclusions, dismissing charges against 
serving Heads of State on the basis of immunity. State practice so far provides for 
upholding personal immunity of high-ranking officials before national courts, despite 
the attempt of some scholars to prove or suggest otherwise.399 
Admittedly, not all of the ICJ’s statements on the matter were very well reasoned 
or beyond dispute.400 The manner in which the ICJ refers to ‘firmly established’ rules 
of customary international law without referring to any examples of State practice or 
academic commentary, suggests that immunity was assumed rather than established.401 
In sum, the ICJ held that under customary international law a Foreign Minister (and 
by extension a Head of State) enjoys absolute immunity from “any act of authority 
of another State” regardless of the gravity of the charges involved, for as long as he or 
she remains in office.402 
The ICJ has in many respects considerably expanded the protection afforded by 
international law to Foreign Ministers. It has given priority to the need for foreign 
relations to be conducted unimpaired. The ICJ concluded, by thirteen votes to three, 
that the issue and circulation of an international arrest warrant: “constituted violations 
of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the DRC, in that they failed 
to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DRC enjoyed under international law.”403
398 The Yerodia case, supra note 28, para. 58.
399 See e.g. Frulli, supra note 66.
400 These statements and findings are however not necessary to be examined for the purpo-
ses of this work. 
401 As Sands has summarized: “The ICJ’s judgment is not accompanied by an identification 
or assessment of the examples which were examined, the process of deduction is not 
explained. Without knowing what the ICJ looked at, or what it distinguished or applied, 
it is not possible to form a view as to the basis or merits of the Court’s reasoning or 
conclusion, and in particular its assumption (by way of starting point) that a  rule of 
immunity exists. The overall conclusion, which may be correct, but we cannot know 
on the basis of what is presented, is more of an ex cathedra declaration than a reasoned 
judgment”, in Sands, supra note 240, p.49.
402 Ibid.
403 The Yerodia case, para. 78 (2).
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Three votes against the majority decision came from Judges Higgins, Kooijmans 
and Buergenthal in a  joint Separate Opinion. The concurring minority considered 
some of the issues more deeply and indeed differently from the majority. Their 
findings well illustrate the tension that the SCSL was also faced with: 
One of the challenges of present-day international law is to provide for stability 
of international relations and effective international intercourse while as the same 
time guaranteeing respect for human rights…the international consensus that the 
perpetrators of international crimes should not go unpunished is being advanced by 
a flexible strategy, in which newly-established international criminal tribunals, treaty 
obligations and national courts all have their part to play.404 
This statement can certainly be approved, but it remains to be seen how far, how fast 
and which direction the State practice evolves. Moreover, it is suggested that international 
criminal tribunals have a different “part to play” than national courts. This was emphasized 
in the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillame. Judge Guillame referred to Belgium’s citation 
of the development of international criminal courts and opined that “this development 
was precisely in order to provide a remedy for the deficiencies of national courts, and the 
rules governing the jurisdiction of international courts as laid down by treaty or by the 
Security Council of course have no effect upon the jurisdiction of national courts.”405 
Importantly for our purposes, in the majority decision the judges also pronounced 
on situations when immunities might be actually irrelevant: 
(1) ‘First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their 
countries, and may thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with the 
relevant rules of domestic law’; 
(2) ‘Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State 
which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity’; 
(3) ‘Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office … he or she will no longer enjoy 
all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that 
it has jurisdiction under international law, a  court of one State may try a  former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or 
subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed 
during that period in a private capacity’; 
(4) ‘Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject 
to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they 
have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established 
404 Ibid., para. 51. 
405 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Guillame, para. 11 (emphasis added).
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pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, and the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome 
Convention.’406 
Let us now consider these assessments: 
(1) It is suggested that the first scenario is a  rather theoretical option, especially 
considering that international crimes are mostly committed in countries with oppressive 
regimes. Lord Brown-Wilkinson supports this view by the following reasoning: 
the fact that the local court had jurisdiction to deal with the international crime 
of torture was nothing to the point so long as the totalitarian regime remained in 
power: a  totalitarian regime will not permit adjudication by its own courts on its 
own shortcomings. Hence the demand for some international machinery to repress 
state torture which is not dependent upon the local courts where the torture was 
committed.407 
(2) The second scenario is possible but exceptional. For example, the Philippines 
government waived the immunity of the former President Marcos. Still, it is difficult 
to see many circumstances, if any, in which a state will waive immunity for a serving 
Foreign Minister. 
(3) In the third scenario, the ICJ is referring to the possibility to prosecute a former 
Foreign Minister of another state for acts committed in private capacity. However, the 
ICJ provides no assistance as to what would or would not be a private act. Would the 
court treat international crimes as private acts? If so, it would not reflect the reality in 
which international crimes are usually committed.408 
When commenting on the decision, Cassese criticized that the ICJ did not refer 
“to the customary rule lifting functional immunities for State officials accused of 
international crimes”.409 Similarly, Cryer noted that the ICJ failed to mention this 
406 Ibid., para. 61. 
407 The Pinochet case III, Lord Brown-Wilkinson p. 199.
408 It is also important to refer to the fact that DRC explicitly admitted that even if 
international crimes are committed by state official while in office, there still exists 
individual criminal responsibility for such acts. The DRC stated that there was no 
disagreement with Belgium on this point, Mémoire of 15 May 2001, at 39, para. 60, 
quoted from Cassese, supra note 97, p. 871.
409 Cassese, supra note 97, p. 870. Similarly, Gaeta, supra note 331, pp. 979-983. See also 
Koller, supra note 256 and Ch. Wickremasinghe, ‘Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000’, 52 
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exception, according to which “former officials can also be tried for any acts which 
constitute serious international crimes, whether in a  ‘private capacity’ or not…The 
omission was also puzzling in that both parties to the dispute-DRC and Belgium-
agreed that functional immunity is not a bar to prosecution for international crime.”410 
Yet, the ICJ perhaps did not address that issue directly or in more detail simply 
because the case concerned personal immunity of incumbent Minister, not functional 
immunity of former Minister. Moreover, the concerned paragraph was merely obiter 
dicta, therefore referring to possible examples rather than representing a closed list.411 
Akande considers the failure of the ICJ to specifically refer to immunities of former 
officials to be a  significant omission, but offers a  concise summary of the possible 
views taken by the ICJ: 
First, the Court may have taken the view that international crimes are to be regarded 
as private acts and that, in line with the third circumstance in the Court’s list, there 
is therefore no immunity with respect to such acts. However, as argued above, the 
categorization of international crimes as always being private acts is wrong. Secondly, 
the Court may have taken the view that international crimes committed by state 
officials are official acts and may be regarded as suggesting that immunity ratione 
materiae continues to exist in proceedings before foreign national courts relating to 
those crimes. This would be contrary to extensive post-World War II practice...A further 
possibility, however, is that the Court’s list is non-exhaustive and does not preclude 
the possibility that there is a rule removing immunity ratione materiae in relation to 
prosecutions for acts amounting to international crimes.412 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that the ICJ intended to prevent possible prosecutions of 
international crimes by trying to label them as official acts being covered by functional 
immunity. Nevertheless, by failing to provide much needed explanation and guidance 
in this area, the ICJ prolongs the controversy over the distinction between private and 
official acts. 
(4) The fourth scenario is crucial for our purposes. Accordingly, it will be dealt 
with separately and extensively in Chapter 6.4 in order to examine whether the SCSL 
could actually do what Belgium was not allowed to do under current international 
law on immunities.413 
International and Comparative Law Quaterly 775 (2003).
410 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 544. 
411 Ibid.
412 Akande, supra note 51, p. 839 (emphasis added).
413 Nollkaemper and Romano, supra note 12. 
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To conclude, whatever the various views on the outcome of the Pinochet and 
Yerodia judgments may be, both of them undeniably confirm that serving high-
ranking officials cannot claim immunity before certain international criminal courts 
and tribunals. Yet, both cases were concerned with immunities before national courts. 
Their reasoning thus does not provide us with a  sufficient basis in order to draw 
conclusions with respect to immunities claimed before international courts and, in 
particular, before the SCSL in the Taylor case. 
In order to consider this matter further, the next Chapter provides an overview of 
international courts and tribunals and their respective legal basis, including those courts 
mentioned by the ICJ in the Yerodia case (the fourth scenario).414 International courts and 
tribunals are introduced together with the relevant provisions of their Statutes relating to 
immunities, from which some conclusions for the Taylor case may be drawn. Other legal 
instruments, judicial decisions and scholarly opinions will serve to develop the analysis.
6.4 The History of International Criminal Prosecutions: Practice Before 
International Tribunals
6.4.1 Practice Before Nuremberg
It has been asserted that there is no entitlement to rely on immunities before 
international tribunals and courts.415 The introductory part of this work however 
suggested that this proposition is oversimplification of an issue. Let us now turn 
to examine the consistency of this practice with respect to immunities before such 
tribunals and courts. 
The first effort to try a former Head of State occurred during the peace negotiations 
after the First World War. The Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War and Enforcement of Penalties (Commission) in its recommendations to prosecute 
Kaiser William II stated: “All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high 
their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, 
414 “Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to 
criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have 
jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant 
to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and 
the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention”. The 
Yerodia case, supra note 28, para 61. 
415 Sands, supra note 142. 
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who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of 
humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution…”416 
The US representative at the Commission expressed disagreement with these 
recommendations and did not approve the possibility to charge persons of offenses 
“against the laws of humanity.”417 Moreover, he held that there are no precedents to 
be found in the modern practice of nations for subjecting a Head of State to such 
criminal proceedings that could, according to him, result into a degree of responsibility 
unknown to municipal or international law.418 As a result of complicated negotiations, 
charges against the German emperor Kaiser William II under the Treaty of Versailles 
(1919) were framed as “a  supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties”, instead of breaches of international law.419 
This first attempt to punish a  former Head of State failed due to refusal of the 
Government of Netherlands to surrender German ex-emperor. The idea of providing 
for the establishment of a first special Tribunal expressed in Article 227 of the Treaty of 
Versailles was thus not fulfilled at that time. Nevertheless, this first attempt to punish 
a Head of State was an important step ahead in the area of responsibility of high-
416 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (29 March 1919), reprinted in 14 
American Journal of International Law 95 (1920), p. 117, quoting from M. A. Summers, 
‘Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State Officials for Core 
International Crimes in States Like the United States That Are Not Parties to The Statute 
of The International Criminal Court’, Brookland Journal of International Law 31 (2) 
(2006), p. 482. 
417 This can be viewed as an emergence of the category ‘crimes against humanity’ as later 
confirmed by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
418 S. S. Gregory, ‘Criminal Responsibility of Sovereigns for Wilful Violations of the Laws of 
War’, 6 Virginia Law Review 400, p. 414 (1920), available at https://archive.org/details/
jstor-1064270 (last visited 26 November 2011).
419 Article 227 of Treaty of Versailles explicitly provided that: “The Allied and Associated 
Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for 
a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special 
tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees 
essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by 
each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, 
Italy and Japan. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be 
imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government 
of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex- Emperor in order that he may 
be put on trial.” In Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 June 1919, 2 
Bevans 43, quoted from Summers, supra note 416, p. 482.
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
118
ranking state officials. Since then, the notion of individual criminal responsibility for 
serious crimes before international courts started to emerge. 
6.4.2 The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
Time passed. Yet another war initiated by Germany broke out. And yet another attempt 
to prosecute those responsible was made. The next opportunity to ‘test’ the existence of 
individual criminal responsibility of high-ranking state officials for international crimes 
arose after the WWII. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established. 
These tribunals were the first ever courts of law tasked with the difficult aim 
“to overcome the confusion of many tongues and the conflicting concepts of just 
procedure among divers systems of law, so as to reach a common judgment.”420 The 
IMT for the Far East was established by the military order421 as opposed to the IMT 
at Nuremberg, which was established by treaty.422
The Nuremberg Charter explicitly confirmed the principle that no accused was 
entitled to claim his official position for purposes of relieving him of individual criminal 
responsibility before those Tribunals. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declared that: 
“The official position of defendants, whether heads of state or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility 
or mitigating punishment.”423
Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter, similarly to Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, 
provided that: 
Neither the position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted 
pursuant to order of his government or a  superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to 
free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged but 
420 Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
in: II Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 98-
155 (Nuremberg: IMT, 1947) (‘the Blue Set’) available at http://www.roberthjackson.
org/Man/theman2-7-8-1/ (last visited 26 May 2012).
421 Established by command of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Forces in the South Pacific.
422 See e.g. Lauterpacht, who explained that the tribunal was: “the joint exercise, by the four 
states which established the tribunal, of a right which each of them was entitled to exercise 
separately on its own responsibility in accordance with international law.” In H. Lauterpacht 
(ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. II (London: Longmans, 1952), pp. 580–581.
423 United Nations Treaty Series, vol.82, p.  279, London (8 August 1945), quoted from 
Summers, supra note 416.
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such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires.424 
The Nuremberg Charter was an expression of the fact “that individuals have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed 
by the individual State.”425 Even though the IMT admitted that international law 
provides under certain circumstances for protection of State representatives, it was 
at the same time emphasized that this does not apply to acts declared as criminal 
by international law.426 It was held that the official position in such cases should in 
no way be serving as a  shelter against punishment.427 The IMT repeated the same 
idea in the following part of its findings: “He who violates the laws of war cannot 
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in 
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law.”428 
While the Nuremberg Charter was an outcome of the practical effort of four victorious 
states,429 standards set up in the Nuremberg Charter (Charter) did not reflect only 
the views of signatories. Seventeen other States including Belgium, The Netherlands, 
424 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, 19 
January 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, quoted from Summers, supra note 416. 
425 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. I. 
(1947), p.  223. Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law 
Commission, Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1950), 
Vol. II, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l2.pdf. (last 
visited 10 December 2011). 
426 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals, The Blue Series (the official record of the trial of the major civilian and military 
leaders of Nazi Germany), p. 223, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
NT_major-war-criminals.html ((last visited 10 December 2011). 
427 Ibid.
428 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals (with the dissenting opinion of the Soviet Member) - Nuremberg 30th 
September and 1st October 1946 (Nuremberg Judgment), Cmd. 6964, Misc. No. 12 
(London: H.M.S.O. 1946), pp. 41-42. Quoted from ‘Universal jurisdiction: Belgian 
court has jurisdiction in Sharon case to investigate 1982 Sabra and Chatila killings’, 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/001/2002/en/dom-
IOR530012002en.html (last visited 25 October 2008).
429 Following the decision of the Yalta conference, President Truman requested representa-
tives of the U.S. to propose an International Agreement. This proposal was submitted 
during the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. This proposal has become 
London agreement with the Charter forming an integral part of this agreement.
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Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, 
Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela, and India supported the 
content of the Charter. The Charter and its principles therefore represented the will of 
twenty-one States and the shared sense of justice of most of the world. 
At the time the acts were committed, there was no judicial precedent for the Charter 
and for principles it incorporated. At the same time, the broad acceptance of the 
Charter by the action of the above mentioned States was perceived as an agreement 
by the majority of the nations to adapt settled principles to new situations. According 
to Justice Jackson, the Charter was not ex post facto legislation but recognition and 
expression of already existing international law.430 Nonetheless, it can be also said that 
international law has been partly revisited in order to meet a change in circumstances.
Justice Jackson emphasized in his Report to the US president an incorporation 
of Charter principles into a  judicial precedent. While quoting Justice Cardozo’s 
comment that: “The power of the precedent is the power of the beaten path”, Justice 
Jackson went on to say that: 
one of the chief obstacles to this trial was the lack of a beaten path. A judgment such 
as has been rendered shifts the power of the precedent to the support of these rules of 
law. No one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi 
leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law and law with a sanction.431 
In December 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 95(1), 
affirming the Principles of International law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.432 In addition, the UN General Assembly 
 
 
 
430 See e.g. citation of the UK Supreme Court of Judicature: “The recognition that individu-
als may be held criminally responsible for offences against international law goes back at 
least to principles stated in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nurem-
berg...”. Quoted from R. G. Jones v The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya as 
Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) & Anor (28 October 2004), available at http://
www.hrothgar.co.uk/YAWS/reps/04a1394.htm (last visited 28 November 2008).
431 Report to the President by Justice Jackson, International Conference on Military Trials: 
London, 1945 (7 October 1946), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/
jackson/jack63.htm (last visited 17 November 2008).
432 G.A. Resolution 95(I), 11 December 1946.
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by Resolution 177(II)433 directed the ILC to “treat as a matter of primary importance 
plans for their formulation.”434 
The ILC in 1950 indeed formulated these principles in its Report. The key provision 
for our purposes, Principle III, which is actually based on Article 7 of the Nuremberg 
Charter, declares that: “The fact that a person who committed an act which constituted 
a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible official does not 
relieve him from responsibility under international law.”435 
The Principle III was also supported by the General Assembly’s acceptation of the 
ILC Report. The ILC further reaffirmed the Principle III, for the first time in 1954, in 
its Article 3 of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(Draft Code): “The fact that a  person acted as Head of State or as responsible 
government official does not relieve him from responsibility for committing any of 
the offences defined in this Code.”436 
For the second time, in 1991, Article 13 of the Draft Code similarly provided: “The 
official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security 
of mankind, and particularly the fact that he acts as head of State or Government, 
does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.”437 In 1996, Article 7 of the Draft 
Code basically reiterated the same.438 
433 G.A. Resolution 177(II), ‘Formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the 
Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal’, 21 November 1947.
434 Ibid.
435 Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1950, 
vol. II. This principle was quoted e.g. by Lord Hutton in Pinochet III, p. 258.
436 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (28 July 1954), 
International Law Commission, 9 U.N. G.A.O.R. (Supp. No. 9) p.  11, U.N. 
Doc. A/2693 (1954). 
437 Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, (19 July 
1991), International Law Commission, 46 U.N. G.A.O.R. (Supp. No. 10) p. 238, U.N. 
Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
438 Article 7 reads: “The official position of an individual who commits a crime against the 
peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does not 
relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.” Report on the Draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (6 May - 26 July 1996), International 
Law Commission, 51 U.N. G.A.O.R. (Supp. No. 22), U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
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Accordingly, all these steps led to the recognition that the Nuremberg principles 
are nowadays firmly established in international law.439 Yet, what did these principles 
exactly establish? What is the real meaning of Article 7? Does Article 7 of the 
Nuremberg Charter actually remove personal immunity? Arguably, the content of the 
Article 7 relates “only” to the fact that a person who committed international crimes 
can be held responsible even if acting in an official capacity. In other words, it can be 
argued that there is no immunity ratione materiae for such crimes.440 
6.4.3 After Nuremberg
We will now proceed to assess further developments in the area of jurisdictional 
immunities before international courts. These developments will then be compared 
with the approach taken by the SCSL in the Taylor case. The examination of relevant 
practice of other international tribunals starts with the constitutive instruments of 
those tribunals, i.e. their Statutes. The Statutes as the most important constitutive 
instruments determine the scope of legitimate action exercised by tribunals since they 
govern jurisdiction and functioning of the tribunals as such. Therefore, the below 
analysis is helpful in order to assess the correctness of the SCSL approach in terms of 
a larger theoretical and practical framework. 
6.4.3.1 Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
Almost a half century after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, two ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals were established. Both the ICTY and ICTR were established 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The provision relevant for our purposes is the Article 7(2) of the Statute, which 
states that, “the official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
 
 
439 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case, where it held 
that Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg ‘reflect[s] a rule of customary 
international law’, in Cassese, supra note 100. See also King stating that: “Number of the 
Nuremberg principles have been incorporated into the army fields manuals of the major 
political powers. National attitudes have been influenced and altered constructively by 
the Nuremberg proceedings and certainly have bearings on subsequent state practice in 
this field.” In H., T., King, ‘The Limitations of Sovereignty from Nuremberg to Sarajevo’, 
20 Canadian-U.S. Law Journal 173 (1994), p. 173.
440 See also the Yerodia case, para. 60. 
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criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”441 The Article 6(2) of the Statute of 
the ICTR is taken verbatim from the Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute. 
The ICTY in the Blaskic case confirmed that there are some exceptions to the 
rule of general international law based on sovereign equality of States (par in parem 
non habet imperium), which otherwise provides for immunity of high-ranking state 
officials.442 On the one hand, acts committed in official capacity are usually attributed 
solely to the State, so the individual could not be held responsible for these acts. 
On the other hand, there are norms of international criminal law, which prohibit 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These norms provide, according 
to the ICTY, for exception to the rule based on sovereign equality, i.e. these acts 
attract individual criminal responsibility.443 The ICTY in the Blaskic case held that 
“under these norms, those responsible for such crimes cannot invoke immunity from 
national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting 
in their official capacity.”444 
But again, same question as with respect to the Article 7 of the Nuremberg 
Charter can be raised. What kind of immunity does Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute 
address? Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute is apparently similar to the wording of 
the Nuremberg Charter. It arguably relates only to the fact that the accused cannot 
claim its official position as a  substantial defence. Therefore, it can be argued that 
there is indeed criminal responsibility for such acts (Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute 
441 Trial Chambers of the ICTY have held that the Article 7(2) of the Statute of the 
ICTY ‘reflect[s] a rule of customary international law’, in cases of Karadzic and others, 
Furundzija, and Slobodan Milosevic. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, 16 May 1995, para. 
24; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 10 December 1998, para. 140; Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 8 
November 2001, para 28.
442 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Subpoena, 29 October 1997, p. 710. 
443 See the ICJ observation in the Yerodia case: “Now it is generally recognised that in the 
case of such crimes, which are often committed by high officials who make use of the 
power invested in the State, immunity is never substantive and thus cannot exculpate the 
offender from personal criminal responsibility”, supra note 28, para. 7.
444 Blaskic, supra note 442 (emphasis added). See also the Karadzic case, where the ICTY 
stated: “According to customary international law, there are some acts for which immunity 
from prosecution cannot be invoked before international tribunals”, para. 17. The ICTY 
noted further noted that: “any immunity agreement in respect of an accused indicted for 
genocide, war crimes and/or crimes against humanity before an international tribunal 
would be invalid under international law”, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, Case No. 
IT-95-5/18-PT), Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for Inspection and Disclosure: 
Immunity Issue, 17 December 2008, para. 25. 
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removes functional immunity which cannot coexist with this responsibility), however 
for so long as the Head of State is in power, there is a procedural bar to the exercise 
of jurisdiction over these acts (Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute preserves personal 
immunity). For example Cassese argued that the indictment of Milosevic was not 
supported by the letter of the ICTY Statute.445 Admittedly, this is not the only view.
For example Gaeta argues that “...the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals provide 
for a derogation from the legal regulation of personal immunities contained in customary 
international law.”446 While she admits that these Statutes do not envisage any such 
derogation explicitly, all UN member States are obliged to cooperate with the ICTY 
on the basis of the Chapter VII powers. By virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, 
these obligations take precedence over customary and treaty obligations relating to 
personal immunity.447 In this respect, she held that, “whenever a Member State to 
which the International Tribunal issues an arrest warrant enjoining the detention 
of the Head of State of another UN member who happens to be on its territory 
executes the arrest warrant, by doing so it does not breach any customary or treaty 
obligations vis-à-vis the foreign State concerned.”448 Some other scholars, such as 
Koller, emphasized the fact that no State objected to the indictment and prosecution 
of Milosevic, which therefore “seems to indicate that the current interpretation of the 
ICTY Statute removes any procedural immunity as well.”449 
In the Milosevic case, it was assumed that the Security Council Resolutions had 
removed any immunity, but the ICTY actually never pronounced on immunity of serving 
Head of State.450 If the ICTY would have to do so, it would have to interpret Article 7(2) 
as removing also personal immunity. Moreover, the ICTY would have to either find that 
such an interpretation “would be compatible with customary international law, like the 
rules on criminal responsibility, or acknowledge that it is a deviation from customary 
international law, but authorized because of its Chapter VII legal nature.”451 
While the ICTY never decided upon the exact scope of Article 7(2), it nevertheless 
confirmed the general validity of the Article and implicitly interpreted Article 7(2) 
445 See Cassese, supra note 97, p. 866.
446 Gaeta, supra note 331, p. 989.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid. See also Cryer et al., supra note 13, pp. 552-554.
449 Koller, supra note 256, p. 33.
450 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Moti-
ons, 8 November 2001.
451 Nouwen, supra note 98, p. 665.
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as not only the attribution of criminal responsibility, but also referring to immunity 
ratione personae.452 Even if such a broad interpretation is accepted, the ICTY could 
arguably adopt a rather flexible interpretation of its Statute with Chapter VII backing. 
It is well known that when the Security Council takes measures under Chapter VII it 
deems necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, it can affect 
the rights of all member states, even against their will or without their consent.453 
6.4.3.2 The International Criminal Court 
As opposed to the two ad hoc tribunals that were established by the Security Council 
Resolutions, the ICC was established by the Rome Statute, which is multilateral treaty. 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute, entitled ‘Irrelevance of official capacity’, provides that: 
(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, 
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government 
official shall in no case exempt a  person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
(2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 
If compared with the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTY and ICTR provisions, 
it is obvious that Article 27 is the most far-reaching and has a considerable impact 
on international rules on personal immunities. The Rome Statute is innovative as 
it added to the criminal responsibility in paragraph 1 of Article 27, a paragraph 2 
that explicitly denies procedural immunity. It thus represents a clear derogation from 
customary international law by complete removal of both immunities.454 
452 Ibid.
453 D. Akande, ‘The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC 
Prosecution?’, Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series (30 July 2008), 
available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Akande.pdf (last visited 18 April 2009). 
For an argument that any derogation from existing customary international law by the 
UN Security Council has to explicit, see M. Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International 
Law: Whither Human Rights?’, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 20:1 
(2009), p. 97.
454 Article 27 of the ICC Statute was also mentioned by the ICTY in the Karadzic case. See 
Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion 
for Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, 17 December 2008.
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However, this derogation operates by virtue of Article 98(1):
only in the reciprocal relationships between States Parties to the Statute. In all other 
cases, in particular when requests for cooperation involve the question of personal 
immunities of officials of a State not party to the Statute, one has to fall back on the 
traditional legal regulation contained in international customary rules. Consequently, 
the Court may not make requests for cooperation entailing, for the requested State, 
a violation of international rules on personal immunities to the detriment of a State 
not party to the Statute.455 
Article 27 is only effective regarding Heads of States that are parties to the Statute, 
while:
non-parties remain entitled to the immunities that they would possess under 
customary international law. This is because the immunity is a right of the State and 
not that of the individual. Other States cannot remove that immunity or affect the 
right of that non-party by a treaty to which the State possessing the immunity is not 
a party.456 
This observation has important implications for the SCSL and its powers to affect 
rights of third parties, as we shall see in Chapters 7 and 8.457 In sum, the Nuremberg 
Principles, the relevant Articles in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, and Article 
27 (1) of the Rome Statute do not explicitly address the issue of personal immunity. 
Yet, the ICTY and ICTR can benefit from the Chapter VII powers and the ICC has 
Article 27 (2). Where does the SCSL Statute stand in relation to personal immunities? 
455 Gaeta, supra note 331 (emphasis added). Compare with the recent decision of the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Al Bashir case. This decision was subject to much criticism. For 
example, Akande stated that: “The biggest weakness in the Pre-Trial Chambers decision 
is that it fails to explain why Art. 98 is there at all. If under international law, there can 
be no immunities when an international court wants someone from prosecution, why 
did the parties to the Rome Statute insert Art. 98? The Chamber even goes on to say that 
it “is of the view that the unavailability of immunities with respect to prosecutions by 
international courts applies to any act of cooperation by states which forms an integral 
part of those prosecutions.” (para. 44) In short national authorities may never raise the 
immunity of a State as an obstacle to cooperation with the ICC. Article 98 has been 
made redundant by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision! This is contrary to a basic principle 
of treaty interpretation.” Akande, supra note 37. 
456 Ibid.
457 See also Article 13 lit. b or 15ter of the Rome Statute. 
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7 The Taylor Case: Submissions of Parties and 
the SCSL Decision with Respect to Immunities
The first three possibilities mentioned by the ICJ in the Yerodia case with respect 
to the irrelevance of immunities evidently do not apply to Taylor’s case.458 However, 
in the fourth scenario, the ICJ indicated its views on the possibility of prosecuting 
crimes under international law before ‘certain international criminal court’. As regards 
the phrase ‘certain international criminal court’, the ICJ explicitly referred to all the 
international courts and tribunals described above. Can the SCSL be also qualified as 
such an international criminal court for the purposes of denying immunity to Taylor? 
The arguments of the parties and of the SCSL where already outlined in Chapter 
2. Therefore, they will be only briefly recalled for the clarity of the analysis that will 
follow. The Defence analysed the Yerodia case and stated that the immunity is more 
a matter of procedure than substance with procedural immunity subsisting for as long 
as the official is in the office. According to the Defence, the indictment against Taylor 
was invalid due to his personal immunity from criminal prosecution. The principal 
argument of the Defence was that Taylor enjoyed absolute immunity from criminal 
prosecution.
The Defence argued that the principles enunciated by the ICJ in the Yerodia 
case establish that only an international court may indict a  serving Head of State, 
while the SCSL does not meet the criteria of an international court. The Defence 
emphasized that exceptions from diplomatic immunities can only derive from other 
rules of international law such as Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII of 
458 See the Yerodia case, para 61: “(1) First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under 
international law in their countries, and may thus be tried by those countries’ courts in 
accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law’; (2) Secondly, they will cease to enjoy 
immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented 
decides to waive that immunity’; (3) Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office … he 
or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other 
States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may 
try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed 
prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed 
during that period in a private capacity.” 
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the UN Charter. Since the SCSL does not have Chapter VII powers; judicial orders 
from the SCSL have therefore the quality of judicial orders from a national court.
The Defence concluded that “the emphatic nature of the decision and the size of 
the majority endorsing it send a clear signal that the main judicial organ of the United 
Nations does not wish to subject the stability of international relations to disturbances 
originating from the decentralised judicial investigations of crimes, no matter how 
object they be.”459
According to the Prosecution the Yerodia case concerned “the immunities of an 
incumbent Head of State from the jurisdiction of the Courts of another state which is 
not the case here”.460 The Prosecution maintained that the SCSL is such an example 
of international criminal tribunal for which customary international law permits to 
indict a serving Head of State. 
The lack of Chapter VII powers was not viewed by the Prosecution as an obstacle. 
The Prosecution argued that the ICC equally lacks Chapter VII powers, yet it denies 
immunity to Heads of States in respect of international crimes. The Prosecution 
concluded that in the Yerodia case, the ICJ enumerated the number of circumstances 
in which a Minister of Foreign Affairs could be prosecuted for international crimes, 
including international criminal courts where they have the jurisdiction. In the 
Prosecution’s view, the SCSL is such an international criminal court and Article 6(2) 
of the Statute clearly envisages that the SCSL has the power to try a Head of State.
The SCSL started its examination by identifying and citing the relevant provisions 
of the IMT Charter, the ILC Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal and relevant provisions 
of the Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and of the ICC. Based on these precedents, 
the SCSL concluded that “[t]he nature of the Tribunals has always been a relevant 
consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle of 
immunity”.461 
The SCSL then addressed the Yerodia case and noted that the ICJ confirmed 
personal immunity of incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national courts. 
At the same time, the SCSL interpreted the ICJ’s reasoning in terms of confirming 
the irrelevance of immunities in relation to ‘certain international criminal courts’. The 
459 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 15.
460 Ibid., para. 9 (d).
461 Ibid., para. 49.
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SCSL justified a different approach on the basis of distinction between international 
and national courts by stating that, “the principle of state immunity derives from 
the equality of sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international 
criminal tribunals which are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the 
international community.”462 
It further stated that it is in any case an established rule of international law, which 
confirms the irrelevance of immunities before international criminal courts, and that 
Article 6(2) of its Statute does not violate any jus cogens norms. On the basis of the 
above arguments, the SCSL held that there is no bar to the jurisdiction of the SCSL 
in relation to Taylor’s personal immunity. Finally, the SCSL concluded that since 
Taylor ceased to be a Head of State prior to this decision, “[t]he immunity ratione 
personae which he claimed had ceased to attach to him. Even if he had succeeded in 
his application the consequence would have been to compel the Prosecutor to issue 
a fresh warrant”.463 
The findings of the SCSL in line with the Yerodia case are hardly surprising. It was 
in the very interest of the SCSL to define itself as an international criminal court with 
all ‘the belongings’ necessary for denying the immunity. Were these findings actually 
correct?
7.1 Jurisdiction As a Precondition For Withdrawal of Immunity
Any immunity analysis is necessarily interconnected with establishing the 
jurisdiction of that particular judicial body in the first place. Logically, the question of 
jurisdiction must be decided first before considering the availability of any immunity. 
In other words, jurisdiction precedes immunity. 
The Statute of the SCSL provides the basis for jurisdiction in the Article 1 that states: 
The Special Court shall . . . have the power to prosecute persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone, since 30 November 
1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.
Originally, the previous version of the Security Council Resolution drafted 
by the US contained a  phrase that restricted jurisdiction only to ‘senior Sierra 
462 Ibid., para 51.
463 Ibid., para 59.
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Leone nationals’; this was later changed to encompass ‘those who bear the greatest 
responsibility’. Moreover, Taylor was accused of crimes committed within Sierra 
Leone rather than elsewhere.464 The SCSL primarily exercises jurisdiction over relevant 
crimes committed on the territory of Sierra Leone regardless of whether these crimes 
were committed by nationals or non-nationals. Accordingly, Charles Taylor can fit 
both in the category of ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ as well as in the 
category of crimes ‘committed in the territory of Sierra Leone’. 
Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the SCSL was clearly established, unlike in the 
Yerodia case, where the ICJ did not actually properly examine the jurisdiction of the 
Belgian court over Yerodia, but rather simply assumed. In this respect, there was no 
controversy. To conclude, despite the fact that the SCSL did not examine whether 
it has a  jurisdiction in order to proceed with addressing any exemption from such 
jurisdiction, its jurisdiction was not objectionable and was not actually disputed by 
the Defence counsel. As Akande has noted:
Although Liberia has instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), arguing that the indictment and arrest warrant issued against its Head of State 
do not respect the immunity that international law confers on heads of states, neither 
Liberia nor any other state appears to have argued that Sierra Leone is not able to 
delegate its criminal jurisdiction to an international court or that the Court is not 
entitled to exercise Sierra Leone’s territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals.465 
However, the possibility to exercise territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals is 
one thing, it is quite another to assert the jurisdiction over foreign national who is the 
serving Head of State. Chapter 7.2 therefore turns to the SCSL’s reasoning relating 
to immunities and subjects the Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction to a critical 
analysis.
464 The Yerodia case, supra note 28, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Guillame, para. 4: “The 
primary aim of the criminal law is to enable punishment in each country of offences 
committed in the national territory. That territory is where evidence of the offence can 
most often be gathered. That is where the offence generally produces its effects. Finally, 
that is where the punishment imposed can most naturally serve as an example. Thus, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice observed as far back as 1927 that “in all 
systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental””.
465 D. Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of 
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), 
p. 631.
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7.2 Analysis of the Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction: 
Addressing Immunities
It is well known that the decisions of the ICJ are binding only for the concrete case 
and only between the parties to the dispute. Still, the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia is 
relevant to other cases relating to immunities. Indeed, as Piotrowicz put it “the reality 
is that whatever it says, whether in the operative part of the judgment or not, is going 
to be scrutinized and used to support claims about the state of law.”466 That is exactly 
what happened in the Taylor case.467 
As illustrated above, the ICJ’s fourth scenario in the Yerodia case was used by both 
parties as well as by the SCSL. The Defence used it in order to demonstrate that the 
SCSL is not an international court and therefore not entitled to deny immunity to 
a serving Head of State. The Prosecution used it to prove that the SCSL is indeed 
a ‘certain international criminal court’ entitled to withdraw immunity from a serving 
Head of State. The SCSL approved the Prosecution’s arguments in this respect. Was 
that a correct conclusion? 
It is submitted that the immunity from jurisdiction may be claimed not only 
before national courts, but also before international courts, depending on the nature 
and extent of powers and attributes each court possesses. This possibility was entirely 
excluded by the SCSL, which understandably rather adopted the argumentation 
of amicus curiae that, “in respect of the jurisdictional immunities of serving heads 
of state both international law and practice has generally distinguished between 
proceedings before national and international courts. As regards the international 
courts and tribunals which have been established, practice has been consistent, in that 
no serving head of state has been recognized as being entitled to rely on jurisdictional 
immunities.”468 
This is all well, but to which consistent practice was the amicus curiae referring 
to? As indicated in Chapter 1, Taylor is only the second in history behind Slobodan 
Milosevic, and the first African Head of State to be indicted for crimes under 
international law at the international level. Furthermore, Taylor is the first Head 
466 Piotrowicz, supra note 257, p. 291.
467 It is of course important to note that the facts of the Yerodia case differ in many respects 
significantly in comparison with the Taylor case. The Yerodia case dealt with immunity of 
incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs before national courts as opposed to immunity 
of incumbent Head of State before international court. The ICJ’s primarily focus was on 
the practice before national courts. 
468 Sands, supra note 142.
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of State to be also convicted of crimes under international law since Karl Dönitz’s 
conviction at the Nuremberg Trials following the WWII. This ‘consistent’ practice is 
thus supported by example of an international court that actually never pronounced 
on the immunity of a serving Head of State, i.e. the ICTY with respect to indicting 
the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic.469 
7.2.1 Significance of the Phrase ‘Involvement of the International Community’
The central part of the SCSL’s decision for the purposes of denying the immunity 
to Taylor was the distinction between international and national courts. In his 
respect, the SCSL relied on ‘the involvement of a whole international community’ 
in the establishment of the SCSL in order to justify its categorisation as ‘certain 
international criminal tribunal’. The SCSL emphasized that it derives its mandate 
from the international community and therefore the principle of immunity based on 
the sovereign equality of States has no relevance before international criminal courts.
 
After establishing its international legal basis, the SCSL proceeded to emphasize the 
role of international community also in the context of the Agreement and its binding 
effects for all UN member States. The SCSL’s argued that the Agreement is actually 
an expression of the will of the international community, because in maintaining the 
international peace and security, the UN acts on behalf of all member states.470 
The issue of the Agreement and its binding effects for third parties was dealt with 
extensively in Chapter 4. Hence, it suffices to repeat that the UN possesses a separate 
legal personality. It is then rather disputable to assert, as the SCSL did, that simply by 
virtue of the fact that States are members of the UN, they are therefore parties to the 
Agreement and accordingly are bound by its provisions. As a general matter, member 
States are not bound by treaties concluded by the UN by the virtue of membership 
alone. 
To conclude, it is submitted that the undeniable involvement of the whole 
international community (i.e. the UN) is not a  sufficient criterion in order to 
determine whether the SCSL can ignore the immunities of the Head of State of 
a  country non-party to the Agreement. Either a  consent of the States (including 
469 At least to the knowledge of this author, there is no other example of what is referred to 
as a consistent practice.
470 See Orentlicher, supra 142, p.  12. Orentlicher stated that the Security Council by 
authorizing the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone was not 
only carrying out its responsibility to maintain peace and security, but “in doing so, it 
was acting on behalf of all Members of the United Nations.” 
133
7 The Taylor Case: Submissions of Parties and the SCSL Decision with Respect to Immunities
the affected State) to be bound by the Agreement or some form of the Chapter VII 
powers involvement of the Security Council would be needed. None of these grounds 
were clearly present in Taylor case, yet the SCSL “tried to find a ground for lifting the 
immunity by combining the two grounds for as far as they were present.”471 
7.2.2 Significance of the Phrase ‘Certain International Courts’ 
The ICJ in the Yerodia case confirmed the authority of a  suitably constituted 
international tribunal to issue an arrest warrant in respect of a serving or former Head 
of State. The phrase ‘certain international criminal courts,’ used by the ICJ, explicitly 
referred to the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC.472 The central issue is whether the SCSL can 
qualify as such a ‘certain international criminal court’, which is capable of derogating 
from the principle of immunity.
With regard to the absence of the SCSL in the list of certain international courts 
mentioned by the ICJ, two observations can be advanced. Firstly, it is important to 
note – as a matter of chronology - that the SCSL was not established at the time of the 
ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case. The ICJ delivered its decision on 14 February 2002. 
It is therefore understandable that it does not mention the SCSL as another example 
of ‘certain international courts’. The Agreement establishing the SCSL was concluded 
only a few weeks before and had not been implemented at that stage.473 Secondly, as 
already set out above, the concerned paragraph was merely obiter dicta, referring to 
possible examples rather than representing an exhaustive list.
Still, there are crucial differences between the SCSL, on the one hand, and the 
ICTY, ICTR and the ICC on the other hand. All international courts cited by the ICJ 
(i.e. ICTY, ICTR and ICC) bind more than one State. All members of the UN are 
obliged to cooperate with both the ICTY and ICTR by virtue of their establishment 
under Chapter VII powers, including arrests and surrendering of any alleged 
perpetrators including Heads of States who are within their jurisdiction.474 As was 
clearly established in the Part II, the SCSL, unlike both ad hoc tribunals, does not 
possess Chapter VII powers. 
The third court mentioned by the ICJ was the permanent court – the ICC. Since 
the ICC is a  treaty-based court similar to the SCSL, it can actually serve as a very 
useful example for illustrating why the SCSL in the Taylor decision ‘got it wrong’. 
471 Nouwen, supra note 98 p. 657. 
472 The Yerodia case, supra note 28, para. 61.
473 Robertson, supra note 250. 
474 Ibid.
HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
134
The SCSL was established by bilateral treaty between the UN and the Government of 
Sierra Leone. The ICC was also established by international treaty, a multilateral one. 
States parties to this multilateral treaty agreed to deny any potential immunity to their 
high-ranking officials including the Head of State in case they commit certain crimes 
under international law. 
Even though the Rome Statute establishing the ICC binds more than one State, it 
cannot bind those States not parties to the treaty without else. It is a well-established 
principle that a treaty can create neither obligations nor rights for third parties without 
their consent (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).475 This is reflected in Article 98, 
which states: “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person 
or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity.” 
In the light of the above, it is clear that the ICC can also come under the pressure of 
how to proceed in the case of immunity invoked by the Head of State of a non-party to 
the treaty. As summarized by Romano and Nollkaemper: “While the Statute of the ICC 
denies immunity to Heads of State, in principle, it cannot affect the immunity of Heads 
of States of non parties. States that are parties to the Statute would violate international 
law if they hand over a Head of State of a non-party to the ICC.”476 In applying the 
above findings regarding the ICC to the similar context of the SCSL, it can be argued 
that States not parties to the Agreement establishing the SCSL cannot arrest and/or 
extradite an incumbent President to the SCSL without some further authority.477
If an international organization, in this case the UN and a State, in this case Sierra 
Leone, decide to establish an international criminal court by bilateral agreement, its 
classification as an international criminal court does not automatically mean that 
a  state official of another country has no immunity from prosecution before that 
body. Were that the case, it would arguably be an easy way to get around international 
obligations.478 It might be argued that what Sierra Leone could not have done 
unilaterally, it cannot do by participating in the creation of an international court. 
475 See also Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reads: “A treaty 
binds the parties and only the parties; it does not create obligations for a  third State 
without its consent”.
476 Nollkaemper and Romano, supra note 12. 
477 Ibid.
478 Nouwen, supra note 98.
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In sum, while the jurisdiction (which precedes immunity) of the SCSL was 
established, the possibility to disrespect personal immunity of serving Head of State 
of another country merely on the international legal basis of the SCSL is disputed. 
Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute, which is a  crucial provision for the purposes 
of immunities, is taken verbatim from Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute. These 
provisions were interpreted as relating ‘only’ to immunity ratione materiae. Even 
if a more extensive interpretation of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes is accepted, the 
important difference is that the ad hoc tribunals were established by Resolution under 
Chapter VII as opposed to the SCSL, which was established by a bilateral agreement. 
It is therefore submitted that (1) the SCSL cannot oppose the provision denying 
personal immunity in its Statute towards a sitting head of a third state, i.e. Liberia; 
(2) Even if it could deny immunity to a  Head of State of another country, such 
a broad interpretation of Article 6(2) would only be valid if the rule denying personal 
immunity reflects customary international law, as has already been established for the 
rule on criminal responsibility; (3) If the SCSL would not be able to establish such 
a rule, a provision similar to that contained in Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute is 
then argued to be necessary.479 The next, final Chapter will suggest a more cautious 
way forward with respect to two kinds of immunities available to a Head of State.
479 Ibid.
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8.1 Denying Personal Immunity to Charles Taylor? 
The fundamental question for our purposes is whether all immunities are irrelevant 
before any court that may be characterized as ‘international’. As shown by State 
practice (including national case law), Statutes of international criminal courts, 
international case law and scholarly opinions, not all immunities before all courts can 
be overcome even for prosecution of crimes under international law.480 
This proposition was also confirmed by the ICJ in Yerodia, which proved to be 
central for analysis of the Taylor case. Both Yerodia and Taylor were incumbent state 
officials at the time of the issuance of arrest warrants; therefore they invoked immunity 
ratione personae. Immunity ratione personae applies irrespective of the nature of the 
acts committed, it is so called absolute immunity. The underlying justification for 
immunity ratione personae is the functional necessity argument, i.e. in order to carry 
out its functions smoothly; the state official (representing a State itself ) needs to be 
protected from any external interventions. Denial of this kind of immunity could be 
said to negatively affect the fulfilment of the functions of the state official.481 
Courts and scholars recognize this immunity not as ‘merely a relic of the personal 
sovereignty of the ruler.’482 Indeed, immunity ratione personae constitutes a general 
rule of customary international law.483 It has therefore relevance not only before 
domestic courts, but also before international tribunals “unless the status and nature 
of the international court justifies a different conclusion”.484 Any exception to this 
 
 
480 Racsmany, supra note 179.
481 Nouwen, supra note 98.
482 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 265; see also the Yerodia case, supra note 28, para. 53. 
483 Cassese, supra note 97.
484 Racsmany, supra note 179, p. 314.
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general rule, which remains so far fully applicable before domestic courts,485 must be 
legally justified in the case of international courts.486 
As was shown in Chapter 6.4, both ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC 
provides for this exception. The legal basis for this exception is either a  Security 
Council Chapter VII resolution or an international treaty. Moreover, even if there 
is an explicit exception in the form of waiver of immunity by States parties to the 
treaty, that immunity arguably applies only to contracting parties. A  summary by 
a leading commentator well defines the position of the SCSL in relation to denial of 
immunities to a serving Head of State of another country: 
[T]he possibility of relying on international law immunities to avoid prosecutions by 
international tribunals depends on the nature of the tribunal: how it was established 
and whether the State of the official sought to be tried is bound by the instrument 
establishing the tribunal. In this regard, there is a distinction between those tribunals 
established by Security Council Resolution (i.e. the ICTY and ICTR) and those 
established by treaty. Because of the universal membership of the UN and because 
decisions of the Council are binding on all UN members, the provisions of the 
Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR are capable of removing immunity with respect 
to practically all states. On the other hand, since treaties are only binding on the 
parties, a treaty establishing an international tribunal is not capable of removing an 
immunity which international law grants to officials of States that are not party to 
the treaty. These immunities are rights belonging to the non-party States and those 
States may not be deprived of their rights by a treaty to which they are not party.487
Lasting entitlement to immunities ratione personae granted by customary international 
law to incumbent Head of States of non-state parties to the ICC Statute seems to be 
the best reflection of the current state of law on immunities. Hence, it is submitted that 
the agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN establishing the SCSL can not take 
away from the incumbent President of another country the immunity rationae persone 
granted under customary international law without more (e.g. the consent of Liberia). 
It is submitted that the SCSL’s interpretation of the Yerodia case led to an incorrect 
conclusion about immunity ratione personae of an incumbent Head of State. The 
SCSL’s decision neither adequately interpreted nor usefully applied the criterion of 
‘certain international courts’. This decision was more of a declaration than the result 
of a well-considered judicial deliberation. 
485 See confirmation of immunity ratione personae by all national courts so far, Chapter 6.
486 Racsmany, supra note 179.
487 Akande, quoted in Sands, supra note 97, p. 28 (emphasis added).
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Admittedly, the SCSL was not in an easy position as its legal basis and any 
obligations under international law are complicated by the hybrid nature of that body. 
Still, as restrictive as it may be, it is proposed that the SCSL should have confirmed 
the immunity ratione personae enjoyed by Taylor while in office.488 
8.2 Another Route to Proceed: Functional Immunity 
The legal assessment relating to withdrawal of personal immunities in Taylor 
has been, as also noted by Cryer, “accepted by some489 and doubted by many.”490 
Nevertheless, there was another route for the SCSL to take in order to be legally 
consistent with the current state of law on immunities and at the same time to address 
the responsibility of Taylor for international crimes. The SCSL already anticipated 
this holding at the end of its decision in the Taylor case, “…it is apt to observe that 
the Applicant had at the time the Preliminary Motion was heard ceased to be a Head 
of State. The immunity ratione personae, which he claimed, had ceased to attach to 
him. Even if he had succeeded in his application the consequence would have been to 
compel the Prosecutor to issue a fresh warrant”.491
Due to the different rationales for the two kinds of immunity international law 
recognizes that once a  state official is out of office there is no longer a  need for 
absolute immunity since he or she is no longer representing a State as such. It follows 
that the only immunity, which Taylor would be left with after he stepped down from 
488 As submitted by Wirth: “Whereas some precedents could be interpreted as . . . allowing 
prosecutions even against persons protected by immunity ratione personae, it remains 
doubtful whether these precedents are in accordance with the hierarchy of values 
recognized by modern international law. The highest of these values is the maintenance 
of peace, and immunity ratione personae, protecting the most important representatives 
and decision-makers of a state, helps to safeguard the ability of a state to contribute to 
the maintenance of international and internal peace. In fact, in a situation where the 
highest functionaries of a state were arrested or otherwise seriously constrained in the 
exercise of their functions by a foreign state, the risk of war would be obvious.” Wirth, 
supra note 316, p. 888. In contrast, Kleffner argues that: “is it not as obvious as suggested 
that granting immunity to those who are likely to be most responsible . . . is unsettling 
orderly international relations any less than hampering the conduct of a State on the 
international plane. After all, these crimes are recognized by the international community 
to ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’.” In J. K. Kleffner, ‘The 
Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International 
Criminal Law’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86 (2003), p. 105. 
489 Gaeta, supra note 38.
490 Racsmany, supra note 179; Koller, supra note 256. See Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 551. 
491 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 27, para. 59.
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the Presidency, is immunity ratione materiae. This brings us back to the distinction 
between private and official acts. 
 
The Indictment stated that Taylor’s support of the rebels in Sierra Leone was 
motivated by the desire to obtain access to the mineral wealth (in particular the 
diamond wealth) of Sierra Leone.492 The SCSL inquired during the proceedings 
whether acts so motivated are, acts in an official capacity. Interestingly, the Prosecutor 
replied that Taylor is charged in his private capacity, in which ‘he embarked on 
a common aim with others to steal diamonds and begin a war to that end.’493 The 
Prosecutor further stated that functional immunity could not apply and that Taylor 
was not acting as Head of State but privately through agents in Sierra Leone. 
Even though one may accept that one of the Taylor’s motives or wishes was to 
increase his private wealth through obtaining control over Sierra Leone’s diamond 
resources, it is hard to maintain that Taylor committed the alleged war crimes and 
crimes against humanity solely in a ‘private capacity’.494 Indeed, he has been accused 
of using his powerful position in Liberia and the region for aiding and abetting in 
(and profiting from) the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. 
492 Specific charges contained in the indictment against Charles Taylor are (1) Violations of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II including 
acts of terrorism; collective punishments; violence to life, health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons, in particular murder; outrages upon personal dignity; violence to life, 
health and physical or mental well-being of persons. (2) Crimes against humanity including 
extermination; murder; rape; sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence; other 
inhumane acts. (3) Other serious violations of international humanitarian law including 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, 
or using them to participate actively in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks against 
personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission. See Prosecutor v. 
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003. 
493 See Response by Desmond de Silva, QC for the Prosecution, Report on Proceedings 
before the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (1 November 
2003), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/
ReportAppealHearings01NOV03.html (last visited 27 April 2012). The author of this 
work conducted questioning of several scholars and practitioners, with answers to the 
examined question going both ways. For example the response to the question whether 
Taylor is prosecuted for crimes committed in private or official capacity by David Crane 
(who acted as the Chief Prosecutor in the Taylor case) was “for both” (i.e. for abuse of the 
state power and for his private criminal enterprise). The indictment nevertheless alleged 
that Taylor committed the crimes alleged “rather in a private capacity”. 
494 In this respect, Barker noted that denying the official character of such crimes “is to fly 
in the face of reality”. Barker, supra note 337, p. 943.
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The better explanation, which was already presented in Chapter 5 dealing with 
distinction between official and private acts, would be that international crimes could 
be indeed committed in an official capacity. This is however not to say that they qualify 
as official acts to be accordingly covered by functional immunity. The State sovereignty 
inspiring the immunity ratione materiae cannot prevail in cases of prosecution of 
international crimes, because international law at the same time establishes individual 
criminal responsibility for those crimes.495 Importantly, the Defence in the Taylor case 
explicitly recognized and accepted this by stating that Taylor’s entitlement to enjoy 
“functional immunity [is] subject to one exception, namely in the case of perpetration 
of international crimes.”496 
By correctly applying the law as it currently stands, both sets of requirements could 
have been protected in a more balanced way. With these arguments, we can move to 
conclude that the SCSL should confirm Taylor’s immunity ratione personae at the 
time of his initial indictment while recognizing that he would not enjoy exemption 
on the basis of immunity ratione materiae from the SCSL’s jurisdiction, should a new 
indictment be issued. 
495 Nouwen, supra note 98. See also Chapter 5.4.2, fn. 312.
496 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Applicants Reply to Prosecution Response to Applicants Motion, 
p. 4, 30 July 2003. 
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Concluding Remarks for the Taylor Case
In the past, the scope of immunities was rarely tested. In recent years, states 
became active in this area, as illustrated in Chapter 1 by list of various cases of high-
ranking officials reaching both national and international courts.497 As a consequence, 
“this emboldened State practice has brought to the fore many hidden or unresolved 
questions as to the boundaries between principles of accountability and immunity.”498 
The Taylor case clearly illustrated some of these unresolved questions (e.g. impact of 
a hybrid nature of the SCSL on immunity) and a collision of the two competing interests 
in contemporary international law: the growing need for international accountability 
for crimes under international law and a system of immunities deriving its origins, as 
most often claimed, from the principle of sovereign equality of States. Which interest 
should prevail? It will be always difficult to reach a proper balance between the two. 
There is little doubt that Taylor case before the SCSL could have presented an 
opportunity to elaborate on the current state of law on immunities and to clarify or 
justify different approaches taken by national and international courts on which the 
SCSL relied. Has it done so, or has it perhaps wasted an opportunity? 
The central issue of this work was whether Taylor, as President of Liberia at the 
time of issuance of the indictment, was entitled to claim immunity before the SCSL 
in light of the fact that the SCSL had been established by a bilateral treaty between the 
UN and Sierra Leone, to which Liberia was not a party. This legal issue is important 
also from the practical perspective for similar cases that may arise, or has already 
arisen, before other courts. The topicality of this issue can be especially seen in the 
increased activities of the first permanent criminal court - the ICC. 
Similar questions in the context of immunities of third states not parties to the 
Rome Statute have already appeared before the ICC. Even when there is a referral of 
497 See Chapter 1.1.
498 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 531.
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the situation by the UN Security Council, as is the case with the current President of 
Sudan, Al-Bashir, some authors argue that there must be explicit removal of immunity 
in the respective Resolution adopted under Chapter VII powers in order to deny 
immunity ratione personae to a serving President of a State which is not a party to the 
Rome Statute.499 The aim of this work was also to contribute to the discussion on the 
emergence of various aspects of procedure in this area. 
Part II of this work focused on identifying the legal basis and manner of the 
establishment of the SCSL, which had important implications for the nature and 
extent of immunity. Part III revealed the close interconnection between the legal basis 
and the issue of withdrawal of immunity for incumbent Heads of State. It was argued 
that the SCSL did not fully take account of its special legal basis. By ignoring its 
bilateral treaty nature, the SCSL failed to properly assess what are the implications of 
its legal basis for the rules of international law on incumbent Head of State immunity. 
Since the SCSL, inspired by the ICJ reasoning in the Yerodia case, connected the 
issue of denying the immunity to Taylor with the international legal basis of the 
SCSL, it came as no surprise that the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL determined 
that the SCSL is indeed an international criminal court. As the consequence of its 
international legal basis, the SCSL held that it can invoke Article 6 (2) of its Statute 
in order to deny personal immunity to Taylor. 
While this work approved the international legal basis of the SCSL, the legal reasoning 
on the basis of which the SCSL arrived at the conclusion was found disputable. Moreover, 
the consequences it attached to its legal basis from the immunity perspective were subject 
to criticism and found to be incorrect. More elaborate reasoning and judicial clarification 
of contentious issues were needed, bearing in mind that until the establishment of the 
SCSL, it had never been considered that the legal basis of an international criminal court 
could be an agreement between the UN and one or more States. 
The considerable attention given to the binding effects of Resolution 1315 was 
justified by the fact that the SCSL attempted to establish its international legal basis 
under Chapter VII powers. It seems that the SCSL was trying to ‘cure’ the shortcomings 
of a merely bilateral agreement by trying to imply binding effects of Resolution 1315 
in order to justify the denial of immunity of a Head of State of another country. If the 
SCSL could indeed prove its legal basis under Chapter VII powers, it would have had 
important implications for immunity afforded by contemporary international law to 
serving Heads of State. 
499 Nouwen, supra note 98. 
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This argument is supported by the approach adopted by the ICTY with respect 
to Article 7 (2) of its Statute. This provision arguably relates only to the fact that the 
accused cannot claim its official position as a  substantial defence, which would in 
turn mean that there is criminal responsibility for such acts (in that sense Article 7 (2) 
removes immunity ratione materiae); however for so long as the Head of State is in 
power, there is a procedural bar to the exercise of jurisdiction over these acts (in that 
sense Article 7(2) preserves immunity ratione personae).
Nevertheless, the ICTY implicitly interpreted Article 7(2) not only as the 
attribution of criminal responsibility but also as referring to immunity ratione 
personae. Even if such a broad interpretation would be accepted, the crucial difference 
is that the ICTY was established by Resolution under Chapter VII as opposed to the 
SCSL, which was established by a bilateral agreement. It follows that the ICTY could 
be perhaps more relaxed by adopting a  rather flexible interpretation of its Statute 
with Chapter VII backing, which allows to affect the rights of all member States, 
even against their will or without their consent. While it is true that Article 6(2) of 
the SCSL Statute is taken verbatim from Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute, the SCSL 
was not in the position to interpret this provision as affecting rights of thirds parties, 
as opposed to the ICTY. 
Resolution 1315, which recommended the establishment of the SCSL, was 
not adopted under Chapter VII powers despite the attempt of the SCSL to prove 
otherwise. Moreover, the SCSL was not even established by any SC Resolution (in 
contrast to the ICTY and ICTR). The SCSL was established by a bilateral agreement 
pursuant to Resolution 1315. It is therefore not possible to imply binding effects of 
Resolution 1315 for the purposes of denying immunity to high-ranking state officials 
as was in the case of the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL should 
instead direct its attention to the Agreement establishing the SCSL, whose binding 
effects for third parties were harder to prove. 
Moreover, it is surprising that despite the attempt to establish its international 
legal basis under Chapter VII powers, the SCSL has not subsequently relied on this 
argument for purposes of denying immunity ratione persoane to Taylor. The SCSL 
rather focused its attention to the distinction between national and international 
criminal courts made by the ICJ in the Yerodia case.500 
By attempting to fit itself into a category of ‘certain international criminal courts’, 
a phrase used by the ICJ in the Yerodia case, the SCSL limited its legal argumentation 
500 Frulli, supra note 66.
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to the finding that it is indeed an international court with powers to deny immunity 
to serving Heads of State. Yet, the mere fact that the legal basis of a certain judicial 
body is characterized as international does not automatically mean that any Head of 
State should be denied immunity before such a court. 
Not all immunities are irrelevant before any court that may be characterized as 
‘international’. A claim to immunity is indeed to be treated differently not only before 
national courts as opposed to international courts, but, importantly for our purposes, 
also before some international courts as opposed to other international courts. Similarly, 
Schabas notes that there may be “various types of international tribunal, and that rules 
of immunity apply differently depending upon the type of tribunal.”501 The SCSL 
in Taylor, as well as the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Al Bashir, was therefore wrong 
to submit that for the purposes of proceedings before international courts, there is 
a general exception to Head of State immunity.502 
Clearly, the approach of the court depends also on the kind of immunity the state 
official may invoke. As for the immunity ratione personae, this immunity constitutes 
a general rule of customary international law and is therefore relevant not only before 
domestic courts, but also before international courts “unless the status and nature 
of the international court justifies a different conclusion”.503 Any exception to this 
general rule, which remains so far applicable before domestic courts, must be legally 
justified in the case of international courts.504
The proposition that immunities ratione personae do not apply before international 
tribunals depends on the manner of the court’s establishment as well as identification 
of the exact legal basis for denying immunity. In addition, the establishing instrument 
(which should include explicit provision on denial of personal immunities) of the 
court must bind the concerned state.505 
As was shown in Chapter 6, both ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC provide for 
the exception to the general rule. The legal basis for this exception is either a Security 
501 W. Schabas, ‘Obama, Medvedev and Hu Jintao may be Prosecuted by International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber Concludes’, 15 December 2011, available at http://
humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.cz/2011/12/obama-medvedev-and-hu-jintao-may-be.
html (last visited 16 August 2012).
502 See also Akande, supra note 37.
503 Cassese, supra note 97.
504 Ibid.
505 Akande, supra note 108.
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Council Chapter VII Resolution or an international treaty. Moreover, even if there is 
an explicit exception to immunity to which states agreed by becoming a party to the 
ICC Rome Statute, it applies only to contracting parties.
Lasting entitlement to immunities ratione personae granted by customary 
international law to incumbent Heads of State of non-state parties before the ICC 
seems to be the best reflection of the current state of law on immunities.506 By analogy, 
the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN establishing the SCSL cannot, 
without more or of itself, take away from the incumbent President of another country 
the immunity rationae personae granted under customary international law. 
In sum, neither the Agreement, nor the Statute of the SCSL should be made 
opposable towards Liberia for the purposes of denying immunity ratione personae. Even 
if they were, an additional argument can be raised, i.e. that Article 6 (2) fails to explicitly 
address immunity ratione personae. Furthermore, as already mentioned above, the SCSL 
is not in the same position as the ICTY with respect to Chapter VII powers, which 
could arguably justify the broad interpretation of the Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute. 
Despite the fact that the following conclusion may appear too restrictive, it is 
proposed that, under given circumstances, the SCSL should have confirmed the 
immunities ratione personae enjoyed by Taylor while in office as this approach best 
reflects the current state practise. 
Nevertheless, there was another route for the SCSL to take in order to be legally 
consistent with the current state of law on immunities and at the same time address the 
alleged responsibility of Taylor for international crimes. International law recognizes 
that once a state official is out of office there is no longer a need for absolute immunity 
since he or she is no longer representing a State as such. The only protection, which 
remains, is for acts committed in an official capacity. It follows that the only immunity 
that Taylor could invoke while out of office is immunity ratione materiae, which is 
based on different rationale than immunity ratione personae. 
On the one hand, there is an immunity ratione personae granted to state 
officials irrespective of the nature of the acts. It can thus be invoked, one may add 
unfortunately, even in the case of international crimes. On the other hand, immunity 
ratione materiae is precisely concerned with the nature of the acts. It applies only to 
acts which can be qualified as official acts. At the same time, international criminal 
law establishes individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. Therefore, 
506 Ibid.
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there cannot simultaneously coexist both individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes and immunity ratione materiae for international crimes, even if 
these crimes were committed in an official capacity, or to be more precise, in the abuse 
of official capacity. 
While it was found that the SCSL was not authorized to set aside immunity ratione 
personae, it could later on declare immunity ratione materiae as incompatible with 
international crimes (this justification is not possible with regard to immunity ratione 
personae). National case law507 together with international case law and relevant 
international instruments, many of which can be seen as a reflection of State practice 
and/or opinion juris, indicate that there exists a  rule of customary international 
law removing immunity ratione materiae in the context of international cimes.508 
Importantly for our purposes, this was also recognized by the Defence in the Taylor 
case when stating that Taylor’s entitlement to enjoy “functional immunity [is] subject 
to one exception namely in the case of perpetration of international crimes.”509 
By correctly applying the norms forming the current international law, both sets 
of requirements could have been protected in a more balanced way. In addition, the 
SCSL would not risk loosing some of its credibility. Based on the above, we can 
conclude that the SCSL should confirm Taylor’s immunity ratione personae at the 
time of his initial indictment while recognizing that he would not enjoy exemption 
on the basis of immunity ratione materiae from the SCSL’s jurisdiction should a new 
indictment be issued. 
Some argue that the manner in which the SCSL was established was completely 
unrelated to the issue of immunity: instead, the initial desire was to separate the 
proceedings from domestic criminal law and the legal system of Sierra Leone.510 This 
may well be so. It can even explain some of the difficulties with which the SCSL was 
confronted. Unfortunately, it does not justify in some respects unfounded reasoning 
of the SCSL in the Taylor case. 
Any constitutive instruments of international criminal tribunals should preferably 
anticipate problems and try to address principal issues such as jurisdiction and 
immunities beforehand in order to avoid the uncertainty, which often makes the 
507 See Chapter 6, see also fn. 312.
508 Ibid.
509 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Applicants Reply to Prosecution Response to Applicants Motion, 
30 July 2003, p. 4. 
510 Chatham House, supra note 14.
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court adopt too creative reasoning, which is hard to justify even by employing 
a teleological interpretation of certain provisions. This is surely a lesson to be learned 
for establishing a similar forum for the prosecution of international crimes elsewhere. 
9.2 Rethinking Immunity? Old Doctrines Die Hard
Laws are like the spider’s webs: they stand firm when any light and yielding object 
falls upon them, while a larger thing breaks through them and makes off.511 
By way of a more general conclusion, some of the following remarks are admittedly 
departing from the current law into the realm of what might be termed “wishful legal 
thinking”,512 to trends in international law pointing towards recognition of the rights 
of victims of international crimes, even if punishing the highest representative of the 
State can threaten the norm of sovereignty.513 
State sovereignty, in Kofi Annan’s view, is being redefined and “States are now 
widely understood to be instrument at the service of their peoples, and not vice 
versa... When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its 
aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”514 
For Kofi Annan, “sovereignty is not becoming less relevant; it remains the ordering 
principle of international affairs. However, it is “the peoples’ sovereignty rather than 
the sovereign’s sovereignty.’”515 
The highest State representatives should be held to the very highest standards of 
international law, not the lowest.516 In past, the respect for the ‘dignity’ of the Head 
of State has been considered as traditional rationale for precluding accountability, as 
511 Solon c. 630- 560 B.C., quoted from ‘Philosophy and Catholic Christian’, Diocesan 
Circular (September 2007), p.  2, available at http://www.anglicancatholic.ca/diocirc/
200709circ.pdf (last visited 26 June 2008).
512 R. Piotrowicz, supra note 257, quoted from K. Hailbronner, ‘Non-Refoulement and 
“Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking’, 26 
Virginia Journal of International Law 857 (1986), p. 872.
513 See Cassese arguing that: “One still has to strive to replace the Westphalian model of 
international society, geared to reciprocity and largely based on mutual respect among 
sovereign states, with the Kantian model, which hinges on a  set of universal values 
transcending the immediate interests of each state, and which therefore moves pride of 
place to community interests.” Cassese, supra note 12, p. 1.
514 K. Annan, The Economist, 1999. 
515 E. Larking, ‘Human rights and the principle of sovereignty: a dangerous conflict at the 
heart of the nation state?’, Australian Journal of Human Rights 15 (2004). 
516 Ibid.
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stated also by the ICJ in the Schooner Exchange case.517 With the recognition of the 
weight of the human rights paradigm, this reason carries less weight nowadays518 and 
dignity is not considered as a compelling reason to prevent a priori accountability for 
international crimes.519 One may argue that there is no need for ‘respect’ or ‘dignity’ 
of the Head of State who suppresses its own people and abuses its official capacity in 
order to engage in commission of worse crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.520
Accordingly, “the moral and legal weight behind individual accountability for 
international crimes regardless of official capacity” was considered by the Commission 
on Human Rights of the Philippines to be “of such substance that it mandates an 
evaluation of the trade-offs involved in accepting the risks of impunity in order 
to preserve comity.”521 Similarly, the ILC recently emphasized that immunity and 
sovereignty should no longer be regarded as mutually exclusive.522
In fact, the notion and scope of sovereignty is increasingly being challenged in 
many inter-related areas.523 All these developments can be viewed as an expression of 
a “struggle between international law as primarily state and sovereignty based regime 
and international law reaching beyond the state and defining justice by taking into 
account not only the interests of the sovereign state, but also the individual human 
being.”524 The status of Head of State immunity is certainly one of the parts of this 
struggle. 
More than ten years ago, the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction Study 
stated that in the future “procedural immunities for sitting heads of state, diplomats, 
517 See Schooner Exchange v. M’Fadden 11 US 116 (2812).
518 See Robertson, supra note 250.
519 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 537. 
520 Sands, supra note 142.
521 Philippine Statute on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Serious International Crimes, Comment on House Bill No. 4998 (22 June 2006), 
available at http://www.chr.gov.ph/MAIN%20PAGES/about%20hr/position%20
papers/abthr_pos066-067.htm. (last visited 23 August 2007).
522 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, International Law Commissi-
on, A/CN.4/SR.3165, 25 September 2013, p. 3.
523 See e.g. the emergence of the concept of The Responsibility to Protect, Report of The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, available at http://
www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last visited 5 May 2011).
524 J. Bröhmer, ‘Immunity of a Former Head of State General Pinochet and the House of 
Lords: Part Three’, Leiden Journal of International Law 13 (2000), p. 234. 
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and other officials may be called increasingly into question, a possibility prefigured by 
the ICTY’s indictment of Slobodan Milosevic while still a sitting head of state. Whether 
this unprecedented action will become the source of a new regime in international law 
remains to be seen.”525 Since then, there have been many developments in this area, 
including indictments against Taylor or Al-Bashir. 
At the same time, it is clear that moral rather than legal arguments can be found 
in support of the reduction of immunity ratione personae before domestic courts so 
far. Indeed, old doctrines die hard.526 States fear that by rejecting immunity, domestic 
courts could be overloaded with cases brought against Heads of State by former 
victims, human rights organizations, or anyone with a ‘cause’.527 Another fear is that 
prosecutions can be abused for political purposes or that they can lead to instability or 
even armed conflict between states.528 Admittedly, these fears are real. State practice 
that opposes removal of personal immunity is significant and cannot be simply 
reconceptualised. 
This is illustrated also in the very recent work of the ILC (as of 2013), which 
currently focuses on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. 
The Drafting Committee of the ILC adopted Articles on immunity of State officials, 
which so far deal only with immunity ratione personae. Draft Article 3 confirms 
the still strong position of personal immunities before domestic courts of other 
states by providing that: “Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity ratione personae from the exercise of foreign criminal 
jurisdiction.”529 
In general, the scope of immunities is being increasingly contested, but it is still 
far from settled. Further evolution of State practice is needed before a straightforward 
consensus may emerge, especially before domestic courts.530 On the one hand, there 
is a visible shift in favor of justice and accountability. On the other hand, to suppose 
that international criminal law has simply superseded international law immunities 
would be an oversimplification of the complex interplay of these two areas.531 
525 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 10, p. 51.
526 Robertson, supra note 250.
527 Philippine Statute on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Serious International Crimes, supra note 521.
528 Ibid.
529 Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, International Law 
Commission, A/CN.4/SR.3174, 2 August 2013, p. 3.
530 Racsmany, supra note 179.
531 Cryer et al., supra note 13, p. 531. 
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The rules emerging from interplay of these two areas have been often described 
as confusing, inconsistent or ambivalent.532 However, if one applies the generally 
accepted dichotomy used in this work, i.e. personal versus functional immunity 
before domestic versus international courts, it becomes clear that while there have 
been “inroads into functional immunity” even before domestic courts, personal 
immunities proved to be more resistant and so far remain intact.533 Of course, this 
current balance may change over time together with shifting priorities and may lead 
to further development of international law in this area.
532 See e.g. R. Van Alebeek, ‘The Pinochet case: International Human Rights Law on Trial’, 
71 British Yearbook of International Law 29 (2001), p. 47; Warbrick, McGoldrick, Barker, 
supra note 337, p. 938. Cryer et al., supra note 13, pp. 532-533.
533 Ibid., p. 545.
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Abstrakt: Práce se zaměřuje na střet dvou zájmů v soudobém mezinárodním právu 
veřejném, tj. na vzrůstající tendenci potrestat pachatele zločinů podle mezinárodního 
práva a zároveň na možnost vysokých státních představitelů nárokovat za své jednání 
imunitu. Cílem práce je poukázat na to, jaký vliv má způsob založení soudu na do-
stupnost imunity ratione personae a ratione materiae, což je konkrétně ilustrováno 
na případu bývalého liberijského prezidenta Charlese Taylora před Zvláštním soudem 
pro Sierru Leone.
Klíčová slova: imunita hlavy státu, imunita ratione materiae, imunita ratione perso-
nae, mezinárodní trestní soudy a  tribunály, smíšené (hybridní) trestní soudy, mezi-
národní trestní právo, zločiny podle mezinárodního práva, Zvláštní soud pro Sierru 
Leone, bývalý prezident Libérie Charles Taylor, Mezinárodní trestní soud (případ 
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Abstract: This work focuses on the case of former Liberian President Charles Taylor 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Taylor case well demonstrates colli-
sion of the two interests in contemporary international law: the growing need for 
international accountability for crimes under international law and a system of im-
munities. The aim of this work is to illustrate how the legal basis of the court may 
affect availability of immunity ratione personae and ratione materiae. 
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